Legal positivism

In this paper I will argue that international criminal law constitutes a valid legal system. There is skepticism over the authority of international law; some claim that it is not a genuine legal system, and does not command legal obligation. I will adopt a particular legal positivist position, known as moral attitude positivism, and apply this to an analysis of international criminal law. I will argue that the criteria necessary for a legal system on the positivist account are present in the international system of criminal law. Specifically, I will argue that a ‘rule of recognition’ can be drawn from a variation of the legal norm pacta sunt servanda, and this serves to validate the system as a whole. I conclude that the skeptic is wrong, and that international criminal law should be regarded as a valid legal system, commanding genuine legal authority.

"A summary of the finds from my dissertation and its main arguments, in favor of studying the legal material of the DSS on their own terms, applying contemporayr legal theory and relieving their examinaiton from the burden of the later rabbinic framework.

Note: after publication I changed my mind regarding terminology of "Natural Law" and "Legal Positivism." A more updated discussion is found in my dissertation, and a corrigendum will eventually appear in a later issue of Diné Israel."

La presente ponencia pretende lograr una conexión entre los tópicos del procedimiento de tutela laboral y el naturalismo jurídico a partir del puente que se pretenderá trazar con el principio de proporcionalidad. Se trata de dos objetos de estudio, de los cuales no se ha visto un trabajo concreto in toto, sí, algunos atisbos al interior de la teoría de la adjudicación. Por separado, las temáticas que se presentan para su estudio conjunto en este trabajo, han sido poco revisadas, así también la bibliografía que puede encontrarse en el ámbito nacional no es mucha. En el caso del procedimiento de tutela laboral, la situación es que su análisis va en alza en la literatura nacional, así teóricos como Sergio Gamonal y José Luis Ugarte (entre otros) incrementan el debate erudito en la materia. Sobre el naturalismo jurídico, la literatura relacionada en español es más bien precaria, pues es un tema que encuentra su desarrollo en inglés. Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, los insumos que esta última, junto al procedimiento de tutela laboral, involucran un mejunje que aplicado al principio de proporcionalidad y cómo puede existir una relación entre ellos resulta interesante y a la vez, inédito. Esta investigación ostenta adentrarse en un análisis no realizado antes e intentar introducir nuevos conceptos a la literatura nacional, como el de naturalismo jurídico y el de proporcionalidad vista desde un punto de vista más filosófico.

"Entre 1999 y 2003, la primera integración del Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación (TEPJF) emitió diversos criterios relevantes, mediante los cuales incrementó —paulatinamente— su capacidad para conocer de litigios originados en el seno de los partidos políticos. Con el paso del tiempo, en la literatura especializada se ha venido consolidando la idea de que estos criterios estuvieron inspirados en el garantismo, la doctrina judicial desarrollada por Luigi Ferrajoli. Sin embargo, en dichos trabajos no es frecuente encontrar argumentaciones encaminadas a demostrar que los criterios del TEPJF efectivamente fueron acordes con el garantismo. El objetivo del presente artículo es, precisamente, analizar las determinacio-nes del Tribunal a la luz de los postulados torales de la teoría de Ferrajoli. Se mostrará que las sentencias de la primera integración comparten algu- nos de los rasgos fundamentales del garantismo, pero que en ellas también hay elementos que discrepan con la teoría ferrajoliana. Por tanto, se concluye que los criterios del TEPJF pueden ser calificados, en todo caso, como un garantismo en tensión.

Between 1997 and 2003, in a series of relevant cases, the first Electoral Court of the Federal Judicial Branch (TEPJF) gradually increased its capacity to adjudicate intraparty disputes. Over time, several authors have argued that these cases were inspired by the judicial doctrine developed by Luigi Ferrajoli, the “guarantism” (garantismo). However, this literature rarely provides evidence to show that the opinions of the TEPJF were consistent with this judicial doctrine. Precisely, this paper seeks to evaluate the decisions of the Electoral Court based upon the theory of Ferrajoli. Specifically, I will argue that the opinions of the first TEPJF share some of the key features of the guarantism, but that they also have others that disagree with the ferrajolian theory. Thus, I conclude that the opinions of the TEPJF could be characterized as a guarantism in tension."

"The paper deals with legal positivism “conventionalist turn” in relation to the matter of the duty to obey the law and legal normativity. In this respect, conventionalist legal positivism is worth considering a) for it offers an explanation of legal normativity partly different vis-à-vis previous ones and b) for it tries to preserve the autonomy of legal obligation from moral obligation and coercion, respectively. Here I will only focus on legal conventionalism sketched out by Hart in the Postscript. Indeed, Hart’s conventionalism faces troubles which in some way affects also other distinguished versions of legal conventionalism like, for example, those worked out by Jules Coleman, Andrei Marmor and Scott Shapiro. Other “stronger” versions of legal conventionalism like, for example, those advanced by Chaim Gans and Gerald Postema, succeed in avoiding some of the traps in which fall the previous ones but, paraphrasing Hart, the outcome is distortion as the price of internal coherence.
To sum up, legal conventionalism follows two pathways, both of them in the end unsatisfactory. The first pathway – opened by Hart – leads to a “weak” version of conventionalism. This approach fails in so far as it does not succeed in preserving the autonomy of legal obligation from moral one. The second pathway – followed in different ways by Gans and Postema – does not soften conventionalism and so it achieves the outcome to design a coherent conventionalist model of legal normativity but at the price of distorting reality."

"Democracy and civil rights are distorted and polarizing ideas that pit the rich against the poor, and should be abandoned in favor of an emphasis on the common good. To reach that conclusion I argue the US Constitution is and has always been designed to protect the wealth of the ruling class. All political associations or states have this as a central idea.

My argument rests on a unique jurisprudential principle, the Unity Thesis. The main school of legal theory, positivism (the science of law) is based on the idea law is always separate from morals. I argue the opposite, that law cannot be understood apart from the moral. There are fundamental legal things, such as consent, iustum bellum and the state, that have persisted since classical times in our legal regimes. However, the Enlightenment acted to refract those legal things into a scientific part and a moral part. All positivist (or scientific) legal concepts, such as the Enlightenment idea of a constitution, have to be reunited with their moral part in order to be properly understood. The unified legal thing out of which constitutionalism emerged is the state, and is associated with the Hobbesian/Lockean individual, social contract theory, inalienable rights, implicit consent, popular sovereignty, slavery, the constitution, limited suffrage, the electoral college, and oligarchic control. The moral part of the US Constitution is democracy and civil rights; the legal part oligarchy. If we merge the various meanings back into the idea of the state (as a legal thing), then we see democracy/rights continue to enable civil discord by unbalanced focus on the Hobbesian individual, and that instead we should focus on the common good."

""Wagenbach demonstrated Kafka's familiarity with unique conceptions, in the work of Brentano and his Prague followers, of natural law and ethics. Issues involved in these conceptions are cogently illustrated in The Trial.
K. is tried for violating a law which is no positive law but a necessary condition for all positive law since all positive laws imply that they ought to be obeyed.

Brentano adamantly rejected all forms of nativism. The opposite of 'natural' in the phrase 'natural law' is not 'acquired' but 'conventional.' Acquaintance with natural norms is entirely acquired: persons having no such acquaintance can exist; K. is such a person. Natural norms, have a cognizable inherent correctness; any other norms oblige only through being authoritatively decreed. Conventional guilt or innocence is subject to influence. K.'s quest for a person to exert such influence on his behalf is evidence of his guilt. K. is unaware that absolute guilt is possible.

In the Prometheus myth, a sense of justice and right is necessary for politically organized society. Without insight into the natural sanction for correct positive laws, citizens cannot fulfill the duty rationally to choose positive laws: citizens will wrong one another, cities perish, humankind will be threatened. The myth gives important clues to the imagery of the parable "Before the Law."

Every authentic act of willing requires that something be desired for its own sake. Since there is a plurality of intrinsic goods, authentic action requires recognizing the chosen action to be better than its alternatives. Acquaintance with good, evil, better, and worse is acquired, Brentano insisted, only by perceiving certain affects to be correct. Like judgments, affects are either blind or evident. Basic moral concepts arise like all others from perception.

K. could become innocent by acquiring the lacking concepts. Then, actual acquittal would be just despite his guilt when arrested. His trial tests whether he is likely to experience intrinsically correct emotions. Guilt would be objective, independent of any finding by the Court. K.'s guilt entails his lacking any such concept of absolute guilt. He is convinced that guilt depends entirely on the Court, is altogether a matter of authority. This is K.'s delusion concerning his relation to the Court and the Law, the delusion illustrated by the legend, "Before the Law."""

"Przedmiotem artykułu są konsekwencje powszechnego stosowania prawniczych elektronicznych baz danych dla praktyki polskich sądów. Poza niekwestionowanymi pozytywnymi skutkami wynikającymi z rozwoju elektronicznej cywilizacji, prezentowane są negatywne skutki wykorzystania baz danych. Następuje bowiem zderzenie nowych możliwości technicznych w postaci łatwego dostępu do tekstów prawnych, komentarzy i tysięcy wcześniejszych orzeczeń ze szczególnym doświadczeniem historycznym sędziów w kraju post-komunistycznym, utrwalonymi przez pozytywizm prawniczy metodami wykładni prawa oraz dominacją sylogistycznego modelu stosowania prawa. W rezultacie możemy mówić o dysfunkcjonalności prawniczych baz danych. Kształtuje się model wykładni prawa, który łączący w sobie: dziedzictwo przeszłości, skutki przemian gospodarczych i ustrojowych, a także nowe zasady prawa z jednej strony z ideologią związanej decyzji sędziowskiej z drugiej strony. Istota takiego modelu wykładni prawa polega na nieograniczonej możliwości cytowania orzeczeń sądów i komentarzy dostępnych w bazach danych, bez szerszej refleksji teoretycznej – bez uzasadniania, dlaczego przywoływane orzeczenie stało się podstawą rozstrzygnięcia. Pozostaje sprawą otwartą, czy pod wpływem możliwości, jakie niosą elektroniczne prawnicze bazy danych, ten typ wykładni przekształci się w nową retorykę prawniczą, czy pozostanie jedynie sposobem adaptacji dyskrecjonalnej władzy sędziów do doktryny pozytywizmu prawniczego, a więc sofistyką okresu transformacji.
Rozbudowana wersja tego tekstu, przygotowana wspólnie z W. Staśkiewiczem, została opublikowana w: „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” Nr 1(4)/ 2012, s. 84-105."

This article deals with the implications of the widespread practice of use of legal databases in Polish judicial practice. Apart from the undeniable positive effects of development of an electronic civilization, the article deals with the negative effects of use of databases. This is because a conflict arises between the possibilities offered by the latest technology in the form of easy access to legal texts, commentaries and thousands of rulings, and the unique historical experience of the judiciary in a former communist country, methods of legal interpretation sustained by legal positivism, and domination by a syllogistic model for application of the law, resulting in dysfunction of legal databases. A kind of “hybrid interpretation of law” is formed, which is a combination of a legacy, the effects of transformation of the economy and the system, as well as the new rules of law, on the one hand, and the ideology of bound decisions of judges on the other. The nature of the “hybrid interpretation of law” is the infinite scope for citing judicial rulings and commentaries available in the databases without taking a broader theoretical view – without supporting arguments, and so the citing of a ruling has become the basis for adjudication. The question of whether the possibilities that electronic databases offer will cause interpretation of this kind to turn into a new form of legal rhetoric, or whether it will remain merely  a means of adaptation of the discretionary power of judges to legal positivism doctrine, and thus the sophism of the period of transformation, remains an open one.