African Union

"La revitalització de la Unió Africana (UA)1 va comportar el sorgiment d'un sistema normatiu de pau i seguretat que té com a objectiu reduir la violència del continent2. L' aparició d'aquesta arquitectura institucional s'emmarcà en la necessitat, per part de la comunitat africana, de resoldre els seus problemes sense dependre de decisions externes. Aquest article aborda la construcció de pau fomentada per la UA en una situació complexa i multidimensional com la de la passada crisi postelectoral de la Costa d'Ivori (novembre 2010-maig 2011).

La crisi ivoriana va constituir un gran repte per la Unió Africana en tres sentits: (1) pel que fa al disseny de les fórmules d'intervenció i mediació, (2) pel que fa a la capacitat de la UA en mantenir una unitat ideològica panafricana respecte del conflicte ivorià (3) i, finalment, per la complexitat de la situació domèstica, tant en el deteriorament de la seguretat civil com en la disponibilitat i voluntat per part dels actors de participar en una mediació. Representà, també, una gran oportunitat per demostrar la seva credibilitat en la defensa dels principis que sustenten la recent creada "Carta Africana per a la Democràcia, les eleccions i la governança"3. No obstant això, finalment fou l'ús de la força armada l'element determinant en el desencallament del conflicte, relegant el diàleg en un segon pla.

Intervenció i mediació

La UA va emprendre el procés de mediació el 5 de desembre de 2010 al·legant, d'entrada i amb coherència amb les Nacions Unides, el reconeixement d'Alassane Ouattara com a guanyador dels últims escrutinis mantinguts al país ivorià. Aquesta declaració fou inicialment criticada per la Comunitat Econòmica dels Estats de l'Àfrica de l'Oest (CEDEAO) i en el sí de la pròpia UA per l'impacte en termes de neutralitat que podia provocar en el procés de mediació.

La UA va iniciar els contactes i mediacions entre els actors implicats -això sí, sense gaires resultats significatius- a través d'una controvertida missió liderada per l'expresident d'Àfrica del Sud, Thabo Mbeki4. I, també, a través d'una altra de conjunta encapçalada pel president de la UA, Jean Ping, i el president de la CEDEAO, James Victor Gbeho5. No fou fins el passat mes de febrer quan s'intensificaren les intervencions per part de l'organització panafricana. Així, el Consell de Pau i Seguretat va crear un Panell d'Experts per a la resolució de la crisi, el qual estava adoptant dimensions alarmants. El Panell, presidit pel cap d'Estat maurità, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, estava constituït pels presidents de Txad, d'Àfrica del Sud, de Tanzània i de Burkina Faso. Les conclusions de la relatoria elaborada pel Panell foren: (1) apostar per un govern d'unitat nacional presidit per Alassane Ouattara; (2) garantir una sortida digne al derrotat Laurent Gbagbo; (3) el desarmament dels exrebels i la reestructuració de l'exèrcit; (4) la reestructuració del Consell Electoral Independent (CEI) i del Consell Constitucional així com (5) la creació d'una comissió independent de "Veritat, Justícia i Reconciliació".

Les mediacions acabaren amb l'informe emès pel Panell el 10 de març durant la reunió extraordinària de la UA pel cas ivorià6, en la qual s'instà les parts a complir les recomanacions anteriorment enunciades en un marge de temps limitat, a fi d'aconseguir una solució pacífica a la crisi postelectoral de la Costa d'Ivori. No fou fins el mes de maig quan el Consell Constitucional proclamà Alassane Ouattara president de la República, després de prendre en consideració, segons digué, les recomanacions de la UA.

Unitat ideològica panafricana respecte el cas ivorià

Seguint amb el segon aspecte analític sobre la mediació panafricana, la crisi ivoriana suposà el col·lapse de l'exemplar unitat africana entre els estats membres i, en conseqüència, assenyalà l'autoritat diluïda de l'organització i la complexitat ideològica que la constitueix. Veus contradictòries es manifestaren entre els caps d'Estat, dificultant la presa de decisions de la UA: per exemple, el president d'Àfrica del Sud, Jacob Zuma, realitzà unes declaracions que es desviaven de les resolucions emeses per la CEDEAO i la UA. Per altra banda, el president del Txad, Idriss Deby, demostrà imprevisiblement simpaties per les tesis de Laurent Gbagbo, mentre aquest s'encarregava d'anar capitalitzant les veus crítiques. A través d'arguments antiimperialistes, Gbagbo intentava guanyar-se el cor i la ment d'alguns líders de la UA per, d'aquesta manera, crear confusió sobre la capacitat de la UA de gestionar i resoldre la crisi.

Complexitat domèstica de la crisi postelectoral de la Costa d'Ivori

Pel què fa a aquest aspecte, cal dir que alguns autors afirmen que la crisi postelectoral ivoriana pot ser recordada com un dels casos més complexes que ha tingut el continent africà al llarg de l'última dècada.7 Les probabilitats que les decisions de la UA es complissin disminuïen a mesura que la catàstrofe humanitària s'incrementava, el rol de les Nacions Unides en la gestió del conflicte s'anava dilatant (a causa, en part, de les acusacions de Gbagbo contra la intervenció internacional) i la voluntat dels actors a l'hora de negociar i cedir estava encallada. Com s'ha dit anteriorment, no fou fins a la intervenció armada on s'anuncià el compliment de les recomanacions expressades per la UA. Per tant, el grau d'èxit de la promoció del diàleg com a metodologia per a la resolució del conflicte, en aquest cas particular, restà amb una eficàcia limitada.

En conclusió, algunes lliçons que va extreure la UA sobre la crisi ivoriana foren la influència limitada de l'organització en la resolució del conflictes; la necessitat d'incidir en la recerca de fórmules que permetin reforçar el compromís dels acords de pau; la rellevància d'instaurar més mecanismes africans de prevenció de conflictes; i finalment, el diàleg com a eina, també, d'entesa i consens en el sí de la UA, per tal d'arribar a acords justos que beneficiïn una majoria."

Somalia is currently experiencing a political and historical turning point. After almost 8 years of the transitional period and 21 years of state collapse, the end of the transition and the launching of a new government have engendered the hope that this could be the inception of a broader political process embracing all Somalis. It also opens the door for a possible and much needed transformation from a war-based economy to a post-war civilian economy. However, the stabilisation of the country is a long way off.

"This book’s chapters are framed within three sections, linked by an introduction (Chapter 1) and a conclusion (Chapter 12). The first section (Looking forward), consisting of a single chapter, highlights the practical transformation that the EU is likely to undergo with the establishment of the European External Action Service foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty. This analysis is important to the extent that it introduces the changes which are expected to influence the EU’s external action and suggests the direction in which these may take the EU.

The second section (chapters 3-5) (Challenges from the EU’s close and wider neighbourhood: External action vis-à-vis Russia, China end Iran) looks at some of the relations that the EU is concerned about because of their interference with its own regional and wider security. Russia, China and Iran are considered here in the light of these countries’ specific way of relating to international affairs.

The third section (chapters 6-11) (The military: Legal aspects, processes and action, and Peace and Security Policy in Africa) focuses on the EU and its military action within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy and inspects the EU’s commitment to bring peace to the African region. Whilst each contribution can be read separately to the advantage of the reader, combined they offer a richer vision of EU engagement (or not) in approaching security issues, and of whether the EU is developing an innovative policy. In some instances there may be overlapping analyses which inevitably bear repetitions, such as in chapters 7 and 8 both focusing on the same CSDP operation. However chapter 7, from the legal expert’s eye, deals with the legislative aspects and with the extent to which the design and implementation of that CSDP action is coherent with the commitments and values expressed by the EU in the ESS, while chapter 8 is the expression of a EU official involved in the institutional control and coordination of that CSDP mission. In some other occasions, there may be different judgements of the same CSDP operations (e.g. chapter 10 and 11) which are due to different angles of observation and experience.

Chapter 2, by Antonio Missiroli, provides the functional context within which the EU’s external action is expected to evolve. Per se, it offers a sound introduction to the idea of the challenges that the EU ought to confront, and the progress that it should secure to increase its influence and advance its position within an international system which is made rather more complex by the interaction of the forces and ad hoc alliances. Missiroli argues, that with the operational launch of the European External Action Service, a year after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a key piece of the new EU external action puzzle falls into place. From now on, the game is likely to change, internally and externally. Yet, the change will be gradual and its pace will depend on a number of political and institutional factors. This chapter analyses the preparatory steps that, throughout 2010, led to the eventual establishment of the new service, the positions and stakes of the main players, and the uncertainties that still linger in its development. Missiroli views the European External Action Service from the perspective of a crucial test of the EU’s capacity to operate more effectively in the international scene, as well as for a more pragmatic and “hybrid” approach to its institutional and policy set up.

In Chapter 3, Laure Delcour focuses on the EU-Russia partnership, explaining that the 2008 Georgian conflict is widely considered a watershed moment in EU-Russia relations for three reasons. She argues, instead, that that conflict does not represent per se a turning point in the relations between the two actors. It is a further illustration of the existing flaws currently underlying the strategic partnership. To a large extent, the framework of EU-Russia relations, designed in the early 2000s, has proved ineffective for tackling issues of common interest, one of the most important being security in the shared neighbourhood. However such ineffectiveness, rather than demonstrating the inadequacy of the institutional framework underpinning their partnership, reflects the deep divergences between the two parties regarding their agendas and their principles. This chapter’s examines the emergence of multilateralism as a joint EU-Russia response to a growing interdependence, and highlights the tension stemming from different conceptions of multilateralism. Through examples relating to conflict resolution, energy and security architecture, it shows that the agreed-upon multilateral frameworks and principles have largely remained empty shells in the EU-Russia partnership.

In Chapter 4, Jing Men offers a vision of the incompatibility of China and the EU as partners. She questions the causes of the problems, and whether these can be overcome, and the partnership maintained despite the increasing difficulties. The chapter, first, looks at the EU’s promotion of norms in China: its pressure on the Chinese authorities to improve human rights and the tools that it has at hand while negotiating with Beijing. It then examines how pragmatism has been developed in China, and analyses China’s different understandings of human rights and national sovereignty. Finally, it uncovers whether there is any convergence between the normative power and the pragmatic player, before looking at the prospects for EU-China relations.

In Chapter 5, Roxane Farmanfarmaian offers an assessment of the European role on the dialogue with Iran. She situates the discussion within the theoretical debate regarding the EU’s normative foreign policy goals, means and impacts. The first section considers not only the EU’s shift in behaviour toward non-normative approaches in other settings within the Middle East and North Africa but, likewise, the attendant loss of influence to affect the conflicts with which it is beset. The second section reviews the key points of the exchange between the E3 (France, Britain and Germany) and Iran during the 2002-2004 period, when European mediation used civilian means to construct policy, reaping gains from the Iranian negotiations, though opening up a gap between the US and EU positions. The third section analyses the breakdown in early 2005 that introduced conditionality into the negotiations, shifting to offers with sanctions under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the P5+1 (the five permanent members plus Germany). The prioritization of the trans-Atlantic relationship, coupled with the adoption of securitizing policies, engaged the EU mediation efforts, under the direction of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Solana, in increasingly coercive measures. The fourth section addresses the growing ineffectiveness of the EU-designed initiatives demanding suspension as a condition of negotiations, and the intercession of other players adopting normative positions to achieve progress. In particular, the discussion revolves around the Turkey-Brazil nuclear fuel exchange deal, towards which the EU and US acted as spoilers in the face of a substantive achievement over which they had no influence. This provides the context in which to analyze the EU’s shifting role, and its loss of initiative and influence. In substituting pressure for persuasion, this chapter’s author argues that no further progress has been achieved. Not only have Iran’s capabilities increased substantially, but the EU’s ability to work with it to achieve agreement rather than increasing international sanctions and friction has fallen. Farmanfarmaian suggests that, if the EU exercises the civilian power at its disposal, a return to direct engagement with Iran concerning its nuclear dilemma could lead to a better understanding of Iran’s motivations (whether it plans on developing the bomb, or the latent capability). However, by prioritizing the trans-Atlantic relationship over the exercise of its own normative goals, the EU has instead become increasingly unable to effect either the psychological or practical developments in this fast shifting conflict.

Chapter 6 and the following turn from the challenges of the EU’s enlarged neighbourhood proper to the specifics of the EU’s military crisis management. In chapter 6, Frederik Naert’s description of the development of the legislative framework within which the CSDP becomes operative is essential to the understanding of the procedural and incremental changes prompted by the EU to deal with the foreign policy security and defence issues confronting Europe. Naert explains that the CSDP has mainly manifested itself through a wide array of civilian and military crisis management actions. In the period from 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2009, some 22 operations were launched, including 6 military, 15 civilian and one mixed civil-military operations. His overview of the norms addresses features of the EU law, covers the main international law and deals with domestic law, including the law of both the sending States and the Host State. The author discusses the role and importance of the legal aspects of EU military operations.

In Chapter 7, Andrea deGuttry, through the joint action case study of Operation Atalanta provides a number of broad views on the reach of the EU’s norms to third countries, and on the way in which normative Europe makes its influence felt. While procedural and incremental changes are necessary for policy efficiency, unless the CSDP is able to deal with the challenging foreign policy issues concerning Europe, any such institutional settings may be simply excessive. DeGuttry examines some of the legal issues related to the military Operation Atalanta, conceived as a reaction to the threat posed by the upsurge in piracy off the Somali coasts. Following a review of the legal sources, both within and outside the EU system, at the basis of Atalanta, deGuttry focuses on the aspects of the agreement between the EU and Kenya which organises the transfer of suspected pirates (and seized property) from the EU-led naval force to Kenya. This chapter explores the compatibility of the legal provisions against the background of the obligations incumbent on the EU and its member states, the international responsibilities, the Human Rights commitment and the compliance with the basic values and principles inspiring the CSDP as well as the European Security Strategy.

Chapter 8, by Gérard Dejoué, brings in the direct experience of a European Council officer from the External and Political-Military Affairs unit, in charge of coordinating EU NAVFOR Somalia, i.e. Operation Atalanta. Atalanta was the first ever military naval operation launched by the European Union. Therefore, the views of an insider are invaluable. Dejoué explains why Atalanta takes place in a challenging and complex environment, and outlines the sets of positive factors benefiting the operation. He focuses on the ability of the EU to negotiate international agreements, and argues that they are key to conferring a comparative advantage to the EU in the market of maritime security providers in the region. Notably, these agreements ensure continuity between military arrests on the high seas and subsequent prosecution. Dejoué contends, however, that the challenges relating to the agreements’ implementation call for more sustainable solutions. The other set of positive factors is provided by the intensive cooperation between the military command and the maritime industry, decided at the outset of the operation. Representatives from industry are integrated in the Operation Headquarters, and military and civilian maritime experts have jointly designed the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa. The author argues that this choice has greatly influenced the merchant mariners' new approach to security, and contributed to building trust and efficiency in promoting best management practice in this community. Dejoué suggests that the different core tasks of the naval force reflect the different influences at play at the time of shaping the EU NAVFOR mandate.

Chapter 9, by Elina Dzalbe, adds the experience of a European Council officer from the Coordination of the Political and Security Committee and Assistance to the Director General. Dzalbe’s knowledge and practice of dealing with the European Union and member states’ actors during Political and Security Committee’s deliberations offer a view of the influences, skills and familiarity with which the decision-makers interact. Through the prism of the mandate and the working practices of the PSC, the author provides an insight into the parameters shaping the decision-making in the area of Common Security and Defence Policy. To that effect, she analyses the implementation of the procedures and the role of the EU actors, disclosing the political and practical considerations guiding the EU member states in the PSC’s deliberations. The author complements the analysis with sociological reflections on the growing esprit de corps and negotiation style of the PSC. Dzalbe condenses the political control and strategic direction exerted by the PSC into the 3P formula, described as the flexible composite of Process, Pragmatism and People.

Chapter 10, by Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Restelli, discusses the European Battlegroup (BG) inaction, explored through a case study. The BG non-deployment, in late 2008, when the UN requested European military support for the United Nations Organisation Mission peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, serves as a basis for the analysis. The chapter first focuses on the EU’s military crisis management official discourse, giving emphasis to the association with the UN. It highlights the ESDP/CSDP policy of developing the battlegroup concept, and makes reference to Operation Artemis, that might serve as a contrast to the case of 2008. It looks at the kind of operations that BGs are supposed to perform and at the differences with the NATO Response Force (NRF) in terms of structure and size, at the African focus of the EU BG concept, and at the way in which the NRF proved a failure and the EU BG concept flawed. The first task of the chapter is to try to establish why the EU uses the practice of ‘linking’ the official acts to the UN. Second, the chapter brings forward the case of the possible action of deployment of BGs: it pays attention to the UN’s demand for a military contribution, and looks at the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting seeking to trace the national positions of several EU states. It points out a few instances of ambiguity including that of the BG concept, and considers whether the EU was obliged to deploy. This chapter’s second task is to try to understand the way in which the European negative response was built. Third, the chapter seeks to work out why those EU states which were in charge of deploying had not done so. It enquires into the difficulties and obstacles which informed the national stances of Britain and Germany regarding BG deployment in the DRC. The chapter’s third task is to establish the main cause of the inaction in late 2008.

Chapter 11, by Alex Vines, investigates ten years of CSDP experimentation policy in the African region. The author overviews the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture to date and examines the EU’s actual involvement in it. The European Union is the major financial partner in terms of both military and non-military assistance to the African Union (AU). Vines argues that Europe has shifted from being a major UN troop contributor towards the funding of African-led peace operations, and the emergence of time-limited, high impact, missions. With the exception of Somalia, these CSDP operations have provided little direct security benefit to Europe and their success has been limited. They have provided experimentation opportunities for CSDP capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Guinea Bissau. Vines discusses the prospects for the Joint Africa EU Strategy Action Plan 2011-2013."

Le modèle européen - fondé sur des transferts et délégations de compétences avec pour conséquence la constitution d’un corpus d’acquis communautaires - fait plus que jamais figure d’expérience unique. La perte de sens qui menaçe le projet Européen coexiste avec un essor du régionalisme en Amérique latine, en Asie ou en Afrique où les projets mis en oeuvre s’articulent sur des trajectoires spécifiques dont la vocation initiale nétéait pas nécessairement de promouvoir l’intégration. De fait, celle-ci est de plus en plus fréquemment issue de processus de régionalisation impulsés par des acteurs non étatiques.

Acceptance of global norms by regional organisations is only the beginning of a long process of institutionalisation, as cases in the African Union (AU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) demonstrate. This is complicated where norms originate outside a regional institution, yet the opportunity for reform is now present.

Darfur’daki ağır insan hakları ihlallerinin uluslararası toplumun koruma yükümlülüğünün sınırlarını aştığı konusunda kuşku yoktur. Darfur’a askeri güç içeren bir müdahale seçeneği 2005’ten beri Güvenlik Konseyi’nde tartışılmışsa da bir sonuca ulaşmamıştır. Bu tartışmalarda, özellikle Çin, Rusya ve Orta Doğu devletleri devlet egemenliği ilkesini ileri sürmektedirler. BM Antlaşması 39 madde çerçevesinde alınmış bir Güvenlik Konseyi kararı varsa, devlet egemenliği itirazı geçerliliğini yitirir ancak bu konuda Konsey’de yapılacak bir oylamada veto hakkı kullanılacağından müdahale kararı çıkması beklenmemektedir. Bölgesel örgüt Afrika Birliği’nin zorlayıcı bir müdahale bulunması, kapasitesinin yetersizliği ve siyasi irade olmaması nedeniyle mümkün değildir. Ağır ihlallerde tek tek devletlerin ya da devletler grubunun bu nitelikte müdahale bulunabileceğini savunan görüşe göre, koruma yükümlülüğünü kabul eden ABD, Avrupa Birliği, NATO gibi birimler müdahale edebilirler. Ancak bu birimlerde de, sebebi devlet egemenliği itirazını kabul etmeleri olmasa da, tek-taraflı bir müdahale için gerekli siyasi irade bulunmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, yerleşmiş bir kurallar dizisi olmadan insancıl müdahalenin öznel değerlendirmelere bağlı olduğu eleştirisi, koruma yükümlülüğü anlayışı açısından da devam etmektedir.

The European Union’s external action is supposed to be inspired by effective multilateralism, a commitment to cooperate with other multilateral actors and to strengthen them. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy’s articulation with those organisations that are identified as its partners for international crisis management shows however much more ambiguous institutional dynamics. This ambiguity appears in two conceptual perspectives: the EU’s strategic culture concerning the place the use of force should have in its external action, and the communities of practice formed by personnel from the organisations or their members. Relations are then carriers for implicit struggles about hierarchy.

During the last decade, peace operation partnerships between the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations have advanced considerably both in operational and institutional terms. With the growing involvement of regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping, coordination between the UN and its potential partners is important in order to avoid duplication or outright inter-organizational rivalry. Recognizing that institutionalised relations between the UN and emerging peacekeeping actors such as the European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and even NATO can lead to beneficial burden- sharing and mutual reinforcement, organizations have made conscious efforts to move from ad-hoc cooperation to more permanent and predictable mechanisms. Effective peace operations partnerships depend on coherent and strategically structured relations at the inter-secretariat level: different organizational cultures, agendas and approaches need to be systematically integrated. Despite some progress in UN-EU, UN-AU and UN-NATO relations, significant challenges persist in designing, maintaining and improving inter- organizational schemes for peace operations.

Unlike what has happened in Asia, where the rise of ASEAN since the 1990s correlates with bottom up processes and an emphasis on ‘lean’ institutionalisation, the revival of regionalism has, in Africa, been essentially associated with ‘thick’ institutionalism and a dysfunctional dissociation between regionalism as a project and regionalisation as a de facto process.At a time when the European integration experiment is coming under significant strain, sticking to a model that, in any case, was never truly accepted in Africa is both costly and counterproductive. regionalism with thick institutionalism is reconsidered, African countries may simply end up following a path that diverges from the pattern whereby, as in many parts of the world, new regionalism is the vehicle for the rise of new regions.