Natural rights

En la estela del iusnaturalismo moderno, tanto Kant como Fichte, abordan el problema de la propiedad para tratarlo según los supuestos de la filosofía crítica del temprano idealismo alemán. Mientras que Kant, en una vena más inductiva, aborda el problema del derecho y de sus diferentes instituciones al hilo de la pregunta por sus respectivas condiciones de posibilidad, Fichte lo hace intentando deducir el derecho y las demás instituciones jurídicas desde la perspectiva de una teoría trascendental de la acción. El resultado de estas diferencias metódicas estriba en que, mientras para Kant los individuos tienen 'la libertad para adquirir propiedades', para Fichte, en cambio, tienen el derecho a 'exigirlas'. Esta diferencia –que tiene enormes consecuencias para la teoría del Estado- refleja la perenne alternativa entre 'occupatio' y contrato como modos originarios de adquirir el dominio, alternativa que recorre toda la filosofía política y que encuentra en la filosofía del derecho de Kant y de Fichte, respectivamente, una de sus mayores y más originales expresiones.

Zu Beginn des modernen Naturrechts haben sowohl Kant wie auch Fichte das Problem des Eigentums in Angriff genommen, indem sie von den Annahmen der kritischen Philosophie des frühen deutschen Idealismus ausgingen. Während Kant auf eher induktivem Weg das Problem des Rechts und seiner verschiedenen Institutionen im Rahmen der Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit in Angriff nimmt, versucht Fichte das Recht und die verschiedenen Rechtsinstitutionen aus der Perspektive einer transzendentalen Handlungstheorie „abzuleiten”. Als Ergebnis dieser Methodenunterschiede haben für Kant die Individuen die 'Freiheit, Eigentum zu erwerben', während sie für Fichte das Recht besitzen, 'es einzufordern'. Dieser Unterschied - der schwerwiegende Konsequenzen für die Staatstheorie hat - spiegelt die ewige Dichotomie zwischen der 'Occupatio' und dem Vertrag als ursprünglichen Arten des Herrschaftserwerbs wider, die die gesamte politische Philosophie durchzieht und in der Rechtsphilosophie von Kant und Fichte zwei ihrer bedeutendsten und authentischsten Ausprägungen findet.

Demoktesis is one of the many hypothetical histories in Anarchy, State and Utopy. Here, Nozick not only aims to show that more than a minimum state can only emerge at the cost of violating some citizen’s rights, but he also intends to put forward a criticism of contemporary democracy. The core of this criticism is the claim that democracy entails a progressive loss of self-ownership. In Nozick’s view, this makes democracy a dystopic regime, akin to slavery. In this article I will attempt to pin down the meaning and the reach of this last criticism. I will claim, first, that it should be understood as aimed only against certain conceptions of democracy; and second, that this criticism is overstated, since these very forms of democracy promote many of the liberties defended by Nozick. I will conclude that Nozick’s criticism against these forms of democracy can be explained to a great extent by his reluctance to admit certain idealizations made by the defenders of democracy in demoktesis. This reluctance has consequences on the more general issue of the methodological pertinence of hypothetical histories and, with it, on the problem of the justification of the principles by which those histories are inspired.

Demoktesis es una de las tantas historias hipotéticas de Anarquía, Estado y utopía. Con ella Nozick quiere demostrar no solo que un Estado mayor al Estado mínimo no puede surgir sin violar los derechos de nadie sino, además, hacer una crítica a la democracia contemporánea. El núcleo de la crítica consiste en sostener que el funcionamiento de la democracia supone la pérdida progresiva de la propiedad que cada uno tiene naturalmente sobre sí mismo. Para Nozick, esto hace de la democracia un régimen distópico, asimilable a la esclavitud. En el presente trabajo intentaremos fijar el sentido y alcance de esta crítica. Se sostendrá, primero, que, en rigor, ella se debe entender dirigida sólo contra ciertas concepciones particulares de la democracia; segundo, que la crítica es exagerada porque dichas formas de democracia pro- mueven muchas de las libertades que Nozick defiende. Se concluirá que la crítica de Nozick a tales formas de democracia se explica en buena medida por su renuencia a admitir ciertas idealizaciones de las que parten los defensores de la democracia aludidos en demoktesis. Esta renuencia conduce al problema más general de la validez de las historias hipotéticas y, con ello, al problema de la justificación de los principios que sirven de inspiración a tales historias.

Michael Zuckert's dismissal of Burlamaqui and Hutcheson as inspiration for the Declaration of Independence is fatally flawed.  Burlamaqui said exactly what Zuckert doubts that Burlamaqui could have said regarding the purpose of government (to secure rights).  Zuckert's attempt to explain the "pursuit of happiness" in terms of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding fails, because Zuckert's two chosen examples of parallel documents both echo Hutcheson and Burlamaqui (but not Locke) on obtaining happiness; and the 1776 congressional definition of happiness includes virtue, in common with the Ciceronian tradition of Hutcheson and Burlamaqui, in opposition to Locke.  In this Ciceronian tradition, rights are derived from duties, and virtue is the "perfection" of human nature, with happiness as the result.  This view is prominently expressed by Burlamaqui's student Vattel, whose "The Law of Nations" was carefully followed by the Continental Congress as it went through the procedure of establishing and then declaring independence.

I argue that all rights exist by convention. According to my definition, a right exists by convention just in case its justification appeals to the rules of a socially shared pattern of acting. I show that (i) our usual justifications for rights are circular, that (ii) a right fulfills my criterion if all possible justifications for it are circular, and that (iii) all existing philosophical justifications for rights are circular or fail. We find three non-circular alternatives in the literature, viz. justifications of rights by consequences, by autonomy or by divine commands. I show that all three alternatives fail, and I conclude that all rights exist by convention. This ontological result has a surprising and beneficial consequence. A common argument against conventionalism is that it implies cultural relativism. I finish by showing that the suggested conventionalism is incompatible with cultural relativism.

This thesis explores medieval English holy days using the theoretical framework of medieval natural rights established by Brian Tierney, R. H. Helmholz, and Kenneth Pennington. It suggests that holy days were invented as natural rights in the Middle Ages based on evidence from summae and from prosecutions of feast nonobservance by ecclesiastical courts. The right allowed all people in society to observe holy days by abstaining from servile work. This had great implications on social relations in medieval society because it limited the power masters had over their servants.

La storia delle dottrine giusnaturaliste è fatta di corsi e ricorsi. A volte, come ai tempi delle grandi rivoluzioni di inizio modernità, il diritto naturale è stato un punto di riferimento teorico indiscusso e un potente motore di rinnovamento politico e sociale. Altre volte, come nei momenti di maggiore fulgore giuspositivista degli ultimi due secoli, è stato ripetutamente dichiarato obsoleto, defunto, o frutto tristemente ambiguo della superstizione e dell’ideologia. Il diritto naturale è dunque vivo o morto?
Il presente testo raccoglie un materiale ricco e stimolante di autori americani e italiani che, da punti di vista e angolature diverse, trattano del diritto naturale e della sua rilevanza nel mondo attuale. I saggi del volume toccano alcuni dei nodi più cruciali dell’attuale dibattito teorico e pratico sul giusnaturalismo, come il problema della legge di Hume, o fallacia naturalistica, che resta per molti l’obiezione più radicale (e quasi invalicabile) a qualsiasi teoria giusnaturalista, e il problema del fondamento normativo della convivenza libera nelle società democratiche.
Contrariamente a quello che spesso si tende a pensare, l’appello al diritto naturale non esprime un pensiero principalmente religioso, ed è anzi oggi avvertito da più parti come una delle forme di rinnovamento dello stesso pensiero giuspositivista, come dimostrano i recenti dibattiti sulla riapertura del nesso diritto morale, sul neocostituzionalismo, sulla questione dei princìpi, o ancora sull’universalità dei diritti umani.

I will be reading a much shorter version of this paper on Monday, May 30, 2016 at the LASA Conference in New York.

Here is the information. It is an illustrious panel. Don't miss this:
1264 // LTC - Panel - Monday, May 30, 12:45pm - 2:15pm, Concourse H
The Relevance of Latin American Philosophy Today

Session Organizer: Amy Reed-Sandoval, University of Texas at El Paso
Chair: Eduardo Mendieta, Penn State University

José Revueltas’s Defense of the Lumpenproletariat: A Lesson for Socialist Movements Today: Amy Reed-Sandoval, University of Texas at El Paso

Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda’s ‘La Mujer’: A Writer’s Plea for Gender Equity in the 1860s: Ofelia M Schutte, University of South Florida

A Radical Approach to Immigration Justice: Jose Mendoza,
University of Massachusetts Lowell

Las Casas’ Articulation of the Indians’ Moral Agency: Looking
Back at Las Casas Through Fichte: Rolando Pérez, Hunter College

Discussant: Eduardo Mendieta, Penn State University

This article responds to the recent challenge directed at the Thomistic tradition for ignoring the modern/colonial problem of race by claiming that the Spanish conquests in the New World precipitated a critical debate about religious coercion centered on the permissibility of using war and slavery to convert Amerindians. It argues that key Dominican theologians (Domingo de Soto and Bartolome de las Casas) trained in Thomistic commentary categorically rejected medieval/early modern justifications for religious wars by appealing to an apostolic ethic of evangelization grounded in the scholastic tradition of natural law. The result was an unprecedented defense of human equality and natural rights protecting the spiritual and political freedom of Amerindian peoples.

An analogy of how God is viewed in the terms of the law that is our heritage. We are endowed by our Creator with unalienable rights and this has always been looked upon as the greatest law and as natural law.

Outlined in law, God is simply identified as a supreme being of good. Key documents that declare the roots of our liberties recognize God as supreme with rules that have been long established over numerous centuries.

Read the entire article here - God In Law: http://www.nomoretyranny.net/god-in-law-its-not-what-you-think/

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick famously quips, “[t]axation of earnings from labor is on par with forced labor” (Nozick, 169). In other words: (1) taxation equals taking of earnings. (2) Taking of earnings equals taking my hours of my leisure, life, labor. (3) Seizing hours of my leisure/labor/life equals forced labor; slavery. If I don't have the sole right to my labor, argues Nozick, then the state is a part-owner of me. If the state owns part of me, then I am essentially a slave.
According to Nozick, this is not a legitimate nor just use of state power. Individuals are endowed with certain inviolable rights by virtue of being human. These rights can never be suspended, and constrain any social activity that may violate these rights.