Moral Philosophy

"Natural Theology (1802) is the classic statement of the argument for the existence and goodness of God from the world He has created. It begins with the famous analogy of the world, and the various creatures in it, to a watch: clearly the fruit of design and contrivance. Using memorably clear language, Paley took examples especially from medicine, natural history and Newtonian physics to establish how organisms were beautifully adapted for their environment, and how enjoyable life was. Although Paley died two hundred years ago his book is frequently mentioned by modern authors. It is even sometimes supposed that Paley invented the argument from Design to a Designer; and that when Charles Darwin published the Origin of Species in 1859 Paley's book became obsolete. In fact, he was part of a long, successful tradition of British natural theology that stretched from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. But his approach did have critics, within the churches as well as from opponents of organised religion: the book was always controversial.

In this new edition based on the original 1802 text, Matthew D Eddy and David Knight consider what made the book so effective, and tie it to key issues in evolutionary science, theology, and philosophy. It provides a helpful introductory essay that explains the relationship between nature and religion with reference to the social, literary, scientific and theological context of the Enlightenment and Victorian era. It also contains a chronology of Paley’s life, a bibliography of critical studies and over 20,000 words of explanatory notes that identify and unpack key concepts, authors, and publications that Paley used to build his argument.

This edition has now gone through a number of reprintings and will be published in Chinese in 2014."

Greg Janzen has recently criticised my defence of Frankfurt’s counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by arguing that Jones avoids killing Smith in the counterfactual scenario. Janzen’s argument consists in introducing a new thought-experiment which is supposed to be analogous to Frankfurt’s and where the agent is supposed to avoid A-ing. Here I argue that Janzen’s argument fails on two counts, because his new scenario is not analogous to Frankfurt’s and because the agent in his new scenario does not avoid A-ing.

This paper seeks to address the moral obligations of certain oppressed persons. In it, I argue that while the victims of oppression do have a moral duty to resist their oppressors, in some cases the obligation is met by achieving a state of happiness – that happiness is itself a form of resistance. Furthermore, it discusses some of the objections which may be levied against the main position defended in this paper.

"Come apparirebbe il mondo visto attraverso la filosofia
di Baruch Spinoza? Come cambierebbero le nostre vite
accettando di leggere gesti ed eventi quotidiani con occhiali
diversi? Il fortunoso rinvenimento di un manoscritto
anonimo è l’occasione per tentare una risposta a
simili interrogativi. Cercando di interpretare questo testo
misterioso, viene mobilitato il pensiero mitico-filosofico
di Parmenide e la filosofia del linguaggio di Vico, nonché
la morale di Spinoza e Petrarca. Ne risulta un sentiero
aperto su panorami insoliti e talvolta impervi, deciso a
condurre il lettore-esploratore verso alcune delle dottrine
più decisive della tradizione filosofica occidentale ma che
pure ancora attendono di essere ripensate con spirito
nuovo. Come quell’Alta Via dei Monti Liguri che s’inerpica
su crinali avvolti di boschi e mare, anche questo
testo disegna il tracciato di un cammino di ricerca che
vorrebbe tentare di far spazio, nel rumore della vita di
tutti i giorni, al silenzio da cui trae origine il pensiero."

Est-il légitime d’employer la notion moderne d’ « honneur » à propos de la République romaine antique ? Les Romains de cette époque obéissaient-ils à un code de conduite strict ? Sur quoi fondaient-ils le prestige social ? Quelles marques de distinction employaient-ils et à quelles fins ? Telles sont quelques-unes des questions auxquelles cet ouvrage tente de répondre. Pour ce faire, l’auteur analyse trois notions romaines, honos, honestum et honestas, qui recouvrent des objets socio-politiques (marques d’honneur, prestige, charges publiques) et des données morales (dignité de la conduite, bien éthique). Cette diversité est appréhendée dans l’ouvrage par une approche plurielle, relevant de la sémantique, de la sociologie et de l’histoire des idées. L’étude préalable du sens de ces termes dans les textes latins débouche ainsi sur l’examen des pratiques d’hommage et d’honorabilité dans la vie des Romains. Confrontant ensuite la pratique à la théorie, l’ouvrage étudie la manière dont ces trois notions ont été employées comme thèmes littéraires, instruments idéologiques et concepts philosophiques chez les auteurs latins de la République.

Demosthenes, I’ll show, has a realistic, non-ideological sense of the elemental flaws of democracy: The ambition and cunning of the few (politicians, etc.)(F1); the want of courage and smarts in the many (ordinary citizens)(F2); the general imprudence and equal fallibility of all (F3); the basic lack of human self-sufficiency (F4). Given the last two, he would find the idea of basing politics on the sufficiency of either moral virtue or expertise dangerous—blue-eyed anyway. Because the first two could be said to be inherent traits in all majorities and elites, any straightforwardly authoritarian or paternalistic scheme is ruled out in fact. Instead, the defects are to be counteracted by making sure all citizens have the best information available and by strengthening their basic capacity for critical thinking and ethical choice. Demosthenes is that rarest of creatures: An intellectual who actually believes popular rule is better than other forms of government.

My paper aims at reconstructing the way – still fertile and up-to-date – in which Murdoch, at the beginning of her career, conceived and practiced moral philosophy. First of all, the research in moral philosophy is devoted to a clarification of the nature of moral life: at this level, Murdoch takes position against the fact-value dichotomy, affirms our original involvement with the good and illustrates the role of imagination. Secondly, the moral philosopher explores the forms assumed by practical life in the present time: to put in order this exploration, a fundamental concept is that of social imagery. Finally, moral philosophy takes part in the symbolic conflict oriented to an understanding of the good, and enriches it by courageously forging new representations and new ethical concepts.