Post-Soviet Transformation

Have there been changes in political institutions, parties, leaders, and regional political orientations in Ukraine after the "Orange Revolution"? If so, are the changes revolutionary or evolutionary? Most previous studies refer to the 2004 presidential elections and mass protest actions as a revolution. To test this claim, this article analyzes political changes in Ukraine. Survey data are used to compare changes in pro-Russian and pro-Western orientation, support for major parties in the 2002, 2006, and 2007 parliamentary elections, and support for leading presidential candidates since the 2004 presidential elections. The implications of these changes for development of democracy in Ukraine are also considered.

This study examines democratic orientations and their determinants in post-Orange Ukraine from the perspective of a political culture theory. The research question is, to what extent is political culture in Ukraine supportive of democracy. This paper uses data from different waves of the Pew Global Attitudes surveys, the World Values Surveys, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems surveys to examine public views towards democracy in Ukraine. The paper compares democratic values in Ukraine with those in Poland and Russia, two similar post-communist countries with differing political cultures and divergent trajectories of democratization. It also examines changes in the levels of pro-democratic attitudes in post-Orange Ukraine compared to the Orange and pre-Orange periods. Finally, this study implements multiple regression analysis of the determinants of democratic attitudes. The analysis shows limited effects of historical democratic legacies and Catholicism on pro-democracy views. With some exceptions, adherents of major parties do not differ significantly in terms of their degree of support for democracy. This study suggests that partially democratic and partially authoritarian political culture impedes the future prospects for consolidated democracy in Ukraine.

"Analyzing the questions of political leadership in the period between the year  1989 and 2009, it is essential to indicate the aims and stages of the series of changes and, expressed mainly by the level the political elites’ development and parliamentary elections. After 1989, a total collapse of the Soviet ideological monopoly has taken place, not only in Moldova, but also in other socialist countries, therefore shaping a new set of rules  governing the political life and leadership. Changes of the system that have taken place in the Republic of Moldova should be treated as a result of the following factors: the formation of the independence movement and the National Front, and  the global and logistics support of the international institutions to strengthen the statehood and the social affirmation in the country.
Since its independence, the Republic of Moldova, witnesses an ongoing struggle for shaping the state  regime and the future model of political leadership.  Years 1991-2009 have become a visible example of a leadership characterized as authoritarian and autocratic. Political elites were characterized as  "disabled" in relation to the role of Russia in the region. This condition has still been observed , despite many reforms that have been introduced. The institution of political leadership in the Republic of Moldova in 1989-2009 was deprived of social authority, which in turn made the country's political system a non-consolidated one.
"

Internally polarized counter-elites, that are often involved in corporate interests, do not have enough power to oppose the negative manifestations of economic transformation. In the countries of the South Caucasus, there are two types of business elites, the internal and the external ones, which "grew up" from the economic transformation. The external elites result from the privatization process, in which primarily Russians and Kazakhs are engaged. Concerning  their interests in the region, they are lobbying the decision-making processes, while the local elites create the aforementioned mentioned "representative system." The wealth factor is therefore the way to exercise  power. The research on  business elites remains a discursive issue, which seems to be an endless subject to develop . its analysis  opens a broad discussion on the methodology of the study of elites, both in terms of their mechanisms and characteristics, as well as the theory itself.

After 1989, a total collapse of the Soviet ideological monopoly has taken place, not only in Moldova, but also in other socialist countries, therefore shaping a new set of rules  governing the political life and leadership. Changes of the system that have taken place in the Republic of Moldova should be treated as a result of the following factors: the formation of the independence movement and the National Front, and  the global and logistics support of the international institutions to strengthen the statehood and the social affirmation in the country.

Built in 1980, the Linnahall Concert Hall in Tallinn, Estonia, is a fairly recent but nonetheless controversial Soviet monument. Having been highly praised on its completion for its bold architectural solution, within a decade its close associations with the previous regime meant that it had fallen into disrepute. Developers, who realised the economic potential of the site, were quick to seize on its controversial history and called for its destruction. Andres Kurg looks at the changing role of the Linnahall in Tallinn over time and asks what the future might now hold for it. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In Russia today one can observe the latent rebirth of the official pre-revolution ideological postulate, “Orthodox Christianity – autocracy – nationhood”, in the new shape: “Orthodox Christianity – state – Rus-sian ethnicity.” This postulate’s instilling can be possible only in a state the power of which “impends” over the people being legitimized by the assertion about the relation between it and the society by way of Orthodox Christianity. In the quasi-religious present-day Russian society Orthodox Christianity’s actual becoming the state ideology would also result in quasi-sacralization of power: The appearance of a civil religion with a distinctive nationalistic component under its cloak. The instilling of the “Orthodox Christianity – state – Russian ethnicity” ideological postulate would contradict the Russian society’s present conditions and trends of development, as well as the global tendencies. Formal religiosity has already be-come, and consolidation of Orthodox Christianity as state ideology can become, a characteristic feature of the Russian version of contemporary post-religious society. An earlier but more extensive Russian version see: http://www.nrgumis.ru/articles/article_full.php?aid=63&binn_rubrik_pl_articles=207"

"Please cite this article in press as: RIZZO, A. (2009). The Multiple City. Tallinn as playground to test new paradigms in urban studies. In Ilmavirta, T. (Ed.), Regenerating Urban Core. Publication of the YTK/IFHP Urban Planning and Design Summer School. Espoo, Finland: C-series of CURS, Helsinki University of Technology, 44-57. ISBN: 978-951-22-9979-9

"Tallinn, the capital of Estonia is the growing identity of the ‘New European East’. Cooperation between Helsinki and Tallinn can be traced back to the early last century and its consequences are still visible in the urban structure of both cities. Cooperation here is based on informal and flexible relations between specific actors, forming bottom up connections rather than the conventional top-down associations. This ongoing regime defines a complex area without clear borders, rather than a traditional stable geographical unit.
At the same time, after the independence of Estonia (1991) citizenship was granted only to those who had ancestors prior to Soviet occupation. Although a minority were able to obtain Estonian citizenship, most of the Russian Speaking Population was cut-off from this integration process. Despite the presence of these enclave formations in the city, it remains unconnected on the surface to ethnical segregation or to the Diaspora between the Russian and Estonian ethnic groups.
The aim of this paper is to describe the current urban and social situation in Tallinn. We will show that beside recognition of Tallinn’s urban fragmentation it is possible to point out the emergence of a new territory, which is both an urban and social entity. From this research we tried to extract a new horizon of reference in the field of urban studies which will be briefly highlighted.""