Unconscious Processes

For most of human history, the proposition of the supremacy of conscious thought and intentional behavior has been primary even though a persisting hypothesis existed about the importance of unconscious causes of human behavior. As we have seen in earlier chapters, contemporary psychological science remains attached to a conscious-centric model of the higher mental activities, supporting the idea of the unconscious as a system that is primarily a subliminal stimulation from the environment. This conception perpetuates the idea that our conscious self promoting processes are most important and significant, representing the causal force of human judgment and behavior. John A. Bargh et al., wrote, “Today, most theories of goal pursuit emphasize conscious choice and guidance of behavior on a moment-to-moment basis.”4 Instead, in this chapter we will begin to examine the fact that many of our actions are not fully determined by our conscious mind, but, rather, we more often act habitually and without conscious awareness. In fact, not only our brain but our whole body is very busy automatically maintaining itself and our relationship to the world. Such processes are unconscious and continue even when we are engaged in conscious calculations. There are many unconscious processes going on not only because we have to filter out stimuli or impulses, but also because many of our cognitive operations function quickly without cognitive awareness. We define the concept of the unconscious in referring to mental activity, in contrast to consciousness.
Therefore, the term ‘the unconscious’ means the existence of sophisticated, flexible, and adaptive outside of awareness behavior guidance systems. Something formed by a combination of biological and environmental influences. It is a process—a way of constructing perception, memories and other kinds of cognition that changes systematically with development and experience. While our consciousness plays a significant role in our ability to transform, manipulate, and convey information, nevertheless, even when we are alert and attentive, our body, which includes the brain, processes a great amount of information automatically and out of awareness. In fact, we are often unaware of implicit percepts, memories, and thoughts that affect our ongoing experience, thought, and action.

The climactic chapter of Eduard von Hartmann's three-volume Masterwork. What better way to introduce this chapter than to let von Hartmann do so himself: "WE have in our previous inquiries ever and again met with two principles, Will and Idea, without the assumption of which no explanation would be possible, and which are really principles, i.e., original elements, because every attempt to resolve them into simpler elements appears from the first hopeless , but all previous endeavours to refer one to the other are to be regarded as miscarrying. We have, however, also nowhere needed other than these two principles for our explanations, and what perhaps might be regarded as principia, feeling or sensation and consciousness, we have seen to be phenomenal consequences of our principles. Other elementary activities, as imagining, willing, perceiving, or feeling, have, so far as I know, never been introduced even tentatively in any spiritualistic philosophy , so that he alone could find fault with our adhering to Will and Idea who, on his part, should furnish the proof that the previously received elementary functions of the mind are not the right ones, and show what others are to be put in their place. Now, as concerns our conceptions of these principia, we proceeded here too purely empirically, and inductively. We understood them, in the first place, as the ordinary intelligence formed in the leading-strings of the Teutonic languages apprehends them, and altered, extended, and limited them as the scientific need of explaining facts required. The starting-point of our philosophising is accordingly anthropological, so far as the linguistic popular consciousness and philosophic empiricism derive both from the inner experience of the mental activity of men. In fact, this starting-point appears, after a little reflection, the only possible one. Only what we are able to understand by analogy with ourselves, only that are we able at all to understand of the world; and were we not ourselves a piece of the world, and had not our anthropological elementary functions, like all the other phenomena of this world, grown out of the common simple fundamental principles of this world, then with the absence of resemblance and analogy between us and the rest of this world all possibility also of an understanding of the same would be cut off for us". And it only gets more fascinating...

Summary

The creative process (whether it is in the arts or the sciences) involves different ways of thinking and different states of consciousness. These can be broadly described as either intellectual, conscious processes or less conscious intuitive processes. Although Jungian psychology provides insight into the nature of intuition as a psychological function, intuition is not well understood by creative individuals and creative arts educators, even though they may be familiar with the intuitive experience itself. This study investigates the nature of intuition in the creative process (referred to as creative intuition) by examining four underlying principles which characterise it, drawing from psychology as well as Eastern and Western philosophy. It aims to contribute to a more coherent understanding of intuition as a mode of creation.

The method of research is primarily phenomenological and interpretive and may be described as philosophical hermeneutics. The primary research approach is supplemented with elements of non-empirical methodologies, specifically ‘conceptual analysis’, ‘philosophical analysis’ and ‘literature review’ as questions of meaning, explanation and understanding are explored.

The expanded state of consciousness in which intuition functions is examined at length, as well as open, fluid ways of thinking and being in the world. The nature of the intuitive experience, which relies on an emotional engagement with particularity, as opposed to concepts or symbols, is examined in detail, including the extraordinary experience of non-duality which arises from an emotional engagement with the concrete and the particular. What emerges from this investigation is an understanding that intuition that cannot co-exist temporally with rational, intellectual functioning. Other ways of being in the world, which involve a surrender of the ego, are required for intuition to flourish. These are presented as suggestions for nurturing the experience of creative intuition in the final chapter before the Conclusion. Further research and dialogue on the topic are recommended, which will benefit creativity research as well as restoring to intuition the value and respect it deserves as a natural and instinctive way of knowing.

Das Unterbewusstsein ist der Teil der menschlichen Psyche, der dem Verstand im allgemeinen nicht zugänglich ist. Hier werden lebenswichtige Körperfunktionen, wie Atmung, Herzschlag, Hormone, Organe usw. gesteuert. Es ist aber auch Sitz von Erfahrungen, Erinnerungen, Konditionen und Suggestionen, die eine wichtige Rolle in Ihren Entscheidungen im Leben haben.
Das Unterbewusstsein ist der Teil unseres Gehirns, der mit Gefühlen, Bildern, Symbolen, Vorstellungen, Gerüchen, Klängen und Kreativität zu tun hat. Es befindet sich in der rechten Seite unseres Gehirns und spielt eine Rolle für alle intuitiven Entscheidungen, die wir in unserem Leben treffen.
Das Unterbewusstsein kann nicht über die Richtigkeit von Informationen bestimmen. Es speichert die Informationen unzensiert solange als wahr, bis wir diese als falsch beweisen. Es mag Routine, kann jedoch durch passende Übung gesteuert werden.

Intertextuality within Shakespeare
APPENDIX: Various Clusterings of Shakespeare Concepts
Kent Palmer

The output matrix of ten iterations of the Leximancer program of Andrew Smith on the Shakespeare data is averaged and used as input into the clustering program of John Brzustowski.

This is data is a further analysis of the data that appears in "Intratextuality: Exploring the Unconscious of the Text" by Kent Palmer
https://www.academia.edu/3795462/Intratextuality_Exploring_the_Unconscious_of_the_Text

This is the third of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London.
The Companion to Volume 3 introduces major phases and findings in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) starting with the time it takes for these to form and the wider research program that might lead to their discovery. This includes the search for mechanisms responsible for “neural binding”—how widely dispersed neural activities support integrated conscious experiences, and the search for neural markers of consciousness that can serve to distinguish conscious from preconscious and unconscious activities in the brain. We then turn to global disorders of consciousness that indirectly reveal the conditions that support consciousness by establishing what abolishes it or impairs it, and conclude this section with reviews of the major challenges in the search for NCCs that still remain. This survey then continues with research on the divided brain with cerebral commissurotomy patients, which proved to be very useful in determining the respective functions of the left and right halves of the brain. It also raised philosophical questions. Could consciousness itself be divided by this operation? And, if so, would such patients have a distinct left-brain and right-brain consciousness? Philosophical issues also combine with methodological and experimental developments in the following sections on the reintroduction of first-person methods and how to combine these with complementary, third-person methods in neurophenomenology and experiential neuroscience—two well-developed research programs for both investigating consciousness and understanding its functions. This Companion (and associated Volume) then concludes with a survey of research on free will, covering both the major findings arising from neuropsychological research and a way to understand these that is consistent with a natural understanding of volition, ethics, and legal responsibility. As with the other Companions to these Volumes there are many links to background resources (marked in pink) and to the selected readings themselves (marked in blue).

Preface This is the second of four online Companions to Velmans, M. (ed.) (2018) Consciousness (Critical Concepts in Psychology), a 4-volume collection of Major Works on Consciousness commissioned by Routledge, London. The Companion to Volume 2 focuses on the detailed relationship of phenomenal consciousness to mental processing described either functionally (as human information processing) or in terms of neural activity, in the ways typically explored by cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Beginning with reviews of functional differences between unconscious, preconscious and conscious processing and the different senses in which mental processing can be said to be " conscious " , the readings turn to seminal work on blindsight and related phenomena, experimental evidence of perception without awareness, ways to combine " subjective " and " objective " measures of awareness, evidence for distinct neural pathways governing visual awareness and visual control of motor acts, and the complex ways in which consciousness of action relates to both voluntary and involuntary acts. The readings then focus on the intimate links between attention and consciousness, starting with the writings of William James and surveying the extensive work on this subject over the last 60 years that explores the relationships between and attended and non-attended processing, preconscious and conscious processing, and attention, primary (working, short-term) memory and consciousness. The readings go on to survey the evidence that attention contributes to the " neural binding " required for an integrated conscious experience and evidence that attention (in humans) is dissociable from consciousness, necessary for consciousness, but not sufficient for consciousness. The readings then turn to research on " inattentional blindness " , and conclude with a review of Baars' global workspace theory, which integrates many theories and findings in this area into a coherent, global model. The Companion then summarises seminal readings on learning, memory and consciousness; the extensive research on mental imagery, long thought to epitomize private, subjective conscious experience—and consequently ruled out of science by reductive, materialist philosophies of mind; the complex relations of consciousness to sleep and dreaming; the development of consciousness in human infants; and the debates surrounding, and extensive evidence for consciousness in non-human animals, with attendant consequences for their humane treatment. As with the other Companions to these Volumes there are many links to background resources (marked in pink) and to the selected readings themselves (marked in blue).

Öyle zamanlarda yaşıyoruz ki, görüp duyduklarımız, okuyup şahit olduklarımıza inanmamız çoğu kez güçleşiyor. Sıklıkla “nasıl olur?” diyoruz; hatta şaşırma refleksimizi soğutmak için günlük popüler dilde “şaka gibi” tabirini kullanıyoruz. Bazen de acı acı gülümsüyor, bu devirlerin bir gün gelip “geçeceği” düşüncesiyle kendimizi avutuyor ya da “bir kişinin eylemi herkesi bağlamaz” rahatlığına sığınmak istiyoruz. Oysaki rahatsızlık duyduğumuz pek çok durumun sebepleri ne kişisel problemlerden kaynaklanıyor ne de bugüne özel bir soruna dayanıyor. Aksine tüm problemlerin kaynağı toplumsal; üstelik farklı biçim, yoğunluk ve etkilerle insanlık tarihinin her anında benzer sorunlarla karşılaşmak da mümkün.
Yine de bütün bu sorunlar içerisinden bir tanesi var ki, üzerine bir miktar düşünmeyi artık hak ediyor. Zira genel itibarıyla rahatsızlık veren düşünce ve davranışların temelinde, tabi kişileri yaptıkları eylemlere sevk etmesindeki güçlü etkisi sebebiyle de, bir “şuur noksanlığı”nın yattığı söylenebilir. İşte çoğu kereler “nasıl böyle bir şeyi yapar/düşünebilirler?” diye hayretler içinde sorduğumuz soruların tüm yanıtları, bir açıdan da şuursuzluk problemine dayanıyor.

Marketing research addressing the role of arousal in attitude formation and change mostly looks at arousal as a merely conscious emotion. However, a substantial body of research, in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, now offers insights on the implicit, subliminal reactions of individuals to external stimuli, sustaining that unconscious emotions may drive to different attitudinal responses. Following a conceptualization of conscious and unconscious arousal and its influence on product attitude formation, this study provides empirical evidence of the hypothesised relationships through a laboratory experiment on 160 subjects. By employing electrodermal activity, a physiological measure, to assess unconscious arousal and self-reported scales to assess conscious arousal, the study reveals that conscious and unconscious arousal are two independent emotional responses and they influence attitude toward the product differently. The study extends theory on emotions and provides an initial step toward using physiological measures to evaluate consumer emotional response to new products.

On where the Cutting Edge of the Western Tradition might be found with respect to the development of Fundamental Ontology within Continental Philosophy

-- Key Words:  Continental Philosophy, Ways of Being, Fragmentation of Being, Time, Cutting Edge

Timothy R. Levine defines deception as the intentional and voluntary act of misleading someone for a particular purpose (2014).
However, as Steve A. McCornack figured out, it does not follow that any deception is necessarily conscious (2014). Therefore, it is
fair to affirm that there are self-deceptive phenomena. The first objective of this paper is to justify such second assertion from the
perspective of narratives theories of identity and the web of beliefs. Secondly, we try to apply our proposal to cases of particular
self-deception types linked to late modernity technification of society. Finally, we identify some important dilemmas originated in
consumerist dynamics of self-deception.

It is common to think of perception of stimuli at the focus of attention as being "conscious." However, deciding what is conscious about perception is not as easy as it seems. We need to understand where in the information processing sequence (from input to output) consciousness of the input arises, how conscious processing differs from preconscious processing, and the different senses in which a process may be said to be "conscious." Partial dissociations of focal attention from consciousness (in blindsight, implicit learning and memory, and hypnotic analgesia) suggest that consciousness relates to a late-arising stage of focal-attentive processing concerned with disseminating the results of input analysis. Perception of stimuli at the focus of attention may be said to be "conscious" in the sense that focal-attentive analysis results in a conscious experience. However, it is not conscious in the sense that one is conscious qf the processing, nor in the sense that consciousness has a causal influence on the processing. Consciousness of familiar stimuli, rather than having a causal influence on input analysis, appears to follow it, in human information processing.

ABSTRACT

This Paper is comparative analysis of films Prisoners and Enemy, both directed by Denis Villenueve. After using Karl Jung’s and Sigmund Freud’s theories of unconscious to examine the text narrative in these movies, I will show the importance of supporting narrative and symbols in understanding the meaning of these works. Like in his previous films, Villenueve offers us drama and suspense but also much more through supporting narrative and relations of the characters if we care to take a second look. I will explain how connected together into one piece, these two movies support Freud’s and Jung’s theories of psychoanalysis.

A great American psychologist summarizes one of the most difficult of subjects--the nature of dreaming--after decades of lifting matters out of the morass of Freudianism. The result nonetheless is a thin gruel that misses the main thing about dreams: their unworldly imaginative power. But he is not the only one. Who defends the psyche in modern science? Who knows what it is, where it resides, and how it controls the brain? The true theory of dreaming will emerge only by facing and answering these questions.

Background. Insight is a specific part of the thinking process during creative problem solving. The experience of a sudden unexpected solution of the problem makes it distinct from other problem solving. Though the insight problem solving process is hidden from the observer and the solver himself, it is possible to study working memory changes during the problem-solving process in order to observe the tracks of insight. objective. A critical experiment was carried out to determine whether it is legitimate to measure insight-problem-solving dynamics within a dual-task paradigm and working memory model. Also a verification was conducted of the hypothesis of whether insight problem solving competes for cognitive resources with unconscious processes. Design. We designed a special procedure based on Kahneman's (1973) modified dual-task paradigm, allowing simultaneous performance of the problem-solving process and probe tasks of different types. The reaction time was measured for the probe task. There were two problems conditions (insight and regular), and two probe tasks conditions (implicit and explicit). Participants: 32 participants, aged from 18 to 32 years (M = 19.81; σ = 2.51). Results. Significant differences in implicit probe reaction time were found between the dual-task condition (implicit categorization and insight problem solving) and solo implicit probe condition (t(15) = –3.21, p = .006, d = –.76). A joint effect of problem type and probe type was found (F(1, 60)= 4.85, p = .035, η p