Saddam Hussein

""The current memory figure of Saladin is a product of joint western and eastern imagination. In the eighteenth century, western philology had recovered the historical Saladin but also novelized and romanticized him. He became the archetype of the noble and sage Muslim enemy-hero in the literature. In the Middle East particular in Palestine, Saladin was never completely forgotten although in the memory of the Middle East he was superseded by Sultan Baybars as a hero against crusaders and infidels. Parallel to the invention of political traditions with historical references in Europe between 1870 and 1914, the memory figure of Saladin was deemed useful in the Middle East. In the 1870s with the authoritarian modernization of ʿAbd al-Hamid the crusades and Saladin were recalled into political rhetoric. In 1878 the sultan commissioned a neo-baroque cenotaph for Saladin in Damascus symbolizing the Ottoman modernity and the sultan as defender of the faith (ghazi) at the same time. In 1898 the visit of the German Kaiser Wilhelm II at the tomb of Saladin finally made the political public in the Ottoman Empire finally aware of the western image of Saladin and bolstered the rhetoric of ʿAbd al-Hamid. During the Mandate period Saladin was remembered in the political rhetoric against the western military imperialism in general and against Zionist expansion in particular.
At the end of the eighties of the past century, Saladin rhetoric surfaced again in Iraq and Syria. After the Gulf War, 1990 to 1991, the figure of Saladin in Iraq was conflated―in a grotesque manner―with the monumental and excessive personality cult of Saddam Husayn. In a staged monologue, Saddam declared himself the incarnation of Saladin who had resisted against the western ‘crusaders’. The combination with the image of the Dome of the Rock which marks Saladin and the conquest of Jerusalem made Saddam Husayn also a hero for the Palestinian, pan-Islamic and pan-Arab cause.
The political rhetoric in Syria was different. Starting in the mid seventies, Syria knew a very pronounced Soviet style personality cult centred on president Hafiz al-Asad. The cult was staged as dialogue with oaths of allegiance. At the end of the eighties, with the attempt of the Baath party to rewrite national history, the figure of Saladin moved into the centre of national propaganda for a short time. The military achievements of al-Asad were compared with those of Saladin, from Hattin to Tishrin, but he and Saladin were not equated in a blunt manner. The Palestinian and Islamic cause which was always symbolised with the ‘Dome of the Rock’ was carefully avoided in Syrian Saladin images sponsored by the government. Saladin rhetoric in Syria took a distinct national turn, independent from the ubiquitous personality cult. This reading found its most visible expression in the Saladin monument of 1992 in front of the citadel in Damascus in which Saladin is depicted as national hero. Although today’s political rhetoric of Bashar al-Asad refrains from all historical allusions, Saladin has remained a resonant memory figure: The movie ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ 2005―with the popular Syrian actor Ghassan Massoud as a main character―transmitted exactly that image of Saladin as a national symbol. Compulsory school attendance had made Saladin a resonant national memory figure and the film was received him as such. At the same time Massoud’s Saladin corresponds to the western interpretation of Saladin, in the sense of ‘political correctness’. The same portrayal of Saladin as eastern-western memory figure served different political uses.
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"A dieci anni dall’inizio della guerra in Iraq, ripensando allo sterminato repertorio iconografico che essa ha prodotto, si può affermare che le immagini non ufficiali, anzi censurate e non autorizzate nate all’interno della prigione di Abu Ghraib potranno restare come vere icone dell’operazione Iraqi Freedom. Dopo la loro diffusione pubblica nel maggio del 2004, infatti, quelle fotografie si sono subito rivelate visualmente fertili, capaci di prestarsi ad alimentare il ricorso, dimostrandosi riproponibili in un insieme eterogeneo di pratiche sociali di appropriazione e re-framing creativo.
Il mio lavoro, dunque, verte, da un lato, proprio sul processo di riappropriazione del senso di quelle immagini e sul loro incessante riutilizzo, dall’altro, sul loro stesso modo inedito di produzione, circolazione e diffusione capillare, usando tali fotografie come occasione per indagare il modo in cui la cultura visuale influenza l’agenda dei media, la politica e l’opinione pubblica. (...)"

What is the “Myopic Vision”, which has resulted in totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and statism? The Myopic Vision has inspired many governments and is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of millions in the 20th century. What are the reasons behind this slaughter? The advocates of the Myopic Vision believe they are the holders of scientifically demonstrable truths concerning man, history, and social evolution. They believe that their vision will bring forth an age of unparalleled human prosperity and happiness. They also believe that to make the Myopic Vision a reality, no person, groups of persons, social customs, organizations, or governments be permitted to obstruct their goals. Everything and everyone is expendable. The struggle for the implementation of the Myopic Vision is like the struggle faced in war. As in all wars, causalities are expected and accepted as part of the process which will achieve a 'greater good'. The casualties will certainly include those that cannot or will not understand the superior logic of the Myopic Vision. The ultimate tragedy is that in every circumstance where the Myopic Vision has been put into practice, even after decades of implementation, the personal freedom and economic welfare of the average citizen worsened exponentially. Thus, Dr. Céspedes coins a new phrase, as well as issues a warning for the future. Can the Myopic Vision be corrected or reversed? What does the future hold? This is a “must read” for all those which cherish and wish to preserve democracy and human dignity. For the IB student, this is an excellent source of study for Papers 1, 2, and 3.

"Letter to American Hitler.

Tomas Young, an Iraq war vet who joined the US military in response to September 11 – he signed up two days after the attacks – is dying. He’s now confined to a wheelchair and in
hospice care as a result of the long-term consequences of wounds suffered in Iraq only five days after arriving there. And he’s not happy about it. As Young wrote in his dying letter to
George Bush and Dick Cheney, on this tenth anniversary of the start of the Iraq war, had he been dying for Afghanistan, at least it was a just war. But Iraq?
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This paper considers the events leading up to and after the first Gulf War and expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by US-led coalition forces. It argues that George Bush Senior was correct not to remove Saddam Hussein, having regard for the international relations policy and interests of the USA, as well as the regional and global political environment at this time with the devastation and subsequent creation of a weak Iraqi State.

Der erste amerikanische Krieg von 1991 gegen Saddam Hussein war moralisch falsch. Man muss kein radikaler Pazifist sein, um zu diesem Urteil zu kommen, denn dies Urteil ergibt sich auch dann, wenn man die drei Kriegsziele ernst und beim Wort nimmt, die George Bush zur Rechtfertigung des Kriegs angeführt hat. In der Tat sind es auf den ersten Blick löbliche Ziele, Kuwait von der Besatzung durch irakische Truppen zu befreien, Saddam Husseins Militärmacht einzudämmen und für eine gerechte Weltordnung zu kämpfen. Doch wenn man die Opfer in den Blick nimmt, die der Krieg kostet, ändert sich das Bild – die Kriegsopfer wiegen schwerer als der erhoffte Vorteil des Kriegs, und also war der Krieg moralisch unverantwortlich.