Developing Country

This qualitative study examines the role of clients in petty corruption by analyzing actual corrupt exchanges between ordinary citizens and low level public and private employees in post-communist Hungary. Using a grounded theory approach, interviews reveal how clients from different social strata deal with low-level agents in corrupt situations. Findings suggest two contrasting forms of low-level corruption: transactions where the client and the agent do not have a prior relationship and where external factors dominate the relationship; and cases with stronger social ties between the actors, where the client has more freedom to structure the transaction. However, a client's social background frequently determines the form of corrupt transaction and the form of resources illegally exchanged in the deal.

This paper re-examines the empirical relationship between financial development and economic growth. The data cover the regressions according to the maximum of 110 countries and at least 10. It includes developing and developed countries. The study period extends from 1973 to 2012. Imports results obtained using the Generalized Method of Moments dynamic panel show that the variable that influence a significant and positive economic growth, whatever the sample is the variable that reflects the level of availability of the banking system. Contrary to that extent the credits granted by the financial system to the private sector, even if significant, has a negative influence on growth. Finally, the measure that reflects the financial deepening of the economy seems to depend positively on economic growth for developing countries and negatively for developed country.

This paper analyzes the co-benefits of introducing a time variant carbon (C) tax scheme in Nepal, a hydropower resourceful country, by using a bottom up integrated energy system model based on the MARKet ALlocation (MARKAL) framework with time horizon of 2005–2050. It discusses the effects of C tax on energy mix, environmental emissions, energy supply security, energy efficiency, energy system cost, and employment benefit. The study shows that the C tax (that gradually increases from US$ 13/tCO2e in 2015 to US$ 200/tCO2e by 2050) results in a reduction of the cumulative emission of greenhouse gases by 83.9 million tons CO2e (12%) as compared to that in the base case. With the introduction of the C tax, there would be a need for additional hydropower capacity of 945 MW by 2050 as compared to the capacity in the base case. The emission of local pollutants consisting of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and non-methane volatile organic compound (NMVOC) in 2050 would be reduced by 12%, 7% and 1% respectively under the C tax scenario. Total amount of imported energy would decrease by 13%, which corresponds to a reduction in discounted net fuel import cost by 5% during the study period. Furthermore, the C tax would result in new employment generation of 151 thousand man-years associated with the additional hydropower capacity requirement.

    Political competition is essential to the development and maintenance of a healthy and stable democracy. Current scholarship has largely ignored the role that federalism can play in fostering meaningful political competition in emerging democracies. This Article aims to fill this void by developing a theory of political competition within federal systems based on a formal game theory model created by economist and Nobel Laureate Roger B. Myerson. The Article argues that constructive political competition is especially difficult in emerging democracies because social and economic exigencies create strong incentives for new leadership to quash opposition and because first-time voters do not have a point of comparison by which to judge their first set of democratic leaders. Unitary regimes exacerbate these problems because they create an all-or-nothing political scenario and provide voters with only one point of political comparison. Federal systems, on the other hand, create multiple political arenas. This means that political opposition can be contained without being quashed, and that voters will have multiple points of political comparison. After exploring the necessary parameters of this model, the Article then applies the model to post-apartheid South Africa, which has been controlled by a single political party since the country’s first democratic election in 1994. The Article concludes that South Africa’s federal structure is gradually fostering constructive political competition as the model suggests and that opposition parties in South Africa are well situated to take further advantage of these opportunities in the future.