Dialectical Logic

This article critically examines Hegel's teleological and state-centered dialectic through the lens of the Quantum and Chaos Libertarianism (QCL) paradigm, which is based on fractality, entanglement, and indeterminacy. It contrasts Hegel's triadic model of thesis-antithesissynthesis with the non-linear, bifurcating, and feedback-rich structure of QCL. Drawing on The Chaotic Atlas of Truth, this paper reinterprets key concepts such as ontology, epistemology, dialectics, law, temporality, subjectivity, ethics, and politics from an extrasystemic perspective, positioning QCL as a counter-structure to Hegelian systematic philosophy.

Friedrich Engels' dialectical assessment of modern science resulted from his fascination with the natural sciences (cell physiology, thermodynamics, theory of evolution) in combination with his resurging interest in the work of "old Hegel." Engels became especially interested in what he saw as the molecular essence of life, namely proteins or, more specifically, albumin (Eiweiß), seeing life as the mode of existence of these enigmatic substances. Hegelian dialectics is crucial for a dialectical materialist understanding of contemporary technoscience. The dialectical materialist understanding of technoscience as a research practice builds on Engels, but also on later (scientific) authors who were inspired by his writings, e.g., life scientists such as Haldane and Bernal. Considering the criticism raised against Engels' dialectics by 20th-century Marxists, a dialectical diagnostic of contemporary technoscience can be achieved, which shifts the focus from artificial albumin as "living matter" (as discussed by Engels) to contemporary research on synthetic cells (as anticipated by Engels).

The Routledge International Handbook of Dialectical Thinking is a landmark volume offering a multi-disciplinary compendium of the research, theory and practice that defines dialectical thinking, its importance and how it develops over the lifespan.

For the first time, this handbook brings together theory and research on dialectical thinking as a psychological phenomenon from early childhood through the human lifespan. Grounding dialectical thinking in multiple philosophical traditions stemming from antiquity, it explores current psychological models of such thought patterns and shows how these can be applied in everyday life and across multiple disciplines, including philosophy, physics, mathematics and international relations. The handbook explains the nature of dialectical thinking, why it is important and how it can be developed in children and in adults. It concludes with a final chapter depicting a discussion among the authors, exploring the question "how could dialectical thinking be the antidote to dogma"

Written by a group of international scholars, this comprehensive publication is an essential reference for researchers and graduate students in psychology and the social sciences, as well as scholars interested in integrating different perspectives and issues from a wide variety of disciplines.

What makes for the appearance of incompatibility between science and religion? Some contributors to the "After Science and Religion" project attribute incompatibility to scientists' assumption of methodological naturalism. In this paper, I argue that the appearance of incompatibility actually stems from upstream theological assumptions about the meaning of the Christian doctrine of creation. In particular, an overemphasis on the intrinsic relation between creaturely being and divine Being can lead to a view that finds the practice of methodological naturalism totally incompatible with theism. I offer an alternative reading of creation as a corrective, which emphasizes the difference between creatures and Creator. Keeping this difference in view creates room for the study of the natural world apart from explicit reference to God, and for a theological reason: the 'ever greater dissimilarity' between Creator and creature warrants a mode of explanation that seeks to understand creatures as different than God.

This is an intelligent exploration of dialectic method and logic, in a contemporary context. Most people, if they have heard anything about Hegel, associate him with the "dialectic method" he claimed to use. The associated "Hegelian dialectic" is often cavalierly explained as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Yet, in fact, Hegel never wrote any substantial account of dialectic logic or method. This book reopens the whole question of the dialectical method in a contemporary context, explaining dialectical logic in terms of variations on indirect proof translatable into today's standard formal logic. "The Dialectic Method" will be of interest not only to Hegel scholars but also to students of history, psychoanalysis, Marxism, theology, philosophy, and formal logic.

O presente artigo tem como objetivo compreender o que revelam as pesquisas brasileiras, com base na Teoria Histórico-Cultural - THC, sobre formação de professores que ensinam matemática e foca nos trabalhos científicos publicados nos Anais do Seminário Internacional de Pesquisa em Educação Matemática (SIPEM), no Grupo de Trabalho 7, nos últimos dez anos (2014 a 2023). O recorte temporal de dez anos nos levou à revisão de literatura das edições do evento dos anos 2015, 2018 e 2021 que, no campo da Educação Matemática, em particular, pode contribuir com a sistematização de informações para que pesquisadores dialoguem com a crescente produção científica da área. No conjunto de 12 pesquisas analisadas, evidencia-se a importância do trabalho coletivo nos espaços de formação docente. Nesse espaço, as ações dos professores e futuros professores que ensinam matemática gradativamente passam a refletir uma mudança de sentido sobre a atividade pedagógica que vai se produzindo, coletivamente, tanto por meio da mudança de motivos dos participantes para participarem desses espaços, quanto de uma tomada de consciência acerca da estrutura da própria atividade docente. Tal processo, como demonstram as pesquisas analisadas, perpassa novos sentidos dos sujeitos acerca de elementos da organização do ensino da matemática e acerca do papel de elementos como o jogo, o problema e a própria concepção de avaliação.

O presente artigo é recorte de uma pesquisa de doutorado sobre o Estágio Curricular Supervisionado na formação inicial de professores de Matemática, ancorada na Teoria Histórico-Cultural e na Teoria da Atividade. Assim como a maioria das atividades humanas, Franco e Longarezi (2011) consideram que exercício da docência também se dá de forma coletiva. Deste modo, analisar as relações sociais que são estabelecidas no Estágio é fundamental para compreendermos a gênese da atividade docente enquanto estrutura social, na maneira como ocorrem suas relações enquanto formas de apropriações de experiências sociais. Como uma das premissas da THC é a de que o desenvolvimento humano é produto das relações sociais, Leontiev (2012) nos esclarece que no decorrer do processo de desenvolvimento do sujeito, sob a influência das circunstâncias concretas da sua vida, o lugar que ele efetivamente ocupa no sistema de relações humanas se altera, assim como a altera a sua atividade principal.

O presente artigo e recorte de uma pesquisa de doutorado sobre o Estagio Curricular Supervisionado na formacao inicial de professores de Matematica, ancorada na Teoria Historico-Cultural e na Teoria da Atividade. Olhamos para as relacoes estabelecidas no Estagio que sao determinantes para a aprendizagem da docencia de futuros professores de Matematica a partir das preocupacoes dos estagiarios sobre o seu ingresso na escola ao assumirem o papel de professores. Para atingir este objetivo constituimos um espaco formativo, constituido de 20 encontros, intencionalmente organizado dentro de um componente curricular de Estagio em Matematica no Ensino Medio em que participaram dez academicos de um Instituto Federal brasileiro. Concluimos que a apropriacao de elementos inerentes a aprendizagem da docencia – tal como ensinar e como relacionar-se com os alunos – e determinada por estas duas relacoes, entre estagiario e alunos e estagiario e professor supervisor.

The situation is-I feel I have not only the right but also the duty to say it-very bad, if not tragic. That is, of course, if we evaluate it not by particular successes and shortcomings, but by the role that philosophy is obliged to play in the communist transformation of the world. Practically, philosophy's influence on events, and on the development of the social and natural sciences, is approaching zero. I have in mind, of course, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, "dialectical materialism"-and since "a sacred place is never empty", as the influence of materialist dialectics declines, so the influence of numerous other motley schools and concepts increases. In the natural sciences, it is-neopositivism,-that is, "logic" in a purely instrumental interpretation (mathematical logic), purged of any philosophical or ideological aspect. As natural scientists increasingly make forays into the field of human and social problems, they operate there most often with the terms of cybernetics ("information", "feedback", "efficiency", "optimality", etc.). And in the social sciences themselves this tendency is very strong. It operates under the noble slogan of "implementing the advanced methods of natural science into the social sciences". The source of translation: E. Il'enkov. 2009. O polozhenii s filosofiej (Pis'mo k TSK partii). In Eval'd Vasil'evich Il'enkov, ed. V. Tolstykh (pp. 378-387). Moscow: ROSSPĖN. We are much obliged to David Bakhurst, whose generous help and insightful suggestions greatly improved this translation. We also thank Penny Cole for checking and improving our English.

Hemmerle's transformation of the question "What remains?" by pointing to love is paradoxical. How is it possible for love to remain when it is that which does not insist on itself, but rather gives itself completely? How are we to think of the remaining of that which does not remain? And yet the recent development of philosophy shows that truth and thought are entangled in just such self-referential "paradoxes of the infinite". This paper will follow Heidegger, Przywara and Hemmerle in studying how Trinitarian self-giving or love is a transformative rhythm of being beyond logic and dialectic. Does it move away from the impasses of modern philosophy and renew the tradition of Trinitarian metaphysics, so that it becomes clear why neither logic nor dialectic but only love completes the emendatory task of thought?

This initial volume is an "encyclopedic dictionary" for the planned multi-volume ENCYCLOPEDIA DIALECTICA.  It defines key concepts developed to explicate the Foundation Encyclopedia Dialectica 'Dialectical Theory of Everything', as a contribution toward a new, dialectical worldview for a united humanity.

Bulletin of the IEEE Technical Committee on Learning Technology, Volume 14, Number 4, October 2012 ... Abstract—We describe ClassConversations a prototype that integrates a synchronous classroom backchannel with an anchored discussion forum. ... Index Terms—Classroom technology, classroom backchannel, discussion forum ... I. INTRODUCTION ONVERSATION has a long tradition in learning. Classroom discussion, and more recently online out-of-classroom discussion are central learning activities in many pedagogical approaches. We are ...

The interests of the Chilean engineer and phi-losopher Manuel Atria Ramírez cover a variety of subjects and disciplines, but most of his pub-lished work focuses on philosophy of mathe-matics and physics. After a first phase of youth, of evident Thomistic inclination, his mature thought shows the influence of the great epistemological schools that thrive during the first half of the 20th century. Beyond illustrating the reception that was given in those years in the Latin American academic scene to the new European philosophical tendencies, we think that the concise expository style of the author and his deep understanding of mathematical physics and its history, have the merit to pose with freshness and originality the question referring to the ultimate foundation of mathematics, and its connection with reality. In this article we present and analyze the fundamental lines of Professor Atria`s philosophy of mathematics and physics, as well as those questions open for further research.

Bu makalede, Birgivî’nin sorgulama ve tartışma kuralları ile ilgili risalesini Veliyyüddîn Cârullah’ın nasıl yorumladığı onun eş-Şerḥu’s-Ṣaġîr eseri çerçevesinde incelenmiş ve Cârullah’ın bu şerhinin tenkitli Arapça metni sunulmuştur. Sorgulama ve tartışma kavramlarının ilahiyat bilimleri ile ilişkisinin kurulduğu disiplinlerden biri, âdâbu’l-baḥs̠ ve’l-münâẓara (sorgulama ve tartışma kuralları) alanıdır. Bu disiplin, Osmanlı yüksek öğretiminde bir ders olarak yer almıştır. Bu dersin okutulduğu metinlerin arasında Birgivî’nin bir sayfalık sorgulama ve tartışma kuralları hakkındaki risalesi ve onun Cârullah’a ait şerhleri bulunmaktadır. Cârullah, bu risaleye sırasıyla büyük, orta ve küçük olmak üzere üç şerh kaleme almıştır. Cârullah, ilk iki şerhte Birgivî’nin risalesini yorumlamaktan ziyade kendisinden önce bu risaleyi yorumlayan dört şârihi tenkit etmekle ilgilenmiştir. Bu nedenle Birgivî’nin ilgili risalesine dair Cârullah’ın yorumunu küçük şerh üzerinden inceledik. Birgivî metninin Cârullah yorumunun makalede inceleme konusu olarak seçilmesinin nedeni, onun diğer on beş yorumcuya göre hem eser sayısı hem de eserlerin hacmi bakımından daha velût olması ve Birgivî’nin risalesini yorumlamadan önce bu alanda hacimli eserlerini kaleme almış olmasıdır. Diğer bir neden ise Cârullah’ın sorgulama ve tartışma alanında ansiklopedik eserler kaleme almasına rağmen özellikle onun entelektüel dünyası ile ilgili yapılan akademik çalışmalarda onun bu yönüne değinilmemiş olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, Cârullah’ın entelektüel profilinde eksik kalan bir parçayı tamamlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda ilahiyat ve İslami ilimlerin “sorgulama” ve “tartışma” kavramlarıyla bir araya geldiği zemininin Cârullah örneği ile gösterilmesi, bu makaledeki diğer bir amaçtır. Bu çerçevede makale iki bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde Cârullah’ın Birgivî risalesindeki tartışma ve tartışmacının mahiyeti, aktarım, iddia, öncül, delil ve sonuç hakkındaki sorgulama ve tartışma kurallarını nasıl yorumladığı incelendi. Bununla beraber Cârullah’ın Birgivî’yi sorgulama ve tartışma literatüründe onu nereye konumlandırdığı tespit edildi. Ayrıca Cârullah’ın diğer yorumcularla örtüşen görüşleri bu yorumcuların şerhlerine atıflarla gösterildi. Bu bağlamda Cârullah, Birgivî’nin metinde kullandığı teknik terimleri tanımlamaktadır. Zira Birgivî, sorgulama ve tartışmanın teknik terimlerini tanımlamadan sadece tartışma sürecini özetlemektedir. Örneğin Birgivî, “tartışmacı” teknik terimini tanımlamadan kullanır ancak Cârullah, “tartışma” kavramı için hem “iki şey arasındaki bağın iki kişi tarafından gerçeği açığa çıkarmak için düşünülmesi” hem de “gerçeği açığa çıkarmak için iki kişinin bir görüşü karşılıklı savunması” tanımlarını ifade eder. Cârullah, Birgivî’nin bazı görüşlerine katılmamaktadır. Bu çerçevede Birgivî, tartışmacıyı sorgulayan olarak isimlendirmektedir. Ancak Cârullah’a göre onun karşılıklı olmayı ifade eden “soruşturan” kavramıyla tanımlanması daha uygundur. Cârullah, Birgivî’nin karşı tarafın itiraz edebilmesini kesin olarak bilmediği konularla sınırlamasını doğru bulmaz. O, bu iddiasını desteklemek için Îcî’nin konu hakkındaki tutumunu örnek gösterir ve karşı tarafın sınamak, bilse bile daha kesin bilgi elde etmek için itiraz edebileceğini ileri sürer. Cârullah, Birgivî’nin bazı konularda Îcî’den farklı düşündüğünü ileri sürse de tartışmanın düzeni bakımından onunla aynı konumda olduğunu ifade eder. O, tartışmanın sıralaması konusunda Kutbuddîn er-Râzî gibi düşündüğünü belirtir. Başka delile geçiş konusunda Birgivî’nin Pezdevî ve Teftazânî’den etkilendiğini ve genel olarak yöntemci Hanefi İslam hukukçularının görüşlerine tabi olduğunu iddia eder. Ancak Cârullah, yine başka delile geçiş konusunda Birgivî’nin Hanefi İslam hukukçuların görüşlerine dair verdiği ayrıntının sorgulama ve tartışma disiplini açısından gereksiz olduğunu düşünür. Çünkü sorgulama ve tartışma disiplininde başka delile geçiş Hanefî ya da Şafiʿî yöntemci hukukçuların belirlediği kriterlere göre değil bu disiplinin kriterlerine göre belirlenir. Örneğin sonucu tartışırken karşı delil getirildiğinde tartışmacı başka delile geçerse bu geçtiği delil, bu disiplinin prensiplerine göre karşı delil olmamalıdır. İkinci bölümde dört nüshası tespit edilen küçük şerhin Arapça metninin edisyon kritiği İSAM tahkik esaslarına göre yapıldı. Ayrıca bu şerhi önceleyen diğer şerhler tespit edildi. Sonuç olarak Cârullah yorumlarında sorunsal konulara değinmeyip Birgivî’nin özet metninin teknik terimlerinin tanımlanmasına ve onun görüşleri itibariyle bu disiplindeki konumunun belirlenmesine odaklanmıştır.
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This article delves into how Walī al-Dīn Jār Allāh interprets Mehmed al-Birgiwī's treatise on inquiry and debate in the context of his work al-Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr and presents the critical Arabic text of his commentary. The field of ādāb al-baḥs̠ wa al-munāẓara, which establishes the relationship between the theological sciences and the concepts of inquiry and debate, is one of the disciplines included in the Ottoman higher education curriculum. Birgiwī’s one-page treatise on inquiry and debate and Jār Allāh's commentaries are among the texts taught in the related courses. Jār Allāh wrote three commentaries on this treatise, namely “the Great”, “the Middle”, and “the Short” ones. However, in the first two commentaries, Jār Allāh focuses more on criticizing the four authors who had written commentaries on the treatise before him rather than on interpreting it. Consequently, this article scrutinizes Jār Allāh's interpretation of the treatise based on “the Short Commentary”. The reason for choosing this commentary on the treatise as the subject of examination in this article is Jār Allāh's greater productivity in terms of both the number of works and the page count compared to the other fifteen commentators. Additionally, he had already authored substantial works in this field before interpreting the treatise. Moreover, despite Jār Allāh's authorship of encyclopaedic works in the field of inquiry and debate, there has been a lack of attention to this aspect, particularly in academic studies focusing on his intellectual legacy. Therefore, this study aims to fill the gap in Jār Allāh's intellectual profile and to illustrate the intersection of theology and Islamic sciences with the concepts of "inquiry" and "debate" through the example of the commentary. This study consists of two sections within this framework. The first section examines how Jār Allāh interprets the inquiry and debate surrounding the nature of the discussion and the discussant in the treatise, as well as the aspects of narration, claim, premise, evidence, and conclusion. Additionally, it examines Jār Allāh's positioning of Birgiwī within the literature on inquiry and debate. Overlapping views with other commentators by Jār Allāh are demonstrated through references to the commentaries of these scholars. In this context, Jār Allāh defines the technical terms used by Birgiwī, as Birgiwī summarizes the process of inquiry and debate without defining the technical terms associated with them. For example, Birgiwī uses the term "debater" without providing a definition, but Jār Allāh defines the concept of "debate" as both "the contemplation by two individuals of the connection between two things to reveal the truth" and "the mutual defense of a viewpoint by two individuals to reveal the truth." Jār Allāh does not agree with Birgiwī's views, and he argues that it is more appropriate to define the debater as an "inquirer," which denotes reciprocal questioning. Jār Allāh disagrees with Birgiwī's opinion that the opposing party can only inquire about the premises, evidence, or narration if they do not have definitive konowledge. To support this claim, he cites al-Ījī's stance on the subject, arguing that the opposing party can challenge and object, even if they already know, to obtain more precise knowledge or test a debater. While Jār Allāh claims that he disagrees with Ījī on certain issues, he expresses that, in terms of the organization of the debate, he is in the same position as Ījī. He thinks similarly to al-Rāzī regarding the organization of the debate. According to Jār Allāh, Birgiwī was influenced by al-Pazdawī’s and al-Taftazānī’s opinions on the transition to another evidence, and he generally followed the views of methodist Ḥanafī jurists. However, Jār Allāh argues that the specific details provided by Birgiwī regarding the views of Hanafī jurists in transitioning to another piece of evidence are not relevant within the discipline of inquiry and debate. In this discipline, the criteria for transitioning to another piece of evidence are determined by its own principles, and not by the criteria set by methodist Ḥanafī or Shafiʿī jurists. For instance, when discussing conclusions and counter-evidence, if a debater prefers the transition to another piece of evidence, it should not be considered counter-evidence according to the principles of this discipline. In the second section of the article, a critical edition of the Arabic text of “the Short Commentary”, for which four copies were identified, was conducted following ISAM’s textual criticism principles. Additionally, four other commentaries preceding this commentary were identified. Ultimately, this study concludes that Jār Allāh focused on defining the technical terms of the treatise and determining his position within the discipline based on his own views without addressing any problematic issues in his interpretations.

Обсуждается, зачем диалектика биологам и исследователям социальных наук, как так получается, что биологическая эволюция и социальная история происходят так, что законы диалектики следуют непосредственно из их наиболее общих черт. Обсуждается соотношение философской подосновы и конкретных научных дисциплин.

La extensa presentación a la compilación Estética y filosofía de la praxis2realizada porel Dr. José Ramón Fabelo Corzobajo el título“Desde la representación hasta la participación:itinerario del pensamiento estético de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez”,constituye  un  profundo estudio  de  la  evolución  de  lasideas  estéticas  de  Adolfo  Sánchez  Vázquez  y,  por  ende,  un pormenorizadoestudio de las distintas facetas o aristas del fenómeno estético desde el punto del marxismo. Por sí mismo este texto resulta sumamente valioso pues el lector tendría que revisar una ingente cantidad de textos de Sánchez Vázquez-dentro deuna producción teórica que  abarca  décadas-que  no  necesariamente  son  accesibles  para  todos,ni  siquiera  para  el público especializado;textos sin los cuales difícilmente es posible arribar aun entendimiento cabal  del  derrotero  del  pensamiento  estético  de  esteimportanteautor,  cuya  reflexión  es imprescindible a la hora de plantear un punto de vista marxista sobre la naturaleza del arte.

Un volumen dedicado a estudios sobre la filosofía moderna y contemporánea. Desde Descartes, pasando por Espinosa, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Engels y Husserl, que fueron conferencias pronunciadas en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de León (España), en el curso anterior, coordinado por María Isabel Lafuente, Profesora de dicha Facultad.

A volume dedicated to studies on modern and contemporary philosophy. From Descartes, through Espinosa, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Engels and Husserl, which were lectures given at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of León (Spain), in the previous academic year, coordinated by María Isabel Lafuente, Professor of Philosophy at that University.

Resumo: O trabalho aborda a questão da compreensão de Federico Engels do problema religioso, entrando na crítica à posição que assume a o pensador marxista como mecanicista e dogmático diante deste e de outros problemas. Pretende-se demonstrar a fragilidade desse entendimento, fornecendo elementos a favor da riqueza do entendimento engelsiano, que não se limita a aceitar a religião como um simples "reflexo" da realidade, mas que também não descarta essa definição clara. Levanta a complementaridade da tese de reflexão e aquela que se situa no nível da teoria da produção espiritual, que vem da filosofia idealista alemã do século XIX. Palavras-chave: Engels, marxismo, religião, ideologia. Resumen: El trabajo aborda el tema de la comprensión por Federico Engels del problema religioso, adentrándose en la crítica a la posición que asume al pensador marxista como mecanicista y dogmático ante este y otros problemas. Se pretende demostrar la fragilidad de esta comprensión, brindando elementos a favor de la riqueza de la comprensión engelsiana, que no se limita a aceptar la religión como simple "reflejo" de la realidad, pero que tampoco desecha esa clara definición. Plantea la complementariedad de la tesis del reflejo y la que se sitúa en el plano de la teoría de la producción espiritual, que viene de la filosofía idealista alemana del siglo XIX.

The world looks like disintegrated into many different and independent spheres, but we feel intuitively that a great variety of existing forms should have a common basis. How can we come to the true knowledge about our existence? How does the Universe work? A great desire of man is to find a true meaning of our life and the essence of existence. Many philosophers and scientists have expressed the Unity Principle by saying "everything is connected to everything else", but its essence has not been detected. On the base of dialectical logic, the Unity Principle is discovered which illustrate not only the exact mechanism how the physical Universe may work, but also the essence of Consciousness.

The TRUTH of our existence has not been detected by science so far. Why does theoretical physics know nothing about the essence of space, matter, energy and time? How can we come to the true knowledge about our existence? Let us look at the reason of critical situation in contemporary theoretical physics and show how critical logical thinking and reasoning can open the door to the truth. I am sure that fair people with open mind want to feel a fresh wind of strong logic leading to the knowledge of truth. A great desire of Man is to find a true meaning of our life and the essence of being. The reality looks like disintegrated into many different and independent spheres, but we feel intuitively that a great variety of existing forms should have a common basis. Many philosophers and scientists have correctly expressed the Unity Principle by the sentence: "Everything is connected to everything else", but nobody has detected its essence. On the base of dialectical logic the Unity Principle is discovered showing not only the exact mechanism how the physical Universe works, but also the essence of consciousness and subsequently personal God representing the whole self-aware and selfcreating reality of the highest complexity.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

This paper focuses on an emblematic encounter between philosophy and psychoanalysis in the guise of a textual analysis that demonstrates the tension between two (philosophical) texts by Slavoj Žižek, through what is omitted from one of them, on the one hand, and some psychoanalytical texts, on the other. Employing Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, one can uncover a curious blind spot on Žižek's part regarding the prevailing social and political context of 'lockdowns' and 'vaccinations'which arguably signal the attempt to execute a global coup d'etat by the 'New World Order'by identifying lacunae in Žižek's second text, which are symptomatic of what Freud called 'negation', and which Lacan relates to the 'censored chapter' of the subject's life story. One can regard these omissions as symptomatic of repressing knowledge of disturbing events in the extant world, given Žižek's well-known ability to offer trenchant criticism of any action he deems deserving of it.

A simple example of the Encyclopedia Dialectica Dialectical Method in action.  Presents 'The Dialectic of the ['''proverse'''] Operations of the Standard Arithmetics and Algebras', including the arithmetical/algebraic operation of "Hyper-Exponentiation', and also addresses the analogues of these standard arithmetical operations in the Encyclopedia Dialectica Non-Standard 'arithmetics for modeling dialectics'.

This essay proposes a reading of psychoanalytic development through crisis. It will be argued that various crisis within and outside of the psychoanalytic field had a determining and constituting role in theoretical and clinical development. The disavowed historical antagonisms that are inherent to psychoanalysis and helped advance psychoanalytic theory, equally created further schisms, perpetuating dialectic of resistance-criticism-revision that maintains the radical potential of the theory and at the same time the destructive other side. The non-relation between particular theories of psychoanalysis and philosophy will be placed in the context of the dialectic that fosters this antagonistic relation, formulating new views and theoretical postulates and equally, the potential for destruction of the radical idea.

The series "Studies in Computational Intelligence" (SCI) publishes new developments and advances in the various areas of computational intelligence-quickly and with a high quality. The intent is to cover the theory, applications, and design methods of computational intelligence, as embedded in the fields of engineering, computer science, physics and life sciences, as well as the methodologies behind them. The series contains monographs, lecture notes and edited volumes in computational intelligence spanning the areas of neural networks, connectionist systems, genetic algorithms, evolutionary computation, artificial intelligence, cellular automata, self-organizing systems, soft computing, fuzzy systems, and hybrid intelligent systems. Of particular value to both the contributors and the readership are the short publication timeframe and the worldwide distribution, which enable both wide and rapid dissemination of research output.

The subject of publication is the theoretical generalization of the philosophical foundations of fundamental scientific research (FSR). The stages of institutionalization of attitude to the FSR are considered, from the stage of critical discussion of the conditions for obtaining true knowledge of the Hellenistic period to the developed system of teaching about the transcendental logic of Kant and Hegel’s logical teaching about being, essence and concept in the context of fundamental scientific research. The methodology is based on generalization of the most radical points of view and approaches of representatives of different philosophical schools and research programs to clarify the essence and ways of FSR. The causes and gnoseological origins of the FSR scientific method change to the modern form of the method of verification toleration of scientific theories of post-positivism and metapositivism (Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend) are described. As a result of the study, it was c...

Rewolucje naukowe według Sadego a dzisiejsza epistemologia * Sady's account of scientifi c revolutions and today's epistemology Abstract: W. Sady's book Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fizyce [The Structure of the Relativist and Quantum Revolutions in Physics] is discussed. In his analysis of the history of physics of XIX and early XX centuries the Author argues, contrary to Kuhn, that grand discoveries result as conclusions from certain assumptions and suitably selected pieces of background knowledge. I point to major Sady's inspirations-Wittgenstein, Wiśniewski and Fleck-and the kinship of his account to hinge epistemology and my sandwich theory of knowledge. His view on the social nature of knowledge and the role of mathematics is commented upon. In conclusion I suggest that the tension between Sady's antirealism and traditional truth requirement for knowledge can be resolved by a suitable modifi cation of Ajdukiewicz's radical conventionalism.

This article aims to critically analyse the concept of the development of science, as proposed by Wojciech Sady in the work Struktura rewolucji relatywistycznej i kwantowej w fi zyce [The Structure of the Relativity and Quantum Revolution in Physics]. The author uses Ludwik Fleck's concept of thought styles and thought collectives to analyse the problem of how two great scientifi c revolutions took place in 20th-Century physics in terms of the rise of quantum theory and special relativity. Sady argues that the way of thinking of scientists is determined by the particular thought style in which they were educated, and that great scientifi c discoveries are not the result of "creative imagination", but a product of deductive reasoning, in which scholars closely adhere to the formalism of mathematical theory and the results of experiments. Therefore, scientifi c discovery in physics is made "on paper" rather than "in the mind of a scientist." In the "battle of equations with the imagination," equations always win, and scientifi c discovery is more a result of the work of a scientifi c community than solitary geniuses, and can only be made at the right time in history, called the "discoverygenic situation." The concept of the development of science presented in The Structure is directed against the incommensurability thesis and the indeterminacy thesis.

RESUMEN: El artículo analiza la formación del pensamiento marxista de Ernesto Che Guevara. Se aborda el ascenso en su autoformación marxista en la medida que conoce, interpreta y se propone cambiar la realidad de su país natal y luego de Latinoamérica en la etapa de su temprana juventud. El presente trabajo pretende resaltar la visión intelectual del Che. Desde sus análisis en la conformación de un diccionario filosófico, hasta las propuestas más elaboradas en su condición de dirigente de la Revolución Cubana, Che asume una posición crítica de la teoría y elabora una propuesta de construcción de una sociedad socialista y de un nuevo hombre, desde las condiciones de un país latinoamericano y subdesarrollado. Aquí se valora al Che como pensador crítico y se considera su obra teórica como parte de los autores de la variante crítica del marxismo latinoamericano.

[[[ (Here only the chapters 3-8, see ***) First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic selfreference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the-pragmatically presuposed-consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). ]]] The central question here is that about the actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition-that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context-ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). 3. *** Analysis of antinomic structures Up to now, it has been assumed that antinomies occur in certain cases, and the question was how to prevent this type of structure. The reason for the emergence of antinomies remained in the dark, and, strictly speaking, antinomies really have been understood only as contradictions resulting from faulty definitions. But undoubtedly not every contradiction as such is antinomic. In the following, therefore, an analysis of the specifically antinomic structures and of the very reason of their occurrence will be undertaken, whereby, as will become apparent, also pragmatic aspects of fundamental importancewill be revealed.

What corresponds to the present-day 'transcendental-pragmatic' concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel's fundamental intuition is that of a 'backward going grounding' obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby 'wrapping itself into a circle'-the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple 'logics' which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Essential is that it is 'under-cover-effcient' as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit undercover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. Zusammenfassung Dem heutigen 'transzendental-pragmatischen' Begriff der Letztbegründung korrespondiert bei Hegel der Absolutheitsanspruch der Logik. Hegels Grundintuition ist die eines 'rückwärtsgehenden Begründens', das seine eigenen Voraussetzungen einholt und sich damit 'in einen Kreis schlingt'das Projekt einer Selbstbegründung der Logik, verstanden als Selbstexplikation der Logik mit logischen Mitteln. Dabei handelt es sich nicht um eine der vielen 'Logiken', die als formale Konstrukte keine Absolutheit beanspruchen können, sondern um eine fundamentale Logik, die logische Gefüge überhaupt erst ermöglicht und damit transzendentalen Charakter besitzt. Das Widerspruchsprinzip ist dafür ein Exempel. Wesentlich ist, dass es sich 'untergründig' Geltung verschafft, sobald überhaupt sinnvolle Begriffe verwendet werden. Selbstexplikation der Fundamentallogik bedeutet dann, deren untergründige, implizite Geltung zu explizieren, und zwar mit den Mitteln eben dieser Logik selbst. Wie gezeigt wird, ist dies Sache der Dialektik, die so als Letztbegründung der Fundamentallogik zu verstehen ist. Am Beispiel der Sein-Nichtsein-Dialektik wird das hier ausführlich analysiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass jeder Explikationsschritt einen neuen impliziten Sachverhalt generiert und die so entstandene neue Explikations-Diskrepanz eine antinomische Struktur erzeugt, die das Explikationsverfahren erneut weiterleitet. Dieses ist dadurch ganz aus sich heraus bestimmt. Entscheidend ist, dass für die Letzbegründungs-Argumentation damit ein objektiv ausweisbares Verfahren gefunden ist, das offenbar nur in einem Hegelschen Rahmen möglich ist. Demgegenüber hat die von der Transzendental-Pragmatik beanspruchte unmittelbare Evidenz eines Sprechakts lediglich privaten Charakter, der begründungstheoretisch irrelevant ist.

This work attempts to understand the contemporary Haitian state, which is a paragon of the neoliberal state model. Haiti’s neoliberal state is a colonial state impoverished to serve American global capitalist hegemony under the auspices of a Haitian comprador bourgeoisie composed of professionals, managers, intellectuals, and business elites in Haiti and the diaspora. However, unlike Chile, which the West points to as the success of the neoliberal process, Haiti’s model is a complete failure, similar to the attempt to neoliberalize Russia post the fall of the Soviet Union. Whereas Russia, under Vladimir Putin, was able to combat the deleterious
effects of the neoliberal process, Haiti is unable to do so. The work posits that Haiti’s failures rest on its
colonial experiences under mercantilist and liberal capitalism and the embourgeoisement of its population on the island and the diaspora.

[[[ (Here only the chapters 3-8, see ***) First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic selfreference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the-pragmatically presuposed-consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). ]]] The central question here is that about the actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition-that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context-ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). 3. *** Analysis of antinomic structures Up to now, it has been assumed that antinomies occur in certain cases, and the question was how to prevent this type of structure. The reason for the emergence of antinomies remained in the dark, and, strictly speaking, antinomies really have been understood only as contradictions resulting from faulty definitions. But undoubtedly not every contradiction as such is antinomic. In the following, therefore, an analysis of the specifically antinomic structures and of the very reason of their occurrence will be undertaken, whereby, as will become apparent, also pragmatic aspects of fundamental importancewill be revealed.

What corresponds to the present-day 'transcendental-pragmatic' concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel's fundamental intuition is that of a 'backward going grounding' obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby 'wrapping itself into a circle'-the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple 'logics' which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Essential is that it is 'under-cover-effcient' as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit undercover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. Zusammenfassung Dem heutigen 'transzendental-pragmatischen' Begriff der Letztbegründung korrespondiert bei Hegel der Absolutheitsanspruch der Logik. Hegels Grundintuition ist die eines 'rückwärtsgehenden Begründens', das seine eigenen Voraussetzungen einholt und sich damit 'in einen Kreis schlingt'das Projekt einer Selbstbegründung der Logik, verstanden als Selbstexplikation der Logik mit logischen Mitteln. Dabei handelt es sich nicht um eine der vielen 'Logiken', die als formale Konstrukte keine Absolutheit beanspruchen können, sondern um eine fundamentale Logik, die logische Gefüge überhaupt erst ermöglicht und damit transzendentalen Charakter besitzt. Das Widerspruchsprinzip ist dafür ein Exempel. Wesentlich ist, dass es sich 'untergründig' Geltung verschafft, sobald überhaupt sinnvolle Begriffe verwendet werden. Selbstexplikation der Fundamentallogik bedeutet dann, deren untergründige, implizite Geltung zu explizieren, und zwar mit den Mitteln eben dieser Logik selbst. Wie gezeigt wird, ist dies Sache der Dialektik, die so als Letztbegründung der Fundamentallogik zu verstehen ist. Am Beispiel der Sein-Nichtsein-Dialektik wird das hier ausführlich analysiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass jeder Explikationsschritt einen neuen impliziten Sachverhalt generiert und die so entstandene neue Explikations-Diskrepanz eine antinomische Struktur erzeugt, die das Explikationsverfahren erneut weiterleitet. Dieses ist dadurch ganz aus sich heraus bestimmt. Entscheidend ist, dass für die Letzbegründungs-Argumentation damit ein objektiv ausweisbares Verfahren gefunden ist, das offenbar nur in einem Hegelschen Rahmen möglich ist. Demgegenüber hat die von der Transzendental-Pragmatik beanspruchte unmittelbare Evidenz eines Sprechakts lediglich privaten Charakter, der begründungstheoretisch irrelevant ist.

How can we think about the role of the erogenous body and its manifestations in the final stage of an analysis, and the solidarity with the human that it enables? This essay examines the stakes of the traversal of the fantasy in the unfolding of an analysis, arguing that the aim of a psychoanalysis is to liberate the unconscious quest that traverses the analysand by giving expression to what has been censored in his or her body. Paradoxically, however, I claim that this censored quest is not only unique to the individual analysand, but something that articulates that subject to humanity as a whole. While Freud consistently underscores the fundamental solitude of the human being with respect to the free drive and the fantasies to which it gives rise, the underexamined corollary of this position is that human reality is fundamentally transindividual and intersubjective, traversed by a quest that impacts each and every human being but that belongs to no one in particular. The second part of the essay explores how this transindividual dimension was experienced, and with what consequences in a clinical case of hysteria; the third turns to the procedure of the Pass that for Lacan guarantees the production of the analyst, arguing that this procedure is essential to the guarantee precisely because it confirms the opening to the human that is the logical conclusion of an analytic cure.

In the book La Lógica de Hegel y el marxismo , published in 2009, an exhaustive study of the objective logic of G. W. F. Hegel was made; This matter is the content of the first volume of The Science of Logic, the masterpiece of the German philosopher. Our work was structured as follows. In the first place, Hegel's text was taken as a starting point, either by means of a direct quotation, a summary or an extract; later, an attempt was made to give the Hegelian obscurity the greatest possible intelligibility in order to obtain the marrow of the philosopher's thought; Finally, this essential nucleus was placed on its feet by rescuing the rational content of the Hegelian postulates.
In this Summary we present both Hegel's thought and the Marxist interpretation of it, completely decanted, separated from all the complicated intellective apparatus used to arrive at them, but without altering their essence. In this way, we want to make our work accessible to a larger number of readers.