Russian Politics

An analysis of the coverage of post-communist countries by the major U.S. television networks from 1998 to 2009 reveals that U.S. allies receive more positive coverage than do non-allies or adversaries and that there are systematic biases in the representation of many post-Soviet countries.

"    Statistical analyses of the voting results from all national parliamentary and presidential elections held between 1991 and 2006 and survey data concerning attitudes towards major historical issues confirm the existence of strong and persistent regional cleavages in post-Soviet Ukraine. Western Ukrainian regions, which differ significantly in terms of their historical legacies
from regions in Eastern Ukraine, are much more supportive, compared to Eastern Ukraine, of pro-nationalist and pro-Western parties and politicians, and they are much less supportive of pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and politicians.
        Similarly, Eastern Ukrainians, compared to Western Ukrainians, express much more favorable attitudes towards the incorporation of Eastern Ukraine by Russia in the seventeenth century, the Bolshevik Revolution, the whole period of Ukraine’s inclusion in the Soviet Union, the past Communist political system, Russian tsars, and Soviet political leaders. People from Western Ukraine are much more likely than the residents of other regions to
regard the artificial famine of 1932/1933 as a result of deliberate Soviet policy directed against ethnic Ukrainians. Western Ukrainians demonstrate much more favorable views than their Eastern Ukrainian counterparts towards the UPA and historical Ukrainian nationalist and pro-independence leaders.
        Regression analysis shows that historical legacies, linked to different historical experiences before Soviet unification, have the largest effect, compared to other factors, on electoral behavior and on attitudes towards historical issues. Keeping other factors, such as ethnicity and the level of economic development constant, the history of Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule is the biggest determinant of the regional pro-nationalist/pro-Western vote index, the pro-Communist/pro-Russian vote index,  and individual attitudes towards the past Soviet political system. Catholic religion and Ukrainian ethnicity also affect the regional electoral behavior indexes but to a lesser extent and less consistently than the historical legacy does. Age, education, Catholic religion, and gender are significant
determinants of attitudes towards the Soviet political system. However, their effects are weaker compared to the effects of historical legacy variables.
    This study concludes that the regional political cleavages in post-Communist Ukraine reflect primarily cultural differences that emerged as a result of distinct historical experiences in Ukrainian regions in the periods before World War I and World War II. These findings imply that the regional differences in electoral behavior and attitudes towards major historical issues will not disappear in Ukraine in the near future.
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Analiza systemu partyjnego i partii politycznych Republiki Mołdawii w latach 1989–2009 pozwala zrozumieć istotę funkcjonowania systemu politycznego tego państwa. Z uwagi na specyfikę badanego obszaru zagadnienie zostało potraktowane wielowymiarowo. Aktualna kondycja mołdawskiej demokracji jest pochodną wydarzeń z lat 1989–2009. Należy zwrócić również uwagę na zakres omawianej transformacji politycznej, tak charakterystycznej dla państw byłego bloku wschodniego. Republika Mołdawii w tym zakresie nie stanowi wyjątku, co przekłada się na jakość i stabilność systemu władzy.

Статья посвящена выявлению и анализу различий в толковании понятия "государственная услуга" в правовых актах разного уровня, в публичных высказываниях и в интервью государственных и муниципальных служащих. Сюжет вписан в проблематику функций государства, гражданских прав и организации исполнительской деятельности.

"• EU continues to prepare Statement of Objections despite Gazprom’s December proposals for an early settlement
• Gazprom breaks record in gas exports to Europe in 2013 with 16 percent y-o-y increase in gas export volumes
• Gazprom-OMV contractual adjustments ‘unaffected’ by EU antimonopoly investigation
• Dutch gas production set to decline in 2014-15 – Could Gazprom fill the gap?
• Putin outlines Russia’s position regarding Ukraine: the gas debt still needs to be paid and the Russian government is prepared to work with whoever is in power in Ukraine
• Nord Stream: EU and Gazprom agree on full use of OPAL pipeline
• EU and Russia continue to negotiate over the application of Third Party Access legislation to the South Stream project
• Gazprom plans to sign deal with CNPC (China) in May, during Putin visit to China
• Gazprom completes 100 percent takeover of ArmRosGazprom (Armenia)
• Gazprom adds fifth tanker to its LNG carrier fleet"

The 2010 Osh events in Kyrgyzstan shall be seen as the turning point for the development of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Established protective mechanism was not efficient to react for indigenously generated conflict that could cause serious security spill-over. In response at the meeting in December 2010 the CSTO Collective Security Council adopted several documents aimed to produce effective crisis response system. The package of accepted proposals included amendments to the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of 7 October 2002 and the CSTO Member States Declaration on CSTO peacekeeping force establishment. The CSTO consolidation process marked with complex military planning demonstrates organization’s growing capability to response on both internal and external challenges to ensure regional stability. The paper is aimed to briefly evaluate current condition of the organization and its ability to react for challenges as the missile threat, Arab spring or post-2014 Afghanistan.

"""During the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, the second largest country in Europe came close to a violent break-up similar to that in neighboring Moldova, which witnessed a violent secession of the Transdniestria region. Numerous elections, including the hotly contested 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, and surveys of public opinion showed significant regional divisions in these post-Soviet countries. Western parts of Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the Muslim Crimean Tatars, were vocal supporters of independence, nationalist, and pro-Western parties and politicians. In contrast, Eastern regions, as well as the Orthodox Turkic-speaking Gagauz, consistently expressed pro-Russian and pro-Communist political orientations. Which factors ? historical legacies, religion, economy, ethnicity, or political leadership ? could explain these divisions? Why was Ukraine able to avoid a violent break-up, in contrast to Moldova?
This is the first book to offer a systematic and comparative analysis of the regional political divisions in post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. The study examines voting behavior and political attitudes in two groups of regions: those which were under Russian, Ottoman, and Soviet rule; and those which were under Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule until World War I or World War II. This book attributes the regional political divisions to the differences in historical experience. This study helps us to better understand regional cleavages and conflicts, not only in Ukraine and Moldova, but also in other cleft countries."""