Constitutional Law Theory
"VĂGYOTT JOGĂLLAMISĂGUNK FELĂ âA JOGVĂLTĂS PARADOXONAIâ [1996] 7â22 [Ătmenet? / 1. Gondolati felkĂ©szĂŒletlensĂ©g / 2. VaksĂĄg Ă©s csodavĂĄrĂĄs / 3. BibĂł-szindrĂłma / 4. Nyugat Ă©s Nyugat között / JogĂĄllamisĂĄg?] // âMEGVALĂSULATLANUL... more
"VĂGYOTT JOGĂLLAMISĂGUNK FELĂ âA JOGVĂLTĂS PARADOXONAIâ [1996] 7â22 [Ătmenet? / 1. Gondolati felkĂ©szĂŒletlensĂ©g / 2. VaksĂĄg Ă©s csodavĂĄrĂĄs / 3. BibĂł-szindrĂłma / 4. Nyugat Ă©s Nyugat között / JogĂĄllamisĂĄg?] // âMEGVALĂSULATLANUL MEGVALĂSULT, VAGY MEGVALĂSULTAN MEGVALĂSULATLAN JOGĂLLAM?â [2000] 23â31 // âJOGĂLLAMISĂGUNK â KIHĂVĂSOK KERESZTĂTJĂNâ [2001] 32â52 [Jelszavak mögött jog: Ă©rtĂ©kek Ă©s technikĂĄk / EmberszerƱsĂ©g, gyakorlatiassĂĄg / TeolĂłgiaiâantropolĂłgiai alapok/ HelyettesĂthetetlenĂŒl sajĂĄt feladat / Jogi ĂșjraĂ©pĂtkezĂ©s szĂŒksĂ©ge]
A MĂLT TERHE âMIĂRT MARADT EL A MĂLTTAL SZEMBENĂZĂS, AZ ĂJRAKEZDĂS BETELJESĂLĂSE?â [2003] 55â63 // âLOPAKODĂ JOGĂJĂTĂS ALKOTMĂNYBĂRĂSKODĂS ĂTJĂN? (RendszervĂĄltoztatĂĄsunk termĂ©szetrajzĂĄhoz)â [2006] 64â111 [1. GlobĂĄlis rendszerformĂĄlĂĄs? / Jogbehozatal alkotmĂĄnybĂrĂĄskodĂĄs örvĂ©n: a jogĂĄllamisĂĄg bƱvszavĂĄval, aktivizmussal, nyugatimĂĄdat hamis idelizmusĂĄval, fĂŒgefalevĂ©lkĂ©nt a parlament fölĂ© növekvĆ jogalkotĂĄssal / 3. EredmĂ©ny: az ĂĄtmenet uralĂĄsa, a mĂșlt eltörlĂ©se / 4. FolytonossĂĄg visszaĂ©pĂtĂ©se az igazsĂĄgtĂ©tel ellehetetlenĂtĂ©sĂ©vel / 5. Joguralom alkotmĂĄnybĂrĂłsĂĄgi önkĂ©ny nyomĂĄn?] // âAMI MEGTĂRTĂNT, ĂS AMI AZĂTA TĂRTĂNIK (A hortobĂĄgyi kĂ©nyszermunkatĂĄborokba hurcolĂĄsok emlĂ©kĂ©re)â [2005] 112â127 [ElĂĄrultatĂĄsunk elĆzmĂ©nyei / »KitelepĂtĂ©s« Ă©s következmĂ©nyek / »KitelepĂtĂ©s« Ă©s az utĂłkor hallgatĂĄsa / RendszervĂĄltĂł elgondolĂĄsok a mĂșlt kezelĂ©sĂ©rĆl / Hazai csĆd mĂ©g liberĂĄlis mĂ©rcĂ©vel mĂ©rve is] // â1956 ERKĂLCSI ĂS JOGI MEGĂTĂLĂSE, avagy a jog vĂĄlaszadĂĄsi kĂ©pessĂ©gĂ©nek erkölcsi egysĂ©ge mint a totalitarizmusok utĂĄni korszak dilemmĂĄjaâ [2006] 128â146 [A jog Ă©s tĂĄrsadalmiâerkölcsi alapjai / Erkölcsi minimum feltĂ©tlensĂ©ge a jogban / 1956 drĂĄmĂĄja, egyedisĂ©ge Ă©s nagyszerƱsĂ©ge / Az utĂłkor szĂ©gyene a jog elhallgattatĂĄsĂĄĂ©rt]
KITEKINTĂS âKUDARCOT VALLOTT KERESZTESHADJĂRAT? Amerikai önbizalom, orosz katasztrĂłfaâ [2002] 149â168 [1. A pĂ©ldaadĂł Ă©s tranzitolĂłgiĂĄja / 2.a. Szervezett mintakĂ©nyszer / 2.b. ProvokĂĄlt csĆd / 2.c. Cui prodest? / 2.d. GyĂĄmsĂĄgban fogant demokrĂĄcia 3. FĂĄtumszerƱsĂ©g Ă©s martalĂ©kkĂĄ vĂĄlĂĄs a globalizmusban] // âA »GYĂKERESEN GONOSZ« A JOG MĂRLEGĂNâ [2002] 169â186 [A normalitĂĄs jogĂĄnak nehĂ©zsĂ©gei szĂ©lsĆsĂ©gek kezelĂ©sĂ©ben / 1. TörtĂ©nelmi hĂĄttĂ©r / 2. NormatĂv (erkölcsi Ă©s politikai) összefĂŒggĂ©sek / 3. NormatĂv (jogi) összefĂŒggĂ©sek / A jog mint gyakorlati feladatvĂĄllalĂĄs] // âJOGĂLLAMI VĂVĂDĂS MINTAKĂNYSZEREK SZCYLLĂJA ĂS CSALĂDĂSOK KHARĂBDISZE KĂZT (LitvĂĄnia pĂ©ldĂĄjĂĄban)â [2004] 187â201 [Az ĂĄtmenet ellentmondĂĄsossĂĄga / LitvĂĄnia Ăștja / Joguralom â elĆfeltĂ©telezettsĂ©ggel? / Ătmenet â szĂ©lsĆsĂ©gekbe bukdĂĄcsolĂĄs ĂĄrĂĄn? / A tudomĂĄny kizĂĄrĂłlagos feladata nemzete irĂĄnt]
HOL ĂLLUNK? âPARADOXONOK FOGSĂGĂBAN, avagy patthelyzet a jog csĂșcsain, mit magunknak teremtettĂŒnkâ [ms] 205â213 // âA POLGĂRI ENGEDELMESSĂG ĂS ENGEDETLENSĂG VĂLASZĂTJAINâ [2007] 214â222 [PolgĂĄri engedetlensĂ©g / PolgĂĄri engedelmessĂ©g]
Tårgy-, Jogforrås-, Névmutató"
A MĂLT TERHE âMIĂRT MARADT EL A MĂLTTAL SZEMBENĂZĂS, AZ ĂJRAKEZDĂS BETELJESĂLĂSE?â [2003] 55â63 // âLOPAKODĂ JOGĂJĂTĂS ALKOTMĂNYBĂRĂSKODĂS ĂTJĂN? (RendszervĂĄltoztatĂĄsunk termĂ©szetrajzĂĄhoz)â [2006] 64â111 [1. GlobĂĄlis rendszerformĂĄlĂĄs? / Jogbehozatal alkotmĂĄnybĂrĂĄskodĂĄs örvĂ©n: a jogĂĄllamisĂĄg bƱvszavĂĄval, aktivizmussal, nyugatimĂĄdat hamis idelizmusĂĄval, fĂŒgefalevĂ©lkĂ©nt a parlament fölĂ© növekvĆ jogalkotĂĄssal / 3. EredmĂ©ny: az ĂĄtmenet uralĂĄsa, a mĂșlt eltörlĂ©se / 4. FolytonossĂĄg visszaĂ©pĂtĂ©se az igazsĂĄgtĂ©tel ellehetetlenĂtĂ©sĂ©vel / 5. Joguralom alkotmĂĄnybĂrĂłsĂĄgi önkĂ©ny nyomĂĄn?] // âAMI MEGTĂRTĂNT, ĂS AMI AZĂTA TĂRTĂNIK (A hortobĂĄgyi kĂ©nyszermunkatĂĄborokba hurcolĂĄsok emlĂ©kĂ©re)â [2005] 112â127 [ElĂĄrultatĂĄsunk elĆzmĂ©nyei / »KitelepĂtĂ©s« Ă©s következmĂ©nyek / »KitelepĂtĂ©s« Ă©s az utĂłkor hallgatĂĄsa / RendszervĂĄltĂł elgondolĂĄsok a mĂșlt kezelĂ©sĂ©rĆl / Hazai csĆd mĂ©g liberĂĄlis mĂ©rcĂ©vel mĂ©rve is] // â1956 ERKĂLCSI ĂS JOGI MEGĂTĂLĂSE, avagy a jog vĂĄlaszadĂĄsi kĂ©pessĂ©gĂ©nek erkölcsi egysĂ©ge mint a totalitarizmusok utĂĄni korszak dilemmĂĄjaâ [2006] 128â146 [A jog Ă©s tĂĄrsadalmiâerkölcsi alapjai / Erkölcsi minimum feltĂ©tlensĂ©ge a jogban / 1956 drĂĄmĂĄja, egyedisĂ©ge Ă©s nagyszerƱsĂ©ge / Az utĂłkor szĂ©gyene a jog elhallgattatĂĄsĂĄĂ©rt]
KITEKINTĂS âKUDARCOT VALLOTT KERESZTESHADJĂRAT? Amerikai önbizalom, orosz katasztrĂłfaâ [2002] 149â168 [1. A pĂ©ldaadĂł Ă©s tranzitolĂłgiĂĄja / 2.a. Szervezett mintakĂ©nyszer / 2.b. ProvokĂĄlt csĆd / 2.c. Cui prodest? / 2.d. GyĂĄmsĂĄgban fogant demokrĂĄcia 3. FĂĄtumszerƱsĂ©g Ă©s martalĂ©kkĂĄ vĂĄlĂĄs a globalizmusban] // âA »GYĂKERESEN GONOSZ« A JOG MĂRLEGĂNâ [2002] 169â186 [A normalitĂĄs jogĂĄnak nehĂ©zsĂ©gei szĂ©lsĆsĂ©gek kezelĂ©sĂ©ben / 1. TörtĂ©nelmi hĂĄttĂ©r / 2. NormatĂv (erkölcsi Ă©s politikai) összefĂŒggĂ©sek / 3. NormatĂv (jogi) összefĂŒggĂ©sek / A jog mint gyakorlati feladatvĂĄllalĂĄs] // âJOGĂLLAMI VĂVĂDĂS MINTAKĂNYSZEREK SZCYLLĂJA ĂS CSALĂDĂSOK KHARĂBDISZE KĂZT (LitvĂĄnia pĂ©ldĂĄjĂĄban)â [2004] 187â201 [Az ĂĄtmenet ellentmondĂĄsossĂĄga / LitvĂĄnia Ăștja / Joguralom â elĆfeltĂ©telezettsĂ©ggel? / Ătmenet â szĂ©lsĆsĂ©gekbe bukdĂĄcsolĂĄs ĂĄrĂĄn? / A tudomĂĄny kizĂĄrĂłlagos feladata nemzete irĂĄnt]
HOL ĂLLUNK? âPARADOXONOK FOGSĂGĂBAN, avagy patthelyzet a jog csĂșcsain, mit magunknak teremtettĂŒnkâ [ms] 205â213 // âA POLGĂRI ENGEDELMESSĂG ĂS ENGEDETLENSĂG VĂLASZĂTJAINâ [2007] 214â222 [PolgĂĄri engedetlensĂ©g / PolgĂĄri engedelmessĂ©g]
Tårgy-, Jogforrås-, Névmutató"
"KĂLVILĂGUNK â BELVILĂGUNK âSZĂP ĂJ VILĂGUNK?â [1992/2002] 7â15 // âDĂL KERESZTJE ALATT (Ăti tƱnĆdĂ©s sorsunkrĂłl â a közös mĂșltrĂłl s jövĆrĆl)â [2009] 16â30 // âHALĂLA VAGY EGYETLEN ESĂLYE-E A TETTNEK AZ OKOSKODĂS?â [2010] 31â43 //... more
"KĂLVILĂGUNK â BELVILĂGUNK âSZĂP ĂJ VILĂGUNK?â [1992/2002] 7â15 // âDĂL KERESZTJE ALATT (Ăti tƱnĆdĂ©s sorsunkrĂłl â a közös mĂșltrĂłl s jövĆrĆl)â [2009] 16â30 // âHALĂLA VAGY EGYETLEN ESĂLYE-E A TETTNEK AZ OKOSKODĂS?â [2010] 31â43 // âKOMMUNIZMUS UTĂN? KĂ©nyszerek Ă©s esetlegessĂ©gek â nemzetközi ellenszĂ©lbenâ [1998/2009] 44â81 [Kis orszĂĄgos magĂĄnyossĂĄga â nagyhatalmak ĂĄrnyĂ©kĂĄban / HelyzetĂŒnk pĂ©ldĂĄtlansĂĄga s a megtapasztalĂĄs szĂŒksĂ©gessĂ©ge / IgazsĂĄgtĂ©tel szĂŒksĂ©ge, fĂ©lelme, majd elodĂĄzĂĄsĂĄnak kĂĄrtevĂ©se / Joguralom, jogĂĄllam, s az elĂ©vĂŒlĂ©s kĂ©rdĂ©se: a jog lehetĆsĂ©gei elidegendĂ©s Ă©s emberszolgĂĄlat között]
A JOG VILĂGA âKĂZĂS FELELĆSSĂGĂNK A JOGĂRTâ [2007/2008] 85â97 // âPARTITĂRA ĂS KATARZIS: mi vĂ©gre szolgĂĄl a jog?â [2010] 98â102 // âJOGFILOZĂFIA â A JOGON TĂLâ [2007] 103â108 // âĂRDEKEK ĂS ĂTMENETEK, NORMALITĂSOK ĂS JOGĂLLAMISĂG-FELFOGĂSOKâ [2009] 109â129 [KĂ©t minta, feloldatlan ellentmondĂĄssal / TörtĂ©nelmi partikularitĂĄs Ă©s elvont univerzalizmus feszĂŒltsĂ©ge / A jog szerkezetĂ©nek Ă©s mƱködĂ©smĂłdjĂĄnak egysĂ©ge / KĂ©nyszer vagy organikus fejlĆdĂ©s dilemmĂĄja / A tĂĄrsadalmi legitimĂĄciĂł megkerĂŒlhetetlensĂ©ge]
DIAGNĂZISOK ĂS A KIĂT LEHETĆSĂGEI âVĂLSĂG A VĂLSĂGBAN?â [2010] 133â146 [Zavarok jogfelfogĂĄsunk, jogrendĂŒnk körĂŒl / Az öncĂ©llĂĄ vĂĄlĂĄs Ă©s kiĂŒresedĂ©s: veszĂ©lyek Ă©s kĂĄrok] // â»KĂZDELEM A JOGĂRT?« AlkotmĂĄnyvitĂĄink Ă©s tanulsĂĄgaikâ [2010] 147â162 [»HĂșsz Ă©ve szabadon KözĂ©p-EurĂłpĂĄban« / »Twenty Years of Freedom« / Globalizmus? Kozmopolitizmus? / Kell-e Ășj jog? Kell-e Ășj alkotmĂĄny? / ZsĂĄkutcĂĄnak bizonyult-e eddigi »jogĂĄllami ĂĄtmenetĂŒnk«? / Milyen jogfelfogĂĄst plĂĄntĂĄl hĂĄt belĂ©nk szĂvĂłsan?] // âKĂNYSZEREDETTEN BOLYONGUNKâ [2009] 163â174 // âFENSĂGES JELSZAVAKKALâ [2010] 175â181 // âVILĂGPROBLĂMĂKBA ĂGTĂNK ISMĂT BELEâ [2011] 182â206 // âEVILĂGI FELTĂMADĂSUNK: Ăllapotok, esĂ©lyekâ [2011] 207â217 [StĂlusteremtĂ©s / JogkiĂŒresedĂ©s / TĂĄmogatĂł szerep helyett / Meddig jutottunk?]
FĂGGELĂK: POSZTUMUSZ ELEMZĂS A KOMMUNIZMUS ĂTMENTĆDĂSĂNEK JOGI LOGIKĂJĂRĂL 1991 DECEMBERĂBĆL VARGA CSABA âSzabĂł JĂłzsefrĆlâ 221â227 // SZABĂ JĂZSEF â»Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra«â 228â252
Személynévmutató 253"
A JOG VILĂGA âKĂZĂS FELELĆSSĂGĂNK A JOGĂRTâ [2007/2008] 85â97 // âPARTITĂRA ĂS KATARZIS: mi vĂ©gre szolgĂĄl a jog?â [2010] 98â102 // âJOGFILOZĂFIA â A JOGON TĂLâ [2007] 103â108 // âĂRDEKEK ĂS ĂTMENETEK, NORMALITĂSOK ĂS JOGĂLLAMISĂG-FELFOGĂSOKâ [2009] 109â129 [KĂ©t minta, feloldatlan ellentmondĂĄssal / TörtĂ©nelmi partikularitĂĄs Ă©s elvont univerzalizmus feszĂŒltsĂ©ge / A jog szerkezetĂ©nek Ă©s mƱködĂ©smĂłdjĂĄnak egysĂ©ge / KĂ©nyszer vagy organikus fejlĆdĂ©s dilemmĂĄja / A tĂĄrsadalmi legitimĂĄciĂł megkerĂŒlhetetlensĂ©ge]
DIAGNĂZISOK ĂS A KIĂT LEHETĆSĂGEI âVĂLSĂG A VĂLSĂGBAN?â [2010] 133â146 [Zavarok jogfelfogĂĄsunk, jogrendĂŒnk körĂŒl / Az öncĂ©llĂĄ vĂĄlĂĄs Ă©s kiĂŒresedĂ©s: veszĂ©lyek Ă©s kĂĄrok] // â»KĂZDELEM A JOGĂRT?« AlkotmĂĄnyvitĂĄink Ă©s tanulsĂĄgaikâ [2010] 147â162 [»HĂșsz Ă©ve szabadon KözĂ©p-EurĂłpĂĄban« / »Twenty Years of Freedom« / Globalizmus? Kozmopolitizmus? / Kell-e Ășj jog? Kell-e Ășj alkotmĂĄny? / ZsĂĄkutcĂĄnak bizonyult-e eddigi »jogĂĄllami ĂĄtmenetĂŒnk«? / Milyen jogfelfogĂĄst plĂĄntĂĄl hĂĄt belĂ©nk szĂvĂłsan?] // âKĂNYSZEREDETTEN BOLYONGUNKâ [2009] 163â174 // âFENSĂGES JELSZAVAKKALâ [2010] 175â181 // âVILĂGPROBLĂMĂKBA ĂGTĂNK ISMĂT BELEâ [2011] 182â206 // âEVILĂGI FELTĂMADĂSUNK: Ăllapotok, esĂ©lyekâ [2011] 207â217 [StĂlusteremtĂ©s / JogkiĂŒresedĂ©s / TĂĄmogatĂł szerep helyett / Meddig jutottunk?]
FĂGGELĂK: POSZTUMUSZ ELEMZĂS A KOMMUNIZMUS ĂTMENTĆDĂSĂNEK JOGI LOGIKĂJĂRĂL 1991 DECEMBERĂBĆL VARGA CSABA âSzabĂł JĂłzsefrĆlâ 221â227 // SZABĂ JĂZSEF â»Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra«â 228â252
Személynévmutató 253"
"PREFACE [1989] 7â9 // ON VITALITY IN THE REGION [1991] 10â18 NO-LAW ON STALINISM [1985] 21â22 // PAST AND PRESENT [1990] 23â27 // ATTEMPTS AT REFORM FROM WITHIN (LA SĂPARATION DES POUVOIRS) [1985] 28â37 // WHAT IS NEEDED TO HAVE LAW?... more
"PREFACE [1989] 7â9 // ON VITALITY IN THE REGION [1991] 10â18
NO-LAW ON STALINISM [1985] 21â22 // PAST AND PRESENT [1990] 23â27 // ATTEMPTS AT REFORM FROM WITHIN (LA SĂPARATION DES POUVOIRS) [1985] 28â37 // WHAT IS NEEDED TO HAVE LAW? [1989] 38â61: I. The Dilemma of Unlawfulness and Lawfulness 40 [1. Unlawfulness or Law in Action? 43 / 2. Negation of Law or a Separate Order? 49] II. The Pathologies of Legal Mediation 50 [1. Instrumentalization 51 / 2. Reduction to a One-faced, One-directines Medium 52 / 3. Loss of Contents 56] III. Law and its Conceptual Minimum 57 // MARXISM IN SERVICE [1993] 62â68
TRANSITION THE SUI GENERIS NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE [1993] 71â77 // TRUMBLING STEPS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STATE [ms/1989] 78â89: I. Everyday Constitutional Process 78 / II. Question Marks of Local Legal Tradition 82
SKIRMISHES AND THE GAMEâS RULE CRIME, NOT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE [ms/1990] 93â96 // FRAGILITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT [ms/1990] 97â102 // TROUBLES SURROUNDING THE FUNCTIONS OF LAW [ms/1991] 103â106 // INDIVISIBILITY OF THE LAW & RULE OF LAW [ms/1991] 107â110 // CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (PATTERN WITH NO STANDARD?) [ms/1991] 111â118
COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST ON SETTING STANDARDS [ms/1990] 121â128 // DO WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO JUDGE THE PAST? [ms/1991] 129â135 // THE DILEMMA OF ENFORCING THE LAW [1993] 136â143: I. Debate on Statutory Limitations 136 / II. Taking Law Seriously 140 / Appendix 143 // FAILURE ON ACCOUNT OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS? [1995] 144â155
RULE OF LAW VARIETIES OF LAW & RULE OF LAW [ms/1993] 159â173: 1. Variants of the Rule of Law 159 [1.1. Rechtsstaatlichkeit 160 / 1.2. Rule of Law 162] II. Variants of the Law 161 [2.1. Rechtsstaatlichkeit and the European Continental Conception of Law 161 {2.1.1. Logical Pattern (Axiomatism, Logical submission: logical determination & normative definition of a legal frame) 162 / 2.1.2. Conclusions (Legal force as a criterion, Science- and language-philosophical reconsideration, Ontology of concepts and texts, The role of logic) 165} 2.2. Rule of Law and the BritishâAmerican Conception of Law 167] 3. The Role of Conceptual Generality 168 [3.1. The Paradigm of the Concept {3.1.1. The Roman tradition 168 / 3.1.2. The Duality of the Conceptual World 169 / 3.1.3. »Concept of Order« in the Law? 170 / 3.1.4. Differenc Approaches to Law? A Community of Law? 172}]
Bibliography 175 // Index of Names 183 / Index of Normative Materials 186 / Index 187"
NO-LAW ON STALINISM [1985] 21â22 // PAST AND PRESENT [1990] 23â27 // ATTEMPTS AT REFORM FROM WITHIN (LA SĂPARATION DES POUVOIRS) [1985] 28â37 // WHAT IS NEEDED TO HAVE LAW? [1989] 38â61: I. The Dilemma of Unlawfulness and Lawfulness 40 [1. Unlawfulness or Law in Action? 43 / 2. Negation of Law or a Separate Order? 49] II. The Pathologies of Legal Mediation 50 [1. Instrumentalization 51 / 2. Reduction to a One-faced, One-directines Medium 52 / 3. Loss of Contents 56] III. Law and its Conceptual Minimum 57 // MARXISM IN SERVICE [1993] 62â68
TRANSITION THE SUI GENERIS NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE [1993] 71â77 // TRUMBLING STEPS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STATE [ms/1989] 78â89: I. Everyday Constitutional Process 78 / II. Question Marks of Local Legal Tradition 82
SKIRMISHES AND THE GAMEâS RULE CRIME, NOT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE [ms/1990] 93â96 // FRAGILITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT [ms/1990] 97â102 // TROUBLES SURROUNDING THE FUNCTIONS OF LAW [ms/1991] 103â106 // INDIVISIBILITY OF THE LAW & RULE OF LAW [ms/1991] 107â110 // CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (PATTERN WITH NO STANDARD?) [ms/1991] 111â118
COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST ON SETTING STANDARDS [ms/1990] 121â128 // DO WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO JUDGE THE PAST? [ms/1991] 129â135 // THE DILEMMA OF ENFORCING THE LAW [1993] 136â143: I. Debate on Statutory Limitations 136 / II. Taking Law Seriously 140 / Appendix 143 // FAILURE ON ACCOUNT OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS? [1995] 144â155
RULE OF LAW VARIETIES OF LAW & RULE OF LAW [ms/1993] 159â173: 1. Variants of the Rule of Law 159 [1.1. Rechtsstaatlichkeit 160 / 1.2. Rule of Law 162] II. Variants of the Law 161 [2.1. Rechtsstaatlichkeit and the European Continental Conception of Law 161 {2.1.1. Logical Pattern (Axiomatism, Logical submission: logical determination & normative definition of a legal frame) 162 / 2.1.2. Conclusions (Legal force as a criterion, Science- and language-philosophical reconsideration, Ontology of concepts and texts, The role of logic) 165} 2.2. Rule of Law and the BritishâAmerican Conception of Law 167] 3. The Role of Conceptual Generality 168 [3.1. The Paradigm of the Concept {3.1.1. The Roman tradition 168 / 3.1.2. The Duality of the Conceptual World 169 / 3.1.3. »Concept of Order« in the Law? 170 / 3.1.4. Differenc Approaches to Law? A Community of Law? 172}]
Bibliography 175 // Index of Names 183 / Index of Normative Materials 186 / Index 187"
topical part of his complete personal bibliography
The Hobby Lobby case gives the Supreme Court a chance to step back from its long march toward making corporations equal to human beings. If it doesn't do that, it will take another step toward what Dr. Frankenstein was doing: trying to... more
The Hobby Lobby case gives the Supreme Court a chance to step back from its long march toward making corporations equal to human beings. If it doesn't do that, it will take another step toward what Dr. Frankenstein was doing: trying to create a living being, and in the process creating a monster. The U.S. Supreme Court has been expanding the "Constitutional rights" of corporations since its 1819 decision that protected the corporation of Dartmouth College against the state of New Hampshire. In that case, the court described a corporation as an "immortal being." In 1886, the court allowed the Southern Pacific Railroad to claim "equal protection of the law" to challenge the California county of Santa Clara. There, the court described the corporation as a "metaphysical being" equal to a "man, woman, and child" and protected by "our blessed government."
Research Interests:
Constitutional Law, Public Policy, Political Philosophy, Public Opinion, Political Science, and 48 morePublic Relations, Politics, Law and Politics, Comparative Constitutional Law, Public Sphere, European Constitutional Law, Public Health, Constitutional Theory, International Constitutional Law, Constitutionalism, Public Space, Constitutional Politics, Constitutional law, Human Rights & Humanitarian law, PolĂtica, Public Law, Public Sector Reform, Direito PĂșblico, Political, Derecho constitucional, Cultura polĂtica, CiĂȘncia PolĂtica, Politic, Constitucional Law, Party Politics, Politica, Diritto Pubblico Diritto Ecclesiastico Diritto Amminsitrativo, Poder PolĂtico, Political Power, Direito Constitucional, Direitos Coletivos, Direitos Humanos, SCIENZE POLITICHE, Constitution, Ciencia polĂtica, Diritto Costituzionale, Etica pubblica, Sector Public, Constituionalism and Constitutional Law, Droit Constitutionnel, Pubblica Amministrazione, Constitucionalismo, Costituzionalismo, PolĂŹtica, Diritto Pubblico Comparato, Diritto pubblico, Pubblic Communication. Political Communication, Costituzione Europea, Reformas Constitucionales, EU Administrative and Constitutional Law, and Constitutional Law Theoryedit
"""Demers teoretic Ăźn domeniul justiĆŁiei constituĆŁionale, lucrarea contribuie Ăźn mod direct la o mai bunÄ cunoaĆtere a acestui fenomen juridic relativ nou. Originalitatea abordÄrii unei teme eminamente de drept constituĆŁional din... more
"""Demers teoretic Ăźn domeniul justiĆŁiei constituĆŁionale, lucrarea contribuie Ăźn mod direct la o mai bunÄ cunoaĆtere a acestui fenomen juridic relativ nou. Originalitatea abordÄrii unei teme eminamente de drept constituĆŁional din perspectiva teoriei generale a dreptului conferÄ lucrÄrii o certÄ valoare ĆtiinĆŁificÄ.
Ăntr-un stil sobru Ći cursiv, mĂąnuind cu maturitate Ći fineĆŁe argumentele de naturÄ juridicÄ, autorul examineazÄ critic o problematicÄ complexÄ Ći expune cu claritate propriile concluzii despre specificitatea actelor jurisdicĆŁionale ale CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale.
Ăn planul peisajului politic romĂąnesc, Ăźn condiĆŁiile Ăźn care tot mai des se ĂźncearcÄ atragerea CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale Ăźn dispute de naturÄ politicÄ, orice studiu academic care ĂźncearcÄ sÄ defineascÄ valenĆŁele acestei instituĆŁii este binevenit. Ăn acest context, lucrarea âActele jurisdicĆŁionale ale CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionaleâ, substanĆŁa tezei de doctorat a autorului, pledeazÄ pentru configurarea valenĆŁelor CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale, Ăźn raport cu ceilalĆŁi âactoriâ ai vieĆŁii democratice.
Cu certitudine, prezenta lucrare va constitui o sursÄ bibliograficÄ pertinentÄ atĂąt pentru teoreticienii Ći practicienii din acest domeniu Ći, de ce nu, chiar pentru judecÄtorii CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale.
Faptul cÄ teza conĆŁine nu numai abordÄri teoretice Ći conceptuale, dar Ći referiri critice la jurisprudenĆŁa CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale, Ăźi conferÄ Ći o valoare aplicativÄ directÄ pentru toĆŁi cei interesaĆŁi de acest fenomen juridic."""
Ăntr-un stil sobru Ći cursiv, mĂąnuind cu maturitate Ći fineĆŁe argumentele de naturÄ juridicÄ, autorul examineazÄ critic o problematicÄ complexÄ Ći expune cu claritate propriile concluzii despre specificitatea actelor jurisdicĆŁionale ale CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale.
Ăn planul peisajului politic romĂąnesc, Ăźn condiĆŁiile Ăźn care tot mai des se ĂźncearcÄ atragerea CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale Ăźn dispute de naturÄ politicÄ, orice studiu academic care ĂźncearcÄ sÄ defineascÄ valenĆŁele acestei instituĆŁii este binevenit. Ăn acest context, lucrarea âActele jurisdicĆŁionale ale CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionaleâ, substanĆŁa tezei de doctorat a autorului, pledeazÄ pentru configurarea valenĆŁelor CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale, Ăźn raport cu ceilalĆŁi âactoriâ ai vieĆŁii democratice.
Cu certitudine, prezenta lucrare va constitui o sursÄ bibliograficÄ pertinentÄ atĂąt pentru teoreticienii Ći practicienii din acest domeniu Ći, de ce nu, chiar pentru judecÄtorii CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale.
Faptul cÄ teza conĆŁine nu numai abordÄri teoretice Ći conceptuale, dar Ći referiri critice la jurisprudenĆŁa CurĆŁii ConstituĆŁionale, Ăźi conferÄ Ći o valoare aplicativÄ directÄ pentru toĆŁi cei interesaĆŁi de acest fenomen juridic."""
""One of the numerous unique features of the Bosnian constitutional system is the (hyper)active role of the courts in the consideration of the concept of "tradition", as one of the vital national interests of the so-called constituent... more
""One of the numerous unique features of the Bosnian constitutional system is the (hyper)active role of the courts in the consideration of the concept of "tradition", as one of the vital national interests of the so-called constituent peoples. In this short text, written for the collection of essays on the topic of "Tradition", we show that the courts' attempt at the reconciliation of the ethnocratic and civic elements of the constitution that they are interpreting often remains unsuccessful. We also notice the phenomenon in political confrontation with court decisions on this issue, which can be designated as "discontinuation of tradition", which in Bosnia and Herzegovina necessarily precedes the manufacture of tradition.
This document is in Bosnian language. Download from SSRN (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383544)
Jedna od brojnih specifiÄnosti bosanskohercegovaÄkog ustavno-pravnog sistema jeste (hiper)aktivna uloga sudova u razmatranju koncepta "tradicije" kao jednog od vitalnih nacionalnih interesa tzv. konstitutivnih naroda. U ovom kratkom tekstu, pisanom za zbornik radova na temu "Tradicija", pokazujemo da nastojanje sudova da na smislen naÄin pomire etnokratske i graÄanske elemente ustava koje tumaÄe Äesto ostaje pravno nepodobno. PrimjeÄujemo i fenomen u politiÄkom suoÄavanju sa sudskim odlukama po ovom pitanju, kojeg smo oznaÄiti kao "diskontinuitet tradicije", a koji u BiH neminovno prethodi svakom izmiĆĄljanju tradicije.
Skinuti sa SSRN (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383544) "
This document is in Bosnian language. Download from SSRN (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383544)
Jedna od brojnih specifiÄnosti bosanskohercegovaÄkog ustavno-pravnog sistema jeste (hiper)aktivna uloga sudova u razmatranju koncepta "tradicije" kao jednog od vitalnih nacionalnih interesa tzv. konstitutivnih naroda. U ovom kratkom tekstu, pisanom za zbornik radova na temu "Tradicija", pokazujemo da nastojanje sudova da na smislen naÄin pomire etnokratske i graÄanske elemente ustava koje tumaÄe Äesto ostaje pravno nepodobno. PrimjeÄujemo i fenomen u politiÄkom suoÄavanju sa sudskim odlukama po ovom pitanju, kojeg smo oznaÄiti kao "diskontinuitet tradicije", a koji u BiH neminovno prethodi svakom izmiĆĄljanju tradicije.
Skinuti sa SSRN (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383544) "
Research Interests:
Constitutional Law, International Law, American Legal and Constitutional History, Private International Law, U.S. Congress, and 36 moreUnited Nations, Comparative Constitutional Law, Public International Law, International Law and Global Justice (in Law/International Law), International law (public and private), State Constitutional Law, Constitutional Theory, International Constitutional Law, History of International Law (or Law of Nations), Constitutionalism, Constitutional Politics, International Public Law, Enumeration, Constitutional History, Public International Law, Private International Law, European Union Law, War of the Confederation, Role of United Nations in Conflict Resolution, International law, international relations, human rights law, international humanitarian law, international organisations, law and politics, Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, Constitution, Public International Law; International Economic Law, Land Law; Equity and Trusts, Comparative Constitutional Law, International. Regional and National Human Rights Law, Rights of Vulnerable Groups, Media Intrusion of Privacy Right Need for Regulation, Model United Nations, Constituionalism and Constitutional Law, Legitimacy of Secession Under the Right to Self-Determination, State Responsibility for Supporting Terrorism , Coup D'Etats, Protection from Invasion of Privacy, Privacy Rights, Personal Information, Legal History, constitutional history, law and society, The Law of Nations, Independence Constitution, December 4, 1950 U.S. Supreme Court Feres Doctrine Rule of Law, EU Administrative and Constitutional Law, The Constitution of the United States of America, apotheosis, Constitutional Law Theory, Supreme Law of the Land, and Supreme Lawedit
Research Interests:
"No weakening, but rather an expansion, of statehood can be observed in the contemporary world. This does not, on the other hand, imply that extensive forms of constitutional ordering do not exist outside the realm of states. Instead, the... more
"No weakening, but rather an expansion, of statehood can be observed in the contemporary world. This does not, on the other hand, imply that extensive forms of constitutional ordering do not exist outside the realm of states. Instead, the evolution of world society has been characterized by a protracted dual movement where the expansion and densification of statehood and autonomous forms of transnational ordering gradually emerged in a mutually constitutive fashion. One implication of this is that neither the concept of the state nor the concept of nonstate transnational entities is adequately capable of delineating the object of constitutional analysis. Instead, the concept of normative orders has been introduced as an overarching category capable of identifying the contexts within which constitutional ordering emerges.
Subsequently, a distinction between the internal and external dimensions of the law of normative orders has been introduced, specifying them as respectively oriented towards establishing internal condensation of a given normative order and external compatibility between different normative orders. With this background, a framework for the analysis of constitutional frameworks of normative orders is developed. The central element is a distinction among three dimensions: First, a constitution implies a coupling between a constitutional object, in the form of a hierarchical organization of a given normative order capable of reproducing an autonomous source of authority, and a concordant legal framework. Second, constitutionalization implies a coupling between an internal reconstruction of an external constitutional subject within the constitutional object, and the register of legal rights, establishing a framework for exchanges between the constitutional object and the wider world as represented by the constitutional subject. Third, constitutionalism denotes the institutionalization of a double function, in the form of a principle-based and legally fortified striving toward universal inclusion, providing a sense of direction in time through an articulated form of constitutional consciousness.
The insights developed are briefly illustrated by the case of the global Fairtrade Certification System.
"
Subsequently, a distinction between the internal and external dimensions of the law of normative orders has been introduced, specifying them as respectively oriented towards establishing internal condensation of a given normative order and external compatibility between different normative orders. With this background, a framework for the analysis of constitutional frameworks of normative orders is developed. The central element is a distinction among three dimensions: First, a constitution implies a coupling between a constitutional object, in the form of a hierarchical organization of a given normative order capable of reproducing an autonomous source of authority, and a concordant legal framework. Second, constitutionalization implies a coupling between an internal reconstruction of an external constitutional subject within the constitutional object, and the register of legal rights, establishing a framework for exchanges between the constitutional object and the wider world as represented by the constitutional subject. Third, constitutionalism denotes the institutionalization of a double function, in the form of a principle-based and legally fortified striving toward universal inclusion, providing a sense of direction in time through an articulated form of constitutional consciousness.
The insights developed are briefly illustrated by the case of the global Fairtrade Certification System.
"
"To state that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the court) has become a victim of its own success is an oft-repeated mantra. Yet to ring the death knell for what is undoubtedly the most successful international human rights... more
"To state that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the court) has become a victim of its own success is an oft-repeated mantra. Yet to ring the death knell for what is undoubtedly the most successful international human rights project is premature. While the court is facing an unsustainable caseload under its current formation, the solution is not to abandon the court
altogether, but to find a structure that facilitates the accommodation of this burdensome caseload.
While Protocol 14âpermitting a single judge to rule on admissibilityâhas eased the court backlog somewhat,1 this impact has only been on cases which are "clearly inadmissible". Reform of the court is still needed if it is to adequately deal with the huge numbers of cases that meet the requirement of admissibility, and the backlog of such cases that have yet to be adjudicated upon.2 In this article, we argue that although the large backlog of cases currently stifling the ECtHR is a
direct result of the individual complaints procedure, nevertheless, the importance of this procedure as the "crown jewel"3 in the ECHR system cannot be foregone. Our proposed model for restructuring the ECtHR preserves such right of individual petition while facilitating the expedition of constitutionalist complaints. We argue that Chambers of the ECtHR should focus on adjudicatory cases and their procedure should be simplified, whereas the Grand Chamber should be reserved for pronouncing
upon constitutionalist issues only. While Draft Protocols 15 and 16 contain provisions that can emphasise the separation between the adjudicatory function of the Chambers and constitutionalist function of the Grand Chamber, we argue that further reforms may be needed and these reforms
should be based on the idea of functional separation between the Grand Chamber and other courtâs formations."
altogether, but to find a structure that facilitates the accommodation of this burdensome caseload.
While Protocol 14âpermitting a single judge to rule on admissibilityâhas eased the court backlog somewhat,1 this impact has only been on cases which are "clearly inadmissible". Reform of the court is still needed if it is to adequately deal with the huge numbers of cases that meet the requirement of admissibility, and the backlog of such cases that have yet to be adjudicated upon.2 In this article, we argue that although the large backlog of cases currently stifling the ECtHR is a
direct result of the individual complaints procedure, nevertheless, the importance of this procedure as the "crown jewel"3 in the ECHR system cannot be foregone. Our proposed model for restructuring the ECtHR preserves such right of individual petition while facilitating the expedition of constitutionalist complaints. We argue that Chambers of the ECtHR should focus on adjudicatory cases and their procedure should be simplified, whereas the Grand Chamber should be reserved for pronouncing
upon constitutionalist issues only. While Draft Protocols 15 and 16 contain provisions that can emphasise the separation between the adjudicatory function of the Chambers and constitutionalist function of the Grand Chamber, we argue that further reforms may be needed and these reforms
should be based on the idea of functional separation between the Grand Chamber and other courtâs formations."


