Ukrainian Foreign Policy

Accessions of post-communist countries to the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represent puzzles. While many such countries were granted a membership or a prospect of membership in these organizations, other European post-communist countries were not offered an accession or prospects of membership in the EU and NATO. The question is which factors account for such significant variation in the accession to the EU and NATO among European post-communist countries. This article uses statistical analysis to determine which factors affect the EU and NATO accession of 25 European post-communist states in 1997-2010. The study shows that the level of democracy is positively associated with NATO and EU accession, while conflicts have a negative impact on the NATO enlargement. The level of economic development has a positive effect on EU enlargement. Being a post-Soviet country has a negative effect on both NATO and EU accession.

The place of Europe in post-Cold War national mythologies of different countries varies widely. In three arguably most dramatic examples, Poland rethought itself as “the somehow decentred heart of Catholic Europe” (Dayan & Katz, 1994, p. 166), while Russia gave reasons to conclude it “leaves the West” (Trenin, 2006, p. 87) and Ukraine stuck with its view of Europe as a normative example (Orlova, 2010, p. 26). To what extent this remains true if one is to look empirically at the discourses that currently inhabit news media? This paper points out to how narratives of Europe are instrumentalised in political discussions in the three counties that followed very different paths since the collapse of the communist bloc. The presentation includes results of qualitative analysis based on an open coding approach; the focus rests on the most prestigious news outlets (Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta wyborcza; Izvestiya, Kommersant; Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Korrespondent) but also includes important online blog platforms.

"The scholars of Central and Eastern Europe have long noticed that the place of Europe in post-Cold War national mythologies of different countries varies widely if not wildly. In three arguably most dramatic examples, Poland rethought itself as “the somehow decentred heart of Catholic Europe” (Dayan & Katz, 1994, p. 166), while Russia gave reasons to conclude it “leaves the West” (Trenin, 2006, p. 87) and Ukraine stuck with its view of Europe as a normative example (Orlova, 2010, p. 26). However, to what extent this remains true if one is to look empirically at the discourses that currently inhabit news media and public discussion? This paper points out to how various narratives of Europe are instrumentalised in internal and regional political discussions in the three counties that followed very different paths since the collapse of the communist bloc to which they once belonged, and whose relations have always remained defining to the structure of the region(s). The presentation includes results of qualitative analysis based on an open coding approach that discerns different narratives of Europe in the media discourses of the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian press. The focus of the analysis rests primarily on the most important and prestigious news outlets (Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta wyborcza in Poland; Izvestiya and Kommersant in Russia; Dzerkalo tyzhnia and Korrespondent in Ukraine) but also includes the most prestigious online blog platforms where opinion leaders set the principal frames for narrating Europe; such as Ukraine’s most read blogs section at Ukrayins’ka pravda or Russia’s Snob.ru. This will arguably give a more valid and up-to-date overview of what could be thought of as the three countries’ public spheres and Europe’s place in them.

Keywords: Europe, public sphere, Poland, Russia, Ukraine"

This article examines determinants of persistent regional political cleavages in post-Communist Ukraine. The question is how significant the role of culture is compared to ethnic, economic, and religious factors in the regional divisions. This study employs correlation, factor, and regression analyses of regional support for the Communist/pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and pro-nationalist/pro-independence parties and candidates in all national elections held from 1991 to 2006, the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union in the March 1991 referendum, and the vote for the independence of Ukraine in the December 1991 referendum. This study shows that the pattern of these regional differences remained relatively stable from 1991 to 2006. Historical experience has a major effect on regional electoral behavior in post-Communist Ukraine. The legacy of Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule is positively associated with the pro-nationalist and pro-independence vote; the same historical legacy has a negative effect on support for pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and on the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union.

Using the political turmoil in Ukraine and perceptions of Western weakness to his advantage, Putin hatched a plan designed to keep hold of Russia’s strategic interests in the Crimea by sending in his soldiers, capturing or surrounding airfields and other important military infrastructure, without a shot being fired.

This article examines differing political orientations of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz, two main Turkic minorities in Ukraine and Moldova. Crimean Tatars in Ukraine expressed anti-Communist and anti-Russian political preferences, while the Gagauz in Moldova showed strong support for pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and politicians. This study analyses the role of cultural factors in political attitudes and behavior of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz and uses data from surveys, elections and referendums. The analysis shows that distinct historical experiences of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and Romania led to the emergence of distinct political cultures of these ethnic groups and affected their political behavior and attitudes in post-communist Ukraine and Moldova.

""During the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, the second largest country in Europe came close to a violent break-up similar to that in neighboring Moldova, which witnessed a violent secession of the Transdniestria region. Numerous elections, including the hotly contested 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, and surveys of public opinion showed significant regional divisions in these post-Soviet countries. Western parts of Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the Muslim Crimean Tatars, were vocal supporters of independence, nationalist, and pro-Western parties and politicians. In contrast, Eastern regions, as well as the Orthodox Turkic-speaking Gagauz, consistently expressed pro-Russian and pro-Communist political orientations. Which factors ? historical legacies, religion, economy, ethnicity, or political leadership ? could explain these divisions? Why was Ukraine able to avoid a violent break-up, in contrast to Moldova?
This is the first book to offer a systematic and comparative analysis of the regional political divisions in post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. The study examines voting behavior and political attitudes in two groups of regions: those which were under Russian, Ottoman, and Soviet rule; and those which were under Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule until World War I or World War II. This book attributes the regional political divisions to the differences in historical experience. This study helps us to better understand regional cleavages and conflicts, not only in Ukraine and Moldova, but also in other cleft countries.""

Have there been changes in political institutions, parties, leaders, and regional political orientations in Ukraine after the "Orange Revolution"? If so, are the changes revolutionary or evolutionary? Most previous studies refer to the 2004 presidential elections and mass protest actions as a revolution. To test this claim, this article analyzes political changes in Ukraine. Survey data are used to compare changes in pro-Russian and pro-Western orientation, support for major parties in the 2002, 2006, and 2007 parliamentary elections, and support for leading presidential candidates since the 2004 presidential elections. The implications of these changes for development of democracy in Ukraine are also considered.