Applied Ethics

Consistent with the main hypothesis, social work students (n = 41) were more distrusting toward a community agency following reports of unethical worker-client sex than reports of alcohol or other personnel problems. Students were somewhat more likely to increase follow-up of a male rather than a female supervisor. Trait forgiveness was largely unrelated to level of trust.

Review essay of: Areté: The Basics of Olympic Philosophy (by Anna Hogenová, Czech Republic), Physical Culture and Sport From the Philosophical Perspective (by Jerzy Kosiewicz, Poland), Philosophy of Olympism (by Jozef Lipiec, Poland), Philosophical and Ethical Views of Sports Humanities (by Josef Oborný, Slovakia)

"Filmová dokumentaristika patří mezi ta místa mediální etiky jako svébytné disciplíny aplikované morální filozofie, která jsou opomíjena nejvíce. Na hranici mezi uměním a žurnalistikou je zde řešení mnohých podstatných etických otázek odsouváno jako hraniční. Tento příspěvek dokládá, že právě tato hraniční témata nám mohou pomoci projasnit hluboké problémy specializovaných disciplín aplikované etiky a prohloubit kritický potenciál současného etického diskurzu zaměřeného na roli profesí v demokracii vůbec, a to s využitím interdisciplinárního přístupu (mediální etika / bioetika).
S využitím dvou případových studií tento teoretický příspěvek zasazuje filmovou dokumentaristiku do modelu médií jako čtvrté moci (fourth estate) v demokracii, s akcentem na uměleckou povahu žánru jako prohlubování reflexe obecně lidského (human interest). Z tohto východiska je pak kriticky nahlédnut vztah dokumentaristů a respondentů v kontextu (pozitivní / negativní) autonomie osoby. Autor příspěvku navrhuje využití mechanismu informovaného souhlasu známého z bioetiky k překonání eticky problematických míst tohoto vztahu."

Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering whether a version of the reason-giving requirement can be salvaged despite this important difficulty.

While most baseball fans agree that the use of performance-enhancing drugs should be banned from the sport, and many even think that players caught using them should be banned too, the philosophical question is, why should that be so? This question may be analyzed from the perspectives of various ethical theories – for example, Kantianism, libertarianism, and utilitarianism. However, I will argue that none of these theories can tell us why performance-enhancing drug use should be banned, and that getting to the heart of the matter requires recourse to the ancient theory of virtue ethics.

Thom Brooks criticizes utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment but argues that utilitarian and retributive goals can be incorporated into a coherent and unified theory of punitive restoration, according to which punishment is a means of reintegrating criminals into society and restoring rights. I point to some difficulties with Brooks’ criticisms of retributive and utilitarian theories, and argue that his theory of punitive restoration is not unified or coherent. I argue further that a theory attempting to capture the complex set of rules and behaviors that constitute the practice of legal punishment cannot persuasively be unified and coherent: legitimate features of the practice advance goals and promote values that in some cases conflict.

"Which kinds of consciousness matter for moral status? According to welfarism, phenomenal consciousness is what matters because of its connection to sentience. A rival view is autonomism, which says that reflective self-consciousness is what matters because of its connection to rational autonomy. Recently, Suchy-Dicey (2009) used the vegetative state to argue for a hybrid view whereby welfare and autonomy both matter for moral status. Suchy-Dicey also argues that the value of welfare and autonomy is asymmetrical: a creature that was sentient without autonomy would have moral status but a creature that was autonomous but not sentient would lack moral status.  I argue we should reject asymmetrical ethical dualism in favor of symmetrical ethical dualism: an entity that is autonomous but not sentient would have moral status too in virtue of the intrinsic value of autonomy.
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"Dans cet article, j'envisage la manière dont Foucault a tenté, à partir d’une réflexion sur l’Aufklärung, de dégager une êthos philosophique engagée dans le présent et qui se caractérise à la fois par une attitude limite et une attitude expérimentale. Cela permet à Foucault de réfléchir l'articulation entre une critique pratique et une ontologie : une ontologie critique de nous-mêmes.

Parallèlement, Foucault avait entamé au Collège de France une série de cours sur la question du sujet et de la vérité. Je m'intéresse plus particulièrement au cours sur L’herméneutique du sujet dans lequel Foucault discerne dans la spiritualité antique, à l’interstice de la métanoïa chrétienne et de l’épistrophè plactonico-gnostique, quelque chose comme une autre conversion, stoïco-cynique, qui n’implique ni rupture dans le rapport à soi, ni bifurcation du monde, mais seulement un « déplacement du sujet » qui ouvre une « distance à soi » permettant d’opérer cette conversion comme geste de retour à cette distance à soi.

Enfin, je voudrais suggérer que Foucault nous donne, avec ces deux thèmes, des outils de pensée permettant d'esquiver la synthèse dialectique et l'herméneutique historique au profit d'une pensée matinale de la grandeur qui affirme la créativité dans l'histoire. Une pensée qui ouvre au lieu de conclure..."

Pharmaceuticals or other emerging technologies could be used to enhance (or diminish) feelings of lust, attraction, and attachment in adult romantic partnerships. While such interventions could conceivably be used to promote individual (and couple) well-being, their widespread development and/or adoption might lead to “medicalization” of human love and heartache—for some, a source of serious concern. In this essay, we argue that the “medicalization of love” need not necessarily be problematic, on balance, but could plausibly be expected to have either good or bad consequences depending upon how it unfolds. By anticipating some of the specific ways in which these technologies could yield unwanted outcomes, bioethicists and others can help direct the course of love’s “medicalization”—should it happen to occur—more toward the “good” side than the “bad.”

"Resumen:
Remitiéndose a las ciencias cognitivas Varela establece una cierta inmediatez que tenemos con el mundo, y cómo desarrollamos una serie de habilidades para relacionarnos con él. No es posible separar los procesos sensoriales y motores, la percepción y la acción, de la cognición –enfoque enactivo de la cognición-. La percepción no es una simple recuperación de un mundo predefinido, sino que es la acción guiada perceptualmente en un mundo que es inseparable de nuestras capacidades sensomotoras, así la cognición “no está constituida por representaciones, sino por acciones corporeizadas” –micromundos y microidentidades-. La confrontación inmediata con el mundo se convierte en el trabajo más complicado, pues es el aspecto que ha tardado mucho más tiempo en desarrollarse. No se trata de negar la importancia de la deliberación y el análisis, sino de relevar la importancia de esos dos modos cognitivos, y tener en cuenta que la mayor parte de nuestra vida activa pertenece a la confrontación inmediata que es estable, transparente y basada en nuestra historia personal.
Dr. Adolfo Vásquez Rocca
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“Neuroreductionism” is the tendency to reduce complex mental phenomena to brain states, confusing correlation for physical causation. In this paper, we illustrate the dangers of this popular neuro-fallacy, by looking at an example drawn from the media: a story about “hypoactive sexual desire disorder” in women. We discuss the role of folk dualism in perpetuating such a confusion, and draw some conclusions about the role of “brain scans” in our understanding of romantic love.