The Third Rome

v INDICE Premessa ix Prologo. Intorno a Maometto il profeta 3 §1. Dove si apprende che Maometto, prima che profeta, am-biva essere papa di Roma, p. 3-§2. Dove si apprende che Maometto era gabellato per cristiano eretico e l'islam per un magma di eresie cristiane, p. 10-§3. A proposito di quei teologi bizantini che fra alto e basso medioevo si dilettavano a confrontare cristianesimo e islam, e ad insultarsi recipro-camente coi sapienti arabi, p. 14-§4. Si ragiona sulle con-clusioni di tanto pensare. Il rapido successo dei musulmani nel mondo si deve alla violenza e all'edonismo promossi dal Corano e suggeriti dal demonio, p. 17 I. La caduta di Costantinopoli, Mosca ' terza Roma' e le congiure dei pagani 23 §1. Dove Nestore Iskinder profetizza la caduta e il riscatto di Costantinopoli, liberamente interpretando la lotta fra un serpente e un'aquila al tempo di Costantino il Grande, p. 23-§2. Dio lo volle, non senza dolore, p. 24-§3. Enumerando utopie e distopie germinate fra i ruderi di Costantinopoli, p. 29-§4. Si spiega come sia mai possibile che in Europa da Carlo Magno in poi vi fossero due imperatori, entrambi romani, entrambi universali, p. 31-§5. Dove si ricorda la triste sorte dell'ultimo imperatore bizantino, Costantino XI Paleologo, mai incoronato secondo regola, e ci si pone il problema, non banale, dell'importanza dell'incoronazio-ne e della Chiesa nella nomina imperiale, p. 35-§6. «Due Rome sono cadute, una terza è e una quarta non sarà»: po-teva anche lo zar essere imperatore dei romani? E poteva Mosca essere la terza Roma a capo di un impero romano

Nikolai Poppel’s second visit to Moscow in 1489 and the unexpected proposals that he addressed to Grand Duke Ivan III encouraged the Moscow court to examine the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire. This required the help of an unknown expert, who, however, was not always accurate in his comments. To legitimize the Moscow ruler in the eyes of the German emperor, a theory was elaborated about the primordial «brotherhood» between the Moscow dynasty and the Roman-Byzantine emperors. The crucial point in it, along with some «historical» dates from the Donation of Constantine, took the marriage of John VIII Palaiologos to the princess Anna Vasilievna of Moscow.

Après un bref rappel des modalités de l’usage public de l’histoire  en Italie à la fin du 19e siècle, la communication examine plus particulièrement l’usage du passé romain dans les discours de célébration de la prise de Rome, avant d’ouvrir sur la question de l’usage de l’idée de « race latine » ou romaine pour définir l’identité italienne et pour justifier l’expansion du Royaume d’Italie au-delà de ses frontières de 1870, vers les territoires « irrédents » du Nord-Est et surtout vers l’Afrique.

Le mythe de la Troisième Rome connaît un nouveau développement dans l’imaginaire politique et culturel de l’Italie du XIXe siècle, par les réflexions et dans l’action du patriote Giuseppe Mazzini, qui définit au cours du Risorgimento la mission du peuple italien pour la renaissance européenne. Dans l’Italie postunitaire, la Troisième Rome devient un mythe national italien qui donne son identité au nouvel État, identifié à la Troisième Italie. Au XXe siècle, ce mythe devient un pilier de la rhétorique mussolinienne pour la mise en place du fascisme et en particulier pour son idée d’Empire. À chaque étape de l’évolution du mythe dans la rhétorique politique et poétique italienne, on remarque que l’idée de Troisième Rome n’exprime pas seulement le rapport de l’Italie avec son passé, mais également la contribution italienne à l’idée moderne de nation.

Few events have had a bigger impact in the Christian world than the siege of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottomans under Sultan Mehmet II. Curiously, one and the same obscure prophecy – about a fair-haired (Russian?) race liberating the city – has served, from the sixteenth century onwards, the national(ist) cause of nations as different as Russia and Greece. By inserting this and other prophecies into more or less dubious authoritative (historiographical) texts, the tragic narrative of the actual fall of the Byzantine capital is reinterpreted by providing the fateful events with a new (epic) plot. The two texts under discussion, Nestor-Iskinder’s Russian Tale of Constantinople (late 15th cent.) and the Greek Vision of Agathangelos (a falsification dating from the 1750s), are approached by Hayden White- and Mikhail Bakhtin-inspired (em)plot(ment) theory. In their ‘replotting’ of history, both texts reserve a role for (the heroic death of) Byzantium’s last emperor, Constantine XI.

[Nur wenige Ereignisse hatten einen größeren Einfluss auf die christliche Welt als die Belagerung und Eroberung Konstantinopels 1453 durch die Osmanen unter Sultan Mehmed II. Ein und dieselbe Prophezeiung – über die Befreiung der Stadt durch ein blondes (russisches?) Volk – diente seit dem 16. Jahrhundert national(istisch)en Bestrebungen so unterschiedlichen Ländern wie Russland und Griechenland. Indem diese und andere Prophezeiungen in mehr oder weniger maßgebende (historiografische) Texte eingebunden wurden, wurde die tragische Erzählung vom Fall Konstantinopels durch einen neuen (epischen) Plot umgedeutet. Die zwei hier diskutierten Texte, Nestor-Iskinders russischer Bericht über den Fall Konstantinopels (spätes 15. Jahrhundert) und die griechische Visionen des Agathangelos (eine Fälschung der 1750er Jahre), werden mithilfe der von Hayden White und Michail Bachtin inspirierten (Em)plot(ment)theorie untersucht. In ihrem Umschreiben der Geschichte betonen beide Texte die Rolle von Byzanzs letztem Kaiser, Konstantin XI. und seinem Heldentod.]

Кудрявцев М.П. Москва - Третий Рим. Историко-градостроительное исследование. Изд. 2-е, дополн. М.: Троица, 2008. 288 с., 256 илл. 1000 экз. ISBN 8-85482-008-7.
Книга выдающегося архитектора-реставратора М.П. Кудрявцева (1938-1993) представляет собой его главный труд, посвященный восстановлению исторического облика российской столицы конца XVII в. - вершины расцвета древнерусского градостроительства и зодчества: http://www.expertmus.com/2015/09/1520-1527.html
Автор поставил своей целью показать, как православное христианское мировоззрение воплотилось в уникальной символической композиции и художественном образе города - центре Русского Православного Царства. Книга богато иллюстрирована редкими фотографиями старых зданий и авторскими схемами, раскрывающими планировочную структуру древней Москвы. Красочные реконструкции видов Москвы XVII в., выполненные автором, позволяют наглядно представить образ старой Москвы.
Православное мировоззрение и учение о Третьем Риме
Древняя Москва и природный ландшафт
Ансамбли Москвы
Искусство градостроителей Москвы
Третий  Рим
Реконструкция видов Москвы XVII в.

Remarks delivered at the Edward L. Keenan Jr. Memorial Service, which took place on Friday, September 25, 2015, from 2:00pm to 4:00pm at Memorial Church. The service celebrated the life of our esteemed colleague, Edward Louis Keenan, Jr., Andrew W. Mellon Professor of History, Emeritus.

The memorial service was sponsored by Harvard’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Dumbarton Oaks, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Ukrainian Research Institute, and Departments of History and of Slavic Languages and Literatures.

В статье на основе анализа записей на Годуновских Псалтирях рассматривается вопрос о распространении идеи «Третьего Рима» в России в конце XVI в. В этом столетии Третьим Римом именовалась либо Русская земля, либо Российское царство. Устанавливается, что одним из первых случаев (возможно, первым) соотнесения Третьего Рима непосредственно с «Москвой» были записи Годуновских Псалтирей. Этот комплекс богато иллюминированных рукописей переписывался в одном из столичных скрипториев между 1591 и 1600 гг. по заказу дяди Б. Ф. Годунова боярина Д. И. Годунова. Данные рукописи вскоре после их написания были отданы в крупнейшие соборы и монастыри России: в Успенский и Архангельский кремлевские соборы, в Чудов, Новодевичий, Троице-Сергиев, Кирилло-Белозерский, Соловецкий, костромской Ипатьевский и калязинский Макарьевский монастыри. В статье высказывается мнение о том, что с распространением Годуновских Псалтирей была связана первая попытка распространения идеи «Третий Рим» за пределами столицы. Она предвосхитила ее тиражирование в печатной Кормчей 1653 г.

In article is considered a question of distribution of the theory «The Third Rome» in Russia of the end of the XVI century. The research is based on texts of records on the Godunov's Psalters. This century the name «The Third Rome» was applied to «The Russian land» and «The Russian tzardom». It is shown that one of the fi rst cases (perhaps, the fi rst) correlation of «the Third Rome» with «Moscow» was records Godunov's Psalters. This complex of richly illuminated manuscripts was written in one of capital monastery between 1591 and 1600 by request of the uncle Boris Godunov of the boyar Dmitry Godunov. These manuscripts soon after their writing were enclosed in the largest cathedrals and monasteries of Russia: in Uspensky and Arkhangelsk Kremlin cathedrals, in monasteries - Chudov, Novodevichij, Troitse-Sergiyev, Kirillo-Belozersky, Soloveckij, Ipatyevsky in Kostroma and Makaryevsky in Kalyazin. In article the opinion that the first attempt of distribution of idea «the Third Rome» outside the capital was connected with distribution of Godunov's Psalters is expressed. It anticipated it's distribution in printing Nomocanon (Kormchaja) of 1653.

"Il contributo è dedicato alla ricostruzione e all’indagine storica degli intrecci dinastici, politici e religiosi miranti ad un progetto di “rifondazione occidentale” di Bisanzio nel XV secolo. Il progetto di un “salvataggio occidentale di Bisanzio” in Morea – sviluppato tra gli anni Venti e Settanta del Quattrocento, promosso in particolar modo da Bessarione e da Enea Silvio Piccolomini, sfociato infine nella sfortunata spedizione antiturca condotta dopo la morte del pontefice da Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta — prese avvio dall’alleanza matrimoniale fra Teodoro II Paleologo e Cleopa Malatesta. La sepoltura di quest’ultima, dedicataria di un tombeau poetico bessarioneo conservato nel codice Marc. gr. 533, si lega fra l’altro all’enigmatica identificazione della cosiddetta “mummia di Mistrà”. L’analisi della vicenda politico-dinastica interessa successivamente la permanenza in Italia di Tommaso Paleologo: legittimo erede e sovrano in pectore della Nuova Bisanzio immaginato nel progetto per la riconquista della Morea promosso da Pio II, fu oggetto, oltreché di cruciali aspettative politiche, di committenze artistiche di peculiare pregnanza simbolica. In effetti non solo la figura di Tommaso, ma l’insieme delle vicissitudini politiche e dinastiche di cui sopra trovano riflesso nella maggiore pittura italiana coeva: gli elementi storici ricordati permettono in particolare un’approfondita analisi iconografica (supportata dalle tavole illustrative in appendice) del più importante prodotto dell’atmosfera filobizantina dell’epoca – e manifesto dell’impresa politico-religiosa occidentale contro i turchi –, la Flagellazione di Piero della Francesca.
L’impresa sarà tuttavia destinata a fallire e sarà così che, dopo il mancato “salvataggio occidentale” di Bisanzio, l’eredità giuridico-istituzionale, politica, ecclesiastica, ideologica e per certi versi lo stile di vita stesso di Bisanzio si trasmetteranno al granducato di Mosca: le nozze tra Zoe Paleologina e Ivan III Vasilevič segneranno il definitivo tramonto del progetto di unificazione tra prima e seconda Roma e la nascita della Terza Roma.

The essay investigates and reconstructs the dynastic, political, and religious intricacies involved in the “Western re-foundation” of Byzantium project in the 15th century.  The plan for the “Western salvage of Byzantium” in Morea – developed between the 1420s and 1460s, promoted with particular energy by Bessarion and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pius II), and resulting in the failed anti-Turk expedition led by Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta after the Pope’s death – began with the marriage of Theodore II Palaeologus and Cleopa Malatesta. The death and burial of the latter, dedicatee of a verse tombeau by Bessarion preserved in M. Marc. gr. 533, may be connected to the mysterious identification of the so-called “Mystras mummy.”  Analysis of the political and dynastic events focuses subsequently on the Italian sojourn of Thomas Palaeologus.  As legitimate heir and sovereign in pectore of the New Byzantium envisaged in the plan to re-conquer the Morea promoted by Pius II, he was the subject of both crucial political expectations and artistic commissions laden with unusual symbolism. In effect, the figure of Thomas and concomitant political and dynastic events are reflected in the major Italian paintings of the period. The historical elements allow us, in particular, a deeper iconographic analysis (documented by illustrations in the appendix) of the most important product of the philo-Byzantine atmosphere of the period – and manifest in the Western political and religious enterprise against the Turks – Piero della Francesca’s Flagellation of Christ.
The undertaking, however, was destined to fail and so, after the abortive “Western salvage” of Byzantium, this is how the juridical, institutional, political, ecclesiastical, and ideological legacy - and, in certain ways, the very Byzantine way of life - moves to the Grand Duchy of Moscow.  The marriage of Zoe Palaeologina and Ivan III (The Great) Vasilyevich marks the definitive decline of the plan to reunite the First and Second Rome with the birth of the Third Rome.
"

"Varieties of Russian Exceptionalism in Putin's Russia: Guest Editor's Introduction

By Andreas Umland

This second RPL edition on the idea of Russia's special path continues a series of M.E. Sharpe Russian translation projects devoted to the roots and varieties of post-Soviet anti-Western ideologies.  The issues dealt with in the previous and following papers translated from Russian have become even more topical than they were already in 2011 when the current translation project had been initiated. During the first half of 2012, Russian society, in general, and its educated classes, in particular, have become increasingly polarized, and divided into pro- and anti-Putin forces. Arguably, the crux of this confrontation comes down to the question of whether Russia should either continue its “special path,” or let herself be measured and criticized according to standards today common across Europe.
To be sure, there is a variety of distinct issues around which the recent conflict between the opposition and authorities has been developing including widespread corruption, manipulated elections, restrictions on the freedom of assembly, misuse of mass media reporting for propaganda purposes, and several others. Nevertheless, in a more general sense, one can interpret the political confrontation that has emerged already before Putin’s third presidential period within the context of the prime foci of the current translation project. The opposition wants Russia to become a "normal" country in the Western sense, whereas Putin and his supporters are claiming legitimacy for the current regime on the basis of Russia's alleged specificity or even uniqueness.
The following papers discuss a number of current ideological permutations, political implications and institutional effects resulting from a practical application of the idea of a “special path” to the peculiarly post-Soviet conditions of today Russia. Aleksandr Kubyshkin and Aleksandr Sergunin provide a succinct survey of the spectrum of Moscow’s foreign policy doctrines that can be seen as expressions of the idea of Russia’s special path. They concentrate on outlooks that have been labeled “neo-Eurasianist,” or “geopolitical.” They engage primarily in a classification of the various subtypes and hybrids of ideas exceptionalism in post-Soviet Russia. Kubyshkin and Sergunin also briefly list the main protagonists of these schools, and outline the evolution of non- or anti-Atlanticist world views during the post-Soviet period.
In my own article, I mention a number of effects that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine had on the political regime, official discourse and public opinion of Russia, since 2005. These repercussions, I argue, partly modified the nature of Putin’s political system making it somewhat distinct from traditional autocracy. I label this alteration “paratotalitarian,” in that it was reminiscent of certain features of totalitarian states, yet did not result in a real regime change from authoritarianism to totalitarianism. I also briefly touch upon some worrying developments in Russian public opinion which, under the influence of an upsurge of anti-Western propaganda in the Kremlin-controlled mass media after the Orange Revolution and in connection with the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, became pre-dominantly anti-American by the end of the last decade.
Emil’ Pain presents an in-depth investigation into Russia’s post-Soviet regime in both historical and comparative perspective. He focuses on classificatory questions and interpretational issues using as his starting points, among other sources, Freedom House scores for the post-Soviet republics. Pain distinguishes Putin’s political system not only from totalitarian ones, but also sees the Russian authoritarian regime as being, in distinction to, for instance, those of Belarus and Kazakhstan, not (yet) consolidated. He discusses the paradox of Russian traditionalism under the conditions of an absence of strong traditional ties in Russia. Pain also touches upon the rise of Russian nationalist xenophobia and the role of Stalinism in relation to the re-emergence of authoritarianism under Putin.
Aleksandr Melikhov, in his brief statement, makes an argument for the adoption of a soft version of an ideology of the “special path.” Such a strategy, Melikhov argues, would be more useful than a simple Westernization because it would both, find more support in the population and, in his opinion, help preventing the rise of a fundamentalist interpretation of the “special path.” In the following discussion between Boris Dubin, Lev Gudkov and Emil' Pain, Melikhov's challenge is taken up, and the role, for Russia, of the idea of a "special path" is analyzed in a lively debate. The three leading social scientist of Russia discuss the meaning and connotation that the word "special" (osobyi) has in today Russia, and whether Russia needs this concept in order to formulate her national idea. Gudkov, for instance, persuasively argues that the idea of a "special path" has played a negative role in Russia's modern history in that it provided a justification for authoritarian or even totalitarian conservatism and isoliationism as well as their stifling effects on Russia's socio-economic development. At best, the idea can play a constructive role as a mean of moral self-defense for peripheral countries that are in the process of a catch-up development.
All in all, the texts of these two special issues of RPL on Russia's "special path" provide a broad overview of the various notions, aspects and applications of one of the crucial ideas which are today used to legitimize Putin's authoritarian domestic and anti-Western foreign policies. The current Russian political system is, in distinction to some other East European and South Caucasian post-Soviet regimes, unlikely to open up any time soon. It will presumably survive for many years to come and may become even more radical in its suppression of internal opposition, intervention into civil society, and manipulation of Russian-Western relations. Against this background, one hopes that more such translation projects - focusing, for instance, on the most recent developments in Russia's political and intellectual scenes - will follow.
CONTENTS: "Varieties of Russian Exceptionalism in Putin's Russia: Guest Editor's Introduction" by Andreas Umland;  "The Problem of the 'Special Path' in Russian Foreign Policy: From the 1990s to the Early Twenty-First Century" by Aleksandr Kubyshkin and Aleksandr Sergunin; "Russia's New 'Special Path' After the Orange Revolution: Radical Anti-Westernism and Paratotalitarian Neo-Authoritarianism in 2005-8" by Andreas Umland; "Special Characteristics of the Post-Soviet Political Regime" by Emil Pain; "The 'Special Path' Ideology as an Instrument of Modernization" by Aleksandr Melikhov; "Does the 'Special Path' Ideology Contain the Potential for Modernization?: A Conversation" by Lev Gudkov, Boris Dubin and Emil Pain."

The Claim of Russian Distinctiveness as an Ideational Foundation for Putin's Neo-Authoritarian Regime: Guest Editor's Introduction

By Andreas Umland

During the past years, M.E. Sharpe's Russian translation journals have devoted a number of their individual contributions as well as some special issues to the past and present of Russian anti-Westernism. For instance, Russian Studies in Philosophy (vol. 47, no. 1) published in 2008 a collection of essays on classical Eurasianism  while Russian Politics and Law (vol. 46, no. 4 & vol. 47, no. 1), in 2008  and 2009,  offered two special editions with research papers focusing on extremely right-wing tendencies in post-Soviet political and intellectual life. These themes were already politically topical at the end of the last decade. Yet, they have become even more salient during the last two years. Especially, since the return of Vladimir Putin to the post of President of the Russian Federation in 2012, non-nationalist modes of legitimation for Russia's re-centralized governmental system have been relegated to the back again.
During the presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev in 2008-2012, the promise of a state-led political, social and economic modernization - an idea already exploited, to a lesser degree, under Putin before - had come to the fore as one of the primary ideational foundations for a supposedly temporary semi-authoritarian governmental system. It appeared as if the duumvirate's peculiar form of rule was, by Medvedev and Putin, seen as a transitional stage on the way on Russia's gradual transformation into a "normal" liberal, rule-based and democratic state. According to that script, Putin's centralizing drive from 1999 to 2008 would have appeared as a politically illiberal intermezzo that was unavoidable in order to bring about an urgent consolidation of Russia's administrative system and civil society, after the chaos of the 1990s. Even the manifest escalation of anti-Americanism and various mobilizational measures, such as the creation of state-sponsored youth organizations, in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of late 2004 could have, within such a scenario, be seen as pragmatic responses to certain destabilizing foreign and domestic impulses which could have threatened the eventually modernizing trajectory of Russia's post-Soviet developmental project.
However, since the announcement, in September 2011, of Putin's re-assumption of the post of RF-President and the impudent electoral falsifications in Moscow and other Russian cities, in December 2012, this narrative of Putinism has lost legitimacy not only as an adequate approach to a historical understanding of the Putin phenomenon in the context of Russia's specifically post-totalitarian situation. The growing confrontation, during 2012, between Putin and Co., on the one side, and the political opposition, civil society and non-conformist artists, on the other, illustrates that the story about Putin as a sort of second Peter the Great does also not fly with many Russians anymore. The officially announced aim of overcoming socio-political backwardness was contradicted by the distinctly pre-modern mode of returning the presidency from Medvedev back to Putin in 2011-2012 as well as the surprisingly primitive methods of falsifying the parliamentary elections of December 2012. Ever since, the peculiar "Putin System" that had emerged in the first decade of the new century has been in crisis, and the Kremlin's political technologists have been in search for a new mode of legitimation of their master's power. 
It is almost "natural" that the Russian authoritarian regime is, under such circumstances, turning to history and the experience of Russia's earlier autocracies. And it is also no surprise that the age-old idea of Russia's "special path" that, supposedly, not only sets her apart from the West, but also entails considerable conflict and, in the worst case, even military confrontation with certain Western countries is gaining popularity again with the current authorities as well as among their various supporters. Since the start of the new Russian protest movement in December 2011, the spread, among the pro-Putinist forces, of ideas about the Russian nation's cultural distinctiveness, historical mission, imperial destiny, Orthodox nature, Eurasian essence, and non-Western character, i.e. ideas closely linked to the vision of Russia's "special path," has been growing by the month.
Fortunately for Russian studies, Emil' Pain, professor of political science at the Higher School of Economics, started already before the latest developments, with the support of the Moscow offices of the Kennan Institute and Friedrich Naumann Foundation, an ambitious project that brought together a number of experts working on ideas of national distinctiveness in Russia and Germany.  On November 20th, 2009, he assembled a binational group of scholars and other researchers at St. Petersburg's Lermontov Library for the Sixth Starovoitova Readings that were devoted to the "Ideology of the 'Special Path' in Russia and Germany."  The literary critic and prolific journalist Aleksandr Arkhangelskii moderated the first session with papers by A. Melikhov, E. Zemskova, M. Maiofis, L. Luks, J. Zarusky, A. Dmitriev, A. Makushinskii, V. Vul'fovich, A. Kubyshkin, M. Gutbrod as well as Iu. Kantor. Pain led the second session consisting of papers by D. Travin, B. Dubin, myself, M. Sokolov, B. Firsov and Pain. Out of this meeting came the collected volume from which the papers of these two special issues of RPL have been drawn.
Sergei Magaril highlights in his broad historical survey some of the sources of Moscow's anti-Westernism, isolationism and provincialism within Russian intellectual, academic, civic and spiritual life. Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Pain provide an exhaustive overview of current ideological trends and political groups espousing the varieties of civilizational nationalism that see the Russian nation as the bearer of some larger supra-national mission. Boris Dubin presents an extensive investigation into the changes and continuities in Russian public opinion about an exceptional distinctiveness of Russia, if compared to other European and non-European nations.
These three papers provide already considerable insight into the origins and nature of contemporary permutations of the idea about Russia's "special path." In combination with the contributions to the following second special issue on the same topic, they constitute a comprehensive illustration for why anti-Western, sometimes radically right-wing ideas have been so tenacious and might become prominent again in Russia. Moreover, the English versions of these investigations have benefited greatly from the fact that their translator, Dr. Stephen D. Shenfield, is himself an accomplished researchers of Russian nationalism, and has thus approached the Russian-language originals of these texts with an especially deep understanding of their substance matter. This translation project should, therefore, contribute to a better understanding, in the West and elsewhere, of the multifarious theoretical foundations, deep historical roots, and varying political consequences of the idea of Russia's "special path."
CONTENTS: "The Claim of Russian Distinctiveness as Justification for Putin s Neo-Authoritarian Regime: Guest Editor's Introduction" by Andreas Umland; "The Mythology of the 'Third Rome' in Russian Educated Society" by Sergei Magaril; "The Myth of the 'Special Path' in Contemporary Russian Public Opinion" by Boris Dubin; "Civilizational Nationalism: The Russian Version of the 'Special Path'" by Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Emil Pain.