Foreign Policy of Ukraine

After the period of the Washington Consensus and the structural adjustments, importance of international democracy promotion and the “good governance” agenda grew gradually. Great deal of question has been asked on how to make the policies of international development more effective, but most of them remain unanswered. Most of the democratisation theories focus on primarily domestic affairs, while the process in which external factors interact with the internal dynamics, remains rather undertheorised. The article attempts to identify the problems with the promotion of democratic governance and discover the correct variables by looking at the causation of internal and external elements. Despite the great number of pessimistic viewpoints regarding the effectiveness of democracy transfer, the paper will attempt to demonstrate that the failures happen because of the absence of certain structural preconditions, both inside and outside of country. The case of the European Union promotion in Ukraine is a good example of the interaction failure in its internal/external dimensions.

The place of Europe in post-Cold War national mythologies of different countries varies widely. In three arguably most dramatic examples, Poland rethought itself as “the somehow decentred heart of Catholic Europe” (Dayan & Katz, 1994, p. 166), while Russia gave reasons to conclude it “leaves the West” (Trenin, 2006, p. 87) and Ukraine stuck with its view of Europe as a normative example (Orlova, 2010, p. 26). To what extent this remains true if one is to look empirically at the discourses that currently inhabit news media? This paper points out to how narratives of Europe are instrumentalised in political discussions in the three counties that followed very different paths since the collapse of the communist bloc. The presentation includes results of qualitative analysis based on an open coding approach; the focus rests on the most prestigious news outlets (Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta wyborcza; Izvestiya, Kommersant; Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Korrespondent) but also includes important online blog platforms.

"The scholars of Central and Eastern Europe have long noticed that the place of Europe in post-Cold War national mythologies of different countries varies widely if not wildly. In three arguably most dramatic examples, Poland rethought itself as “the somehow decentred heart of Catholic Europe” (Dayan & Katz, 1994, p. 166), while Russia gave reasons to conclude it “leaves the West” (Trenin, 2006, p. 87) and Ukraine stuck with its view of Europe as a normative example (Orlova, 2010, p. 26). However, to what extent this remains true if one is to look empirically at the discourses that currently inhabit news media and public discussion? This paper points out to how various narratives of Europe are instrumentalised in internal and regional political discussions in the three counties that followed very different paths since the collapse of the communist bloc to which they once belonged, and whose relations have always remained defining to the structure of the region(s). The presentation includes results of qualitative analysis based on an open coding approach that discerns different narratives of Europe in the media discourses of the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian press. The focus of the analysis rests primarily on the most important and prestigious news outlets (Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta wyborcza in Poland; Izvestiya and Kommersant in Russia; Dzerkalo tyzhnia and Korrespondent in Ukraine) but also includes the most prestigious online blog platforms where opinion leaders set the principal frames for narrating Europe; such as Ukraine’s most read blogs section at Ukrayins’ka pravda or Russia’s Snob.ru. This will arguably give a more valid and up-to-date overview of what could be thought of as the three countries’ public spheres and Europe’s place in them.

Keywords: Europe, public sphere, Poland, Russia, Ukraine"

This article examines determinants of persistent regional political cleavages in post-Communist Ukraine. The question is how significant the role of culture is compared to ethnic, economic, and religious factors in the regional divisions. This study employs correlation, factor, and regression analyses of regional support for the Communist/pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and pro-nationalist/pro-independence parties and candidates in all national elections held from 1991 to 2006, the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union in the March 1991 referendum, and the vote for the independence of Ukraine in the December 1991 referendum. This study shows that the pattern of these regional differences remained relatively stable from 1991 to 2006. Historical experience has a major effect on regional electoral behavior in post-Communist Ukraine. The legacy of Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule is positively associated with the pro-nationalist and pro-independence vote; the same historical legacy has a negative effect on support for pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and on the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union.

Using the political turmoil in Ukraine and perceptions of Western weakness to his advantage, Putin hatched a plan designed to keep hold of Russia’s strategic interests in the Crimea by sending in his soldiers, capturing or surrounding airfields and other important military infrastructure, without a shot being fired.

This article examines differing political orientations of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz, two main Turkic minorities in Ukraine and Moldova. Crimean Tatars in Ukraine expressed anti-Communist and anti-Russian political preferences, while the Gagauz in Moldova showed strong support for pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and politicians. This study analyses the role of cultural factors in political attitudes and behavior of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz and uses data from surveys, elections and referendums. The analysis shows that distinct historical experiences of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and Romania led to the emergence of distinct political cultures of these ethnic groups and affected their political behavior and attitudes in post-communist Ukraine and Moldova.

""Although present-day Ukraine has only been in existence for something over two decades, its recorded history reaches much further back for more than a thousand years to Kyivan Rus’. Over that time, it has usually been under control of invaders like the Turks and Tatars, or neighbors like Russia and Poland, and indeed it was part of the Soviet Union until it gained its independence in 1991. Today it is drawn between its huge neighbor to the east and the European Union, and is still struggling to choose its own path… although it remains uncertain of which way to turn. Nonetheless, as one of the largest European states, with considerable economic potential, it is not a place that can be readily overlooked.

The problem is, or at least was, where to find information on this huge modern Ukraine, and since 2005 the answer has been the Historical Dictionary of Ukraine in its first edition, and now even more so with this second edition. It now boasts a dictionary section of about 725 entries, these covering the thousand years of history but particularly the recent past, and focusing on significant persons, places and events, political parties and institutions as well as more broadly international relations, the economy, society and culture. The chronology permits readers to follow this history and the introduction is there to make sense of it. It also features the most extensive and up-to-date bibliography of English-language writing on Ukraine.""

At the time of writing, Russian military forces have been placed on high alert. Political unrest is taking place in the strategically important autonomous Ukrainian province of Crimea, a long time Russo-Ukrainian fault-line. Pro and anti-Ukrainian ethnic groups, Russians, Tartars and Ukrainians have taken to the streets calling for loyalty to either Moscow or Kiev.

""During the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, the second largest country in Europe came close to a violent break-up similar to that in neighboring Moldova, which witnessed a violent secession of the Transdniestria region. Numerous elections, including the hotly contested 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, and surveys of public opinion showed significant regional divisions in these post-Soviet countries. Western parts of Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the Muslim Crimean Tatars, were vocal supporters of independence, nationalist, and pro-Western parties and politicians. In contrast, Eastern regions, as well as the Orthodox Turkic-speaking Gagauz, consistently expressed pro-Russian and pro-Communist political orientations. Which factors ? historical legacies, religion, economy, ethnicity, or political leadership ? could explain these divisions? Why was Ukraine able to avoid a violent break-up, in contrast to Moldova?
This is the first book to offer a systematic and comparative analysis of the regional political divisions in post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. The study examines voting behavior and political attitudes in two groups of regions: those which were under Russian, Ottoman, and Soviet rule; and those which were under Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule until World War I or World War II. This book attributes the regional political divisions to the differences in historical experience. This study helps us to better understand regional cleavages and conflicts, not only in Ukraine and Moldova, but also in other cleft countries.""