Democratization In Ukraine

This article examines differing political orientations of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz, two main Turkic minorities in Ukraine and Moldova. Crimean Tatars in Ukraine expressed anti-Communist and anti-Russian political preferences, while the Gagauz in Moldova showed strong support for pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and politicians. This study analyses the role of cultural factors in political attitudes and behavior of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz and uses data from surveys, elections and referendums. The analysis shows that distinct historical experiences of Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and Romania led to the emergence of distinct political cultures of these ethnic groups and affected their political behavior and attitudes in post-communist Ukraine and Moldova.

This article examines determinants of persistent regional political cleavages in post-Communist Ukraine. The question is how significant the role of culture is compared to ethnic, economic, and religious factors in the regional divisions. This study employs correlation, factor, and regression analyses of regional support for the Communist/pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and pro-nationalist/pro-independence parties and candidates in all national elections held from 1991 to 2006, the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union in the March 1991 referendum, and the vote for the independence of Ukraine in the December 1991 referendum. This study shows that the pattern of these regional differences remained relatively stable from 1991 to 2006. Historical experience has a major effect on regional electoral behavior in post-Communist Ukraine. The legacy of Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule is positively associated with the pro-nationalist and pro-independence vote; the same historical legacy has a negative effect on support for pro-Communist and pro-Russian parties and presidential candidates and on the vote for the preservation of the Soviet Union.

This study examines democratic orientations and their determinants in post-Orange Ukraine from the perspective of a political culture theory. The research question is, to what extent is political culture in Ukraine supportive of democracy. This paper uses data from different waves of the Pew Global Attitudes surveys, the World Values Surveys, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems surveys to examine public views towards democracy in Ukraine. The paper compares democratic values in Ukraine with those in Poland and Russia, two similar post-communist countries with differing political cultures and divergent trajectories of democratization. It also examines changes in the levels of pro-democratic attitudes in post-Orange Ukraine compared to the Orange and pre-Orange periods. Finally, this study implements multiple regression analysis of the determinants of democratic attitudes. The analysis shows limited effects of historical democratic legacies and Catholicism on pro-democracy views. With some exceptions, adherents of major parties do not differ significantly in terms of their degree of support for democracy. This study suggests that partially democratic and partially authoritarian political culture impedes the future prospects for consolidated democracy in Ukraine.

This study analyzes changes in regional electoral behavior and foreign policy attitudes in Ukraine after “Orange Revolution.” The research question is whether the public support for major groups of political parties and presidential candidates and attitudes towards principal foreign policy issues in regions of Ukraine have changed after the “Orange Revolution.” This article employs comparative and statistical analyses of voting results of the 2007, 2006, and 2002 parliamentary elections, the 2010 local elections, and the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections, and survey data to examine effects of regional political culture, compared to other factors, on support for pro-nationalist/pro-Western and pro-Russian/pro-communist political parties and presidential candidates. This study also uses survey data to analyze changes in attitudes towards NATO, the European Union, and a union with Russia in regions of Ukraine and a change in separatist preferences in Crimea. The analysis shows that Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution” remained divided along regional lines in terms of support for political parties and presidential candidates and attitudes towards foreign orientation.

""During the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, the second largest country in Europe came close to a violent break-up similar to that in neighboring Moldova, which witnessed a violent secession of the Transdniestria region. Numerous elections, including the hotly contested 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, and surveys of public opinion showed significant regional divisions in these post-Soviet countries. Western parts of Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the Muslim Crimean Tatars, were vocal supporters of independence, nationalist, and pro-Western parties and politicians. In contrast, Eastern regions, as well as the Orthodox Turkic-speaking Gagauz, consistently expressed pro-Russian and pro-Communist political orientations. Which factors ? historical legacies, religion, economy, ethnicity, or political leadership ? could explain these divisions? Why was Ukraine able to avoid a violent break-up, in contrast to Moldova?
This is the first book to offer a systematic and comparative analysis of the regional political divisions in post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. The study examines voting behavior and political attitudes in two groups of regions: those which were under Russian, Ottoman, and Soviet rule; and those which were under Austro-Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak rule until World War I or World War II. This book attributes the regional political divisions to the differences in historical experience. This study helps us to better understand regional cleavages and conflicts, not only in Ukraine and Moldova, but also in other cleft countries.""

Have there been changes in political institutions, parties, leaders, and regional political orientations in Ukraine after the "Orange Revolution"? If so, are the changes revolutionary or evolutionary? Most previous studies refer to the 2004 presidential elections and mass protest actions as a revolution. To test this claim, this article analyzes political changes in Ukraine. Survey data are used to compare changes in pro-Russian and pro-Western orientation, support for major parties in the 2002, 2006, and 2007 parliamentary elections, and support for leading presidential candidates since the 2004 presidential elections. The implications of these changes for development of democracy in Ukraine are also considered.