Ming Dynasty

This paper focuses on the militia in the Ming. The generic term minbing 民兵 (“civilian troops,” as opposed to the hereditary professional troops of the weisuo 衛所 garrison system) encompasses that of minzhuang 民壯 (“people’s stalwarts”), even if the two words are sometimes used indiscriminately in the sources. The need for raising militia began to be felt as early as the 15th century to make up for both quantitative and qualitative shortages of the weisuo system (desertions, aging ranks, rigidities of the system, looseness of the weisuo geographical coverage). Minzhuang were institutionalized by the 1494 law, which made the militia service a corvee service, backed up by the lijia system (and thus locally financed). Minzhuang were to obtain convincing results on the battlefield, in particular in the repression of ethnic uprisings in the South or in the mid-16th century war against the Japanese pirates. However, the non-stop attempts at revamping minzhuang in the 16th century clearly reveals that the system was soon afflicted by the same ills as the weisuo : careless updating of the registers (a task that was delegated to yamen clerks, hence the development of a vast corruption network), laxity in training and discipline, desertions (with similar causes), deterioration of the quality of the militia (worthless men posing a threat to public security). The commutation of the militia corvee into a monetary payment only hastened the phenomenon, while laying grounds for a third system : the recruits system (mubing 募兵). Last, minzhuang were diverted from their early mission: they ended up mere yamen clerks, who no longer fulfilled any military role. Those evolutions were predictible because minzhuang had gradually been assimilated to the weisuo system (same universal and compulsory kind of service, same hierarchy, same organization). The long-celebrated yu bing yu nong 寓兵於農 ideal (“give the arms to the peasants”) was never really put into effect. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that militia were used until the late Ming, alongside weisuo soldiers and mercenaries: the chronological outline weisuo-minbing-mubing is a simplifying one.

Zhu Mujie (1517-86) was a lower-ranked imperial clansman of the Ming dynasty who achieved fame as a scholar. A member of the house of Zhou, which seat was in Kaifeng, Zhu Mujie built one of the most important book collections of his time. Surviving manuscript copies of the catalogue list no less than 4,000 titles. Zhu was a notable editor, compiler, writer and publisher, and a prominent figure of the intellectual life in Kaifeng from the 1550s through the 1580s. Through several massive editorial projects he publicized his region. His own works evidence a wide range of interests (most noteworthy were his works in the field of jingxue) while his extensive network of connections at the local, provincial and national levels, with scholars of different generations, suggests that he did meet the requirements for entry into the scholarly world. At the same time, Zhu Mujie also acted as adviser to provincial officials. In his later years, he was appointed the de facto ruler of the house of Zhou and headed the school for the young clansmen of the house. His support of the Court-devised policy aiming at curbing the expenses of the imperial clan earned him deep-seated enmity among his fellow imperial clansmen. On the whole, Zhu Mujie should best be regarded as a scholar who happened to be of imperial blood rather than a scholarly imperial clansman.

Except for those relating to the early and the very late part of the period, Ming narratives traditionally do not make room for the Ming princes (i.e. the relatives of the emperor, enfeoffed in provincial courts across the empire). Since the imperial clansmen were soon debarred from any participation in politics and in war, it has been assumed that they simply did not matter. Such a view owes much to the idea that the Ming period was the apex of imperial rule. It is also a by-product of Ming bureaucrats’ discourse and of their ideals. Recently, however, scholars in the West have begun to stress the princes’ involvements in culture, art or religion. In this talk I will attempt to challenge the common view that the Ming princes were disconnected from the Beijing court, by showing that, quite the contrary, there existed many different kinds of links and interactions between the two. A constant flow of objects, correspondence, money (including bribes) and men connected Beijing to the provincial courts. Whether symbolical or real, public or secret, the relations were constant and ultimately of a very political nature. Princes were always willing to remind Beijing of their existence, to the extent of even plotting rebellions; the emperor could side with the princes against the bureaucracy; and officials in the capital, for their part, might use the imperial clan to serve their own agenda in heated factional struggles. Furthermore, the growing numbers of the imperial relatives made it more and more difficult to ignore them: bodies of ad hoc legislation were issued, and the crucial question of their cost of maintenance sparked a long (and never settled) debate.

The Zongfan tiaoli 宗藩條例 is a collection of 67 legal provisions on imperial clansmen issued in 1565. The full text has survived. Each article consists of precedents (li 例) followed by a summary and comments. The book was intended for officials of the Board of Rites as well as officials serving in princely houses (wangguan 王官), provincial officials, and imperial clansmen themselves. A similar body of regulations, the Fanfu zhengling 藩府政令, had been compiled in the early sixteenth century, but how widely it circulated is unclear. The compilation of the Zongfan tiaoli had been made necessary by the multiplication of the imperial clansmen’s transgressions of all kinds but above all by the skyrocketing cost of maintaining the Ming clan – one of the major causes of the late Jiajing-era budgetary crisis. In the 1550s and early 1560s, riots erupted in regions where the swelling numbers of lower-ranked imperial clansmen could no longer be paid. Almost all of the 67 articles in the Zongfan tiaoli were aimed ultimately at curbing the expenses linked to the imperial clan, by tightening the bureaucratic control over it (in a fashion somewhat similar to what would be done later with Qing-dynasty bannermen). Two distinct groups which shared the same interests were the driving forces behind the Zongfan tiaoli “project”: a new generation of officials eager for change (they were mostly Yan Song’s opponents), and a cluster of “reformist” princes ready to compromise with the State. In the “fabrication” process of the collection, imperial clansmen were requested to submit proposals and give feedback. The Zongfan tiaoli was opposed by many imperial clansmen, who tried their best to circumvent it, arguing for instance that its dispositions could not be retroactive. As the new regulations did not prove effective, Zhang Juzheng ordered the compilation of a revised, simplified, but more hard-line version, which does not seem to have survived although parts of it were included in the 1587 edition of the Huidian. The reasons why the Zongfan tiaoli failed to fulfill its goals were, it seems, that it came already too late – abuses had been standard practice for too long – and enforcement remained too lax.

In 1556, 1564 and 1568 respectively, the prince of Hui 徽 Zhu Zailun (based in Junzhou, Henan), the prince of Yi 伊 Zhu Dianying (based in Luoyang) and the prince of Liao 遼 Zhu Xianjie (based in Jingzhou, Huguang) were stripped of their titles and the hereditary transmission of these titles was terminated. In all three cases, the deposition of the prince came after an escalating conflict, numerous impeachment memorials, the dispatch of investigation commissions to the principality seats, and meetings at the imperial court in which the prince’s alleged crimes were discussed. These crimes, in which the princes were aided by “evildoers” in their entourage, included the killing of innocent people, the selection of young girls for service in the princely palaces, mistreatment of officials, unauthorized construction works and, most importantly, plotting rebellion. However, Zhu Zailun (and his father Zhu Houjue), Zhu Dianying and Zhu Xianjie were all fine scholars. As Daoists, they also enjoyed the favour of the Jiajing emperor, who backed them all along. As a very small number of later sources suggest, the charges levelled against them were stereotyped and exaggerated, and the rebellion charges were even trumped-up. What these cases were all about was political strife at the imperial court in Beijing between the Yan Song faction and its opponents. As the Yan faction gradually lost power to its opponents, Xu Jie and his supporters, the latter were able to bring these cases to a conclusion to their advantage. Besides, the ultimate but unnamed target of their attacks was none other than Jiajing himself, the princes being merely surrogate targets.