Poland

This article examines determinants of persistent regional political cleavages in post-Communist Ukraine. The question is how significant the role of culture is compared to ethnic, economic, and religious factors in the regional divisions. This study employs correlation, factor, and regression analyses of regional support for the Communist/pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and pro-nationalist/pro-independence parties and candidates in all national elections held from 1991 to 2006, the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union in the March 1991 referendum, and the vote for the independence of Ukraine in the December 1991 referendum. This study shows that the pattern of these regional differences remained relatively stable from 1991 to 2006. Historical experience has a major effect on regional electoral behavior in post-Communist Ukraine. The legacy of Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule is positively associated with the pro-nationalist and pro-independence vote; the same historical legacy has a negative effect on support for pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and on the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union.

"The transition to democracy in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe is said to be
the achievement of the dissident sector. In Poland the biggest power in the democratization
process was the Solidarność trade union. At the same time many smaller grassroots groups
from that time remain unnoticed and their influence on the democratization process is
underrated.  Such  grassroots  groups  were  responsible  for  organizing  numerous  strikes,
campaigns on the issues of environmental protection and many others. They also brought
novel protest repertoires and managed to mobilize different sectors of the society. This paper
aims at presenting the complex environment of civil society actors in the democratization of
Poland as well as presents the broader context for the transformation of 1989: structural
preconditions, cleavages within the authorities and main waves of protest events."

There had been a visible shift in a recent LGBT politics in Poland from coming out politics to the politics underlining the subjectivity of non-heterosexual relationship (Kulpa, Mizielińska, Stasińska 2012). The transition occurred in many different levels (activism, grassroot social campaigns, voices of LGBT people) and as such it calls into question politics mostly modeling Western (U.K.-USA) ideas of LGBTQ emancipation. There is a need to analyze this turn but also ask about love and kinship as political concepts of LGBT/queer activism. In my speech I would like to engage in the discussion on love and kinship politics which has been recently developed in the Western political theory and queer theory (Hardt&Negri 2009, Berlant&Warner 1998, Boelstorff 2007, Ahmed 2004) and attentively confront it with Polish (& possibly CEE) reality. Is the argument of Western scholars who claim that love can only be powerful political concept when separated from family (Hardt 2007, Berlant&Warner 1998) adequate in Polish (& possibly CEE) context where the meaning of kinship/family and love is firmly linked with specific geo-temporal specificity of the region (Kulpa&Mizielińska 2011)? What could be queer in referring to love/kinship in post-communist time and space? While addressing these question I will firstly, discuss the works of Western and CEE scholars (i.e. Nedbalkova,Kuhar,Lambevski) to trace the possible common understanding of love and kinship in sexual politics of CEE and secondly, I will analyze the strategies of LGBT/Queer activism that refer to the notions of love and kinship in Poland, CEE and in the West.

"On 5 th January 2011, Poland approved new Gender Quota Law, which insists on 35% neutral gender quota on the party electoral lists and has been implemented through amended electoral law (electoral gender quota type). According with that mandatory regulation, partiesmust guarantee minimum 35% candidates of both sexes (female/male) on their electoral lists.This dissertation focuses on gender quota policy formulating analyzing on the grassroots and parliamentary level in Poland, while finally outlines factors which impact on 35% gender quota policy and proposes recommendations to increase quota effectiveness. The two policymaking models are implemented to support quota policy observation - the Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model (MS) and partially the Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)(which are explained in the methodology section). Firstly, overall paper determines the wayhow gender quota policy is being formulated on the grassroots and parliamentary level andexamines institutional and non-institutional factors which impact on recently passed quotaregulation. Although, additionally within thesis sections they are few sub - questions toexplain which will be followed. The dissertation starts with preceding section, which outlineswhat gender quota policy is, for what is used and what makes the Polish case special to takeresponsibility as the researcher for involving into that case study and no another. The firstsection deals with analyzing grassroots gender quota policy campaigning level and outlines policy actors (both pro and against) involved within quota shaping to the point of policygetting into the Lower Assembly (state highest legislative body). Section 2 begins withoutlining parliamentary working under Gender Quota Proposal within parliamentary debates and commissions and what is the most important focuses on outlining
party’s attitudes towards quota policy shaping (in the 2011 General Elections background) which revealed and impacted on final quota policy regulation. That section investigates voting results under  proposal. The last section investigates 35% gender quota from both institutional as non- institutional factors which have impact on quota outcomes. The policy recommendations are proposed and 35% quota mechanism limits are being examined."

"Praca poświęcona jest zamieszkującej wspólnie parze intymnej. Leży na skrzyżowaniu zainteresowań socjologii rodziny, gender studies i studiów nad miłością oraz codziennością. Pierwsza część zawiera analizę historycznych przemian kształtu pary intymnej w Polsce i Europie z punktu widzenia procesu funkcjonalnego różnicowania się systemu społecznego, aż po krytyczną analizę współczesnych dyskusji nad związkami (single, kohabitacja, nietrwałość związków i małżeństw). W drugiej części opisano proces budowania pary w materialnym kontekście wspólnego mieszkania, wraz z definiującymi go napięciami, w tym zwłaszcza tym między ideą miłości romantycznej a tendencją do zastygania w znajomych schematach działania i rutynizacji. Rozprawa bazuje na wykonanych w Poznaniu badaniach, które tworzą: (a) przeprowadzony przez Pentora sondaż na próbie kwotowej mieszkańców Poznania i okolic, N=506; (b) cztery wywiady grupowe i dwanaście wywiadów z parami, w sumie 20 par w wieku 23-35 lat, reprezentujących różne środowiska społeczne. Praca opiera się na programie teoretycznobadawczym Jeana-Claude’a Kaufmanna, ukazując zalety łączenia relacyjnych, kontekstowych i procesualnych koncepcji socjologicznych, w szczególności teorii systemów Niklasa Luhmanna z jednej strony, a z drugiej – koncepcji kultury jako skrzynki narzędziowej Ann Swidler i innych ujęć bazujących na pragmatyzmie i interakcjonizmie symbolicznym.

The main subject of the thesis are couples who live together. It is situated between different research fields, such as sociology of marriage and family, gender studies and the studies on love and everyday life. The first part analyzes the historical changes of intimacy in Poland and Europe from the perspective of the functional differentiation process. It ends with critical analysis of the contemporary discussions on intimacy (singles, cohabitation, instability of relationships). The second part of the thesis is devoted to the process of constructing a couple in the material context of home. There are several tensions which define this process, particularly the relation between the idea of romantic love and the tendency to congeal in familiar schemata and habits. The thesis is based upon empirical research in Poznan (Poland): (a) a survey conducted by Pentor Research International on a quota sample (N=506); (b) four group interviews and twelve interviews with couples, in total 20 relationships of people aged 23-35, marital and non-marital, representing various social milieus. The point of departure for the project was the research agenda created by Jean-Claude Kaufmann and the aim was to show the advantages of combining several different relational, contextual and dynamical sociological theories. On the one hand, it is Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, and on the other, Ann Swidler’s notion of culture as a tool kit and other concepts rooted in pragmatism and symbolic interactionism."

"This quantitative international study shows that to demand from Europe's Muslims that they should adapt or assimilate themselves to the lead culture would deserve the cynical answer from the empirical social scientist that this lead culture, by the turn of the Millennium, was a culture of over 200 million tax evaders, 200 million Roma-phobes, 155 million homophobes and 67 million open anti-Semites, and in between these lead culture values more than 100 million people who think that somehow political assassinations are justified and that taking bribes is somehow acceptable. So what is Europe's lead culture? According to the WVS, in Europe we are confronted with a considerable potential of mistrust in democracy, distance to and mistrust in basic societal institutions, and we are also confronted with a very large group of people holding xenophobic and anti-Semitic world views on the part of the total population. Radical Islam and Islamism are a minority affair, affecting surely less than 3 million European Muslims:
Rejecting Jewish neighbors 1,92
Confidence in the Justice System: none at all 1,51
Confidence in the Police: none at all 1,34
Confidence in Churches: none at all 1,28
Political system which governs the country very bad 1,20
Confidence in the Armed Forces: none at all 1,07
Having a democratic political system fairly bad 0,81
Having a democratic political system very bad 0,23
Democracy may have problems but it's better (strongly disagree) 0,14

It would be absolutely erroneous to assume that the European majority population is free from authoritarian opinions The probability is far greater that a European Muslim will have theocratic world views, prefers army rule and is totally dissatisfied with democracy than the average European, but at the same time, the probability is very small compared to the average European  that a European Muslim generally rejects democracy or proposes to pay in cash (to the detriment of the tax collectors), or rejects immigrants or foreign workers. Our materials also shows that the probability is about the same, for European Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to be anti-Semitic or to mistrust the Social Security system or to illegally claim government social benefits. The conclusions from this can be partially optimistic: Euro-Islam has a better confidence in the Army than global Islam, a better confidence in the Social Security System, in Parliament, in the police, in the political system, in democracy, in the education system than global Islam; and Euro-Islam tends to be less anti-Semitic, homophobe, Romaphobe and racist and anti-immigrant than global Islam, and also less self-hating, and tends to be less fascinated by army rule than global Islam. Sure, that's a good point for European decision makers. Euro-Islam, in a way lost its innocenceby partially having learnt the lessons of partial lawlessness and corruption, existing in Europe, but it also became less rigid in other aspects  in terms of Confidence in the army, the institutions of the state of residence, and it became more respectful of the many other minorities around it. Thus having learnt the lessons of sin and tolerance, what other guiding experiences are available to conjecture the future trajectory of Islam in Europe? JEL-class.: C43, F15, F5, Z12 Keywords: C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation; F15 - Economic Integration; F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy; Z12 - Religion "