EU Foreign Policy

The democratic foundations of European integration in the foreign and defence realm are increasingly being debated. This article looks at the question of democratic legitimacy from one particular angle, by examining public opinion as measured in Eurobarometer surveys between 1989 and 2009. Based on reflections about the relation between polling results and wider questions of democracy, it examines three aspects of public opinion: general support for a common foreign and a common defence policy; differences among support rates in EU member states; and what roles Europeans would prefer for European armed forces. It turns out that general support for a common foreign policy is high, whereas the desirability of a common defence policy is much more contested. Moreover, citizens across Europe would prefer European armed forces to take on traditional tasks, as territorial defence. An EU defence policy that goes beyond strict intergovernmentalism and is directed towards protecting international law and universal human rights would thus require a significant communicative effort to become accepted.

Poland has become a part of Western Europe – for better or for worse. In the face of the escalating Ukrainian conflict it definitely seems for worse. The Poles have become wealthy enough to forget where they were 25 years ago. The memories of our own poor condition are so faded that we can no longer empathize with the Ukrainians’ violent struggle. And yet it seems so easy to keep convincing everyone in Brussels that Poland will teach its European partners to think in terms of solidarity.

Policy implications aside, assessing the EU’s involvement in the Mediterranean region necessitates a reconsideration of the impact and limits of the so-called ‘normative power’ upon which its approach has been based, implicitly or explicitly. This paper does so by examining the EU’s engagement with Egypt and the Israel-Palestine conflict; it sets out to challenge the notion that EU-style normative power alone is well-suited to promote democracy and regional cooperation, particularly in regions with diverging dynamics where the promotion of EU-associated norms may stumble upon European trade- and diplomacy-related interests. In this sense, it aims to enrich and inform the debates on ‘normative power TEurope’ and Euro-Mediterranean relations.

"This article reflects on the EU’s strategy towards the Western Balkans. It identifies the lack of a coherent and consistent strategy intended for stabilization and integration. In principle, the Western Balkan states’ road towards Europe is driven by the belief that regional stabilization and EU membership are mutually constitutive and reinforcing objectives. Progress in one is expected to lay the ground for advancements in the other. In practice, however, we claim the Union capitalizes on the prospect of accession to attain transformation. The problem
is that it has so far failed to set out what is the ultimate aim and stake of its strategy. It appears both reluctant to concert its declarations with its intentions and unprepared and unable to
implement its pronounced will. As a result, it finds much difficulty in relating means to achieve the ends in view, and this strips its current strategy of an important part of its value."

""As the ineffectiveness of EU neighbourhood initiatives mostly stems back to a lack of bilateral cooperation, this paper advocates for a Franco-German initiative on the Transnistrian conflict. It is argued that the proposed renewed conflict resolution initiative could 1) serve as a catalyst for overcoming the divisions over neighbourhood policies within the EU in general and 2) improve the situation in the Transnistrian conflict.
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The European Union (EU) has closely correlated different aspects of the peace process in Bosnia with progress towards European accession. The ‘power of attraction’ of EU membership would presumably induce the Bosnian authorities to accept the adaptation costs of political and economic transformation. However, the Europeanisation approach has not produced the expected results. The track record of the EU’s policies towards Bosnia represents a paradigmatic case of what would happen if almost nothing works as efficiently as in the case of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The article investigates the causes of EU policy failure in Bosnia and claims that the EU has not effectively responded to three challenges: 1) adjust the process to the needs of an ethnically divided post-war state; 2) preserve the credibility of accession conditionality, and 3) convey the proper messages on how to comply with EU rules. Therefore, the article argues for a more cohesive and consistent EU approach towards Bosnia.

Нинішній український уряд, зважаючи на все, має ілюзії щодо того, що Україна зможе приєднатися до європейського інтеграційного проекту, не дотримуючись його основних принципів. Проте ні улесливі промови, ні зміна теми, ні самовихваляння не звільнять Київ від виконання принаймні кількох попередніх умов, поставлених ЄС для підписання Угоди про асоціацію. Протягом наступних місяців Україна не повинна витрачати час на піар-кампанії або політтехнологічні маневри — їй слід зосередитися на проведенні реальних реформ у внутрішній політиці та законодавстві відповідно до пріоритетів, встановлених Брюсселем.

Since the ‘mega-enlargement’ of the EU into the erstwhile Communist territories of Central Eastern Europe and the Baltics in 2004/07, the prospect for further enlargements (of a similar scale at least) has seriously dissipated. The agreed accession of Croatia into the EU perhaps represents the closing of the enlargement door, for the foreseeable future, with the smaller states of the Western Balkans the only viable candidates (save for Iceland which will likely accede in the next couple of years). Although the success of enlargement for not only the transitioning states which joined but for older EU member states has been undeniable, the prospects for further enlargement are uncertain. Indeed, the prognostication that the EU will one day stretch to the limits of Europe in the Urals now seems doubtful. Terms such as ‘enlargement fatigue’ and ‘absorption capacity’ have become en vogue in the post-enlargement setting where older EU member states have developed negative attitudes towards future enlargements. Subsequently, this paper argues that the limits of EU eastern enlargement are set by both prevailing (subjectively defined) political attitudes founded on various grounds in the leading EU member states and by the rationally defined objective capacity of the EU’s institutions to absorb new member states. It is through the latter which this paper attempts to define the limits of EU enlargement through explicitly examining the membership prospects of the states of the Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhood.

""This is a valuable piece on European Union (EU) foreign policy, well
suited for its intended audience: advanced undergraduates, graduate
students and others interested in EU foreign policy. It demonstrates how
a fragmented and inconsistent foreign policy shatters the reputation and
diminishes the effectiveness of this international actor. Karen E. Smith
provides a concise examination of the fuzzy implementation of EU
policy since its origins in 1951. To achieve the ostensible goal of the
book – identifying the integrity of the EU’s international identity and
the level of its international ‘actorness’ (p. 25) – Smith goes beyond the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar and, adding the
European Community and Justice and Home Affairs pillars, investigates
five, sometimes clashing, foreign policy objectives: the encouragement of
regional cooperation and integration, the promotion of human rights, the
promotion of democracy and good governance, the prevention of violent
conflicts, and the fight against international crime. The author not only
examines the EU’s foreign policy objectives but also traces their evolution
and implementation, analysing numerous impediments and pressures
influencing the Union’s approach.""

Despite its alleged inconsistency, the foreign policy of the European Union was successful with the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The enlargements resulted in an increased number of EU members with important votes in qualified majority voting (QMV) and crucial influence over the unanimous decision-making. Meanwhile, the Lisbon Treaty is meant to foster greater cooperation among the member-states and make the EU speak with one voice in terms of foreign policy. This article analyses the political and institutional dynamics in the EU foreign policy decision-making process after the enlargements and in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. Focusing on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the article tracks the dynamics in the CFSP evolution and identifies the potential impact the Lisbon Treaty may have on the consistency and coherence of EU foreign policy. The findings show that contrary to predictions the enlargements did not have negative effects on the institutional or political dynamics of the CFSP. However, the Lisbon Treaty, by introducing new institutions and responsibilities as part of creating more efficient institutional framework, has instead created confusion and institutional competition.

Given the severity of the crisis that has emerged in Ukraine since the decision in November, there has been little attention given to the deeper causes of Yanukovych’s rejection of the EU. While this is understandable, it is important to understand that the current events are the results of a longer and more complicated power struggle over Ukraine. Was it all that surprising that Yanukovych decided to forego the EU deal? In the following I attempt to reconstruct the European approach to Ukraine, in order to better understand the current events and to highlights where improvements can and should be made.