Electoral Behavior
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
In Romania, this year has seen the resignation of one government, a vote of no-confidence in another, an attempt to change the electoral system and efforts by the government to impeach the sitting President. Cristina Bucur looks over... more
In Romania, this year has seen the resignation of one government, a vote of no-confidence in another, an attempt to change the electoral system and efforts by the government to impeach the sitting President. Cristina Bucur looks over political developments in Romania during 2012, finding that they have been characterised by constitutional infighting and an often difficult political cohabitation between the recently re-elected government and the President.
Research Interests:
Los resultados de Italia pueden servir a los partidos para valorar los efectos de la corrupción
This paper analyzes the relationship between the persistence and growth of secessionist parties in democratic countries and economic globalization, controlling for political and economic factors. The implications of secessionist... more
This paper analyzes the relationship between the persistence and growth of secessionist parties in democratic countries and economic globalization, controlling for political and economic factors. The implications of secessionist persistence for decentralization are also examined. The paper finds that globalization is positively related to secessionist vote growth, while there is some evidence that economic conditions also impact secessionist parties in systematic ways. Secessionist support is also substantially affected by policy changes. Central governments have offered autonomy more often to regions with secessionist parties than to regions without such parties, though often the offers take the form of symmetrical countrywide decentralization.
"Este artículo pretende contribuir a la literatura del comportamiento electoral examinando el análisis de las elecciones presidenciales celebradas en Argentina en octubre de 2007. Tras la grave crisis institucional vivida en 2001, la... more
"Este artículo pretende contribuir a la literatura del comportamiento electoral examinando el análisis de las elecciones presidenciales celebradas en Argentina en octubre de 2007. Tras la grave crisis institucional vivida en 2001, la victoria de Néstor Kirchner en las elecciones de 2003 presagiaba un serio déficit de legitimidad política al llegar a la presidencia como segundo candidato más votado, con apenas un 22,24 por ciento de votos. Pese a ello, Kirchner logró consolidar su apoyo electoral hasta lograr en 2007 la reelección de su Frente para la Victoria. ¿Qué factores permiten explicar este resultado? Estamos principalmente interesados en discutir el alcance de los tradicionales modelos de voto así como también de las hipótesis propuestas recientemente para explicar el comportamiento electoral de los argentinos. Nuestros datos provienen del proyecto internacional constituido por el Comparative National Election Project (CNEP).
Palabras clave: democracia – elecciones – comportamiento electoral – voto – Argentina"
Palabras clave: democracia – elecciones – comportamiento electoral – voto – Argentina"
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
What role does executive partisan interest play in the reform of election administration? The forces for reform and continuity in the USA, the UK and Ireland from 1980 to 2007 are compared. Partisan involvement is found to be present in... more
What role does executive partisan interest play in the reform of election administration? The forces for reform and continuity in the USA, the UK and Ireland from 1980 to 2007 are compared. Partisan involvement is found to be present in the USA and the UK but less so in Ireland. This is explained by conceiving partisan interest as a context-specific causal mechanism which varies according to three factors. First, an issue trigger may be required to bring election administration on to executive policy agenda. Five such triggers are identified in the cases. Second, the systemic institutional features of political systems shape and refract the (non-)politics of election administration by altering the incentives, opportunities for and constraints upon elite action. Executive interest in and action on election administration are influenced by the electoral system, party system and constitutional control over procedures. Finally, executive strategy on election administration is influenced by the reform process of other electoral institutions.


