Strategy

This paper reports on the influence the volume an organisation buys from alcoholic beverage suppliers has on their service quality expectations. The primary alcoholic beverage focus areas used in this study in the North West Province were Rustenburg, Mafikeng and Potchefstroom. A non-probability judgment sample method was used, and the sample size quantity was 220 respondents. The questionnaire requested respondents (high and low-volume) to rank their customer service expectations and opinions with reference to Parasuramans’s service delivery dimensions. Ranking was done using a five-point Likert scale. The findings of the study indicated that both the high and low-volume customers felt that alcoholic beverage supplying companies had to deliver on all five service delivery dimensions but failed to do so to full satisfaction. There were also differences between the high and low-volume customers’ opinions and expectations. Thus, the results indicated that there are differences between customers’ (high and low-volume) expectations and opinions of service delivery from alcoholic beverage supply companies. These findings, if used strategically and as a guideline, can improve an alcoholic beverage supply company’s retention and profit growth.

In terms of volume SABMiller plc (SABMiller) was the second largest brewer in the world operating in over 75 countries and with about 200 odd brands. SABMiller's portfolio of business spanned over six Continents (Africa, Asia Pacific, Europe, Latin America, South Africa and North America). SABMiller was also one of the largest bottlers of Coca-Cola Products. SABMiller nurtured strong, local brands to suit the tastes of consumers in each of the markets it operated. Of the many strategic priorities, SABMiller strived to raise the profitability of local businesses by adopting sustainable development in its corporate agenda. While doing business SABMiller was able to provide jobs, pay taxes and generate economic value to distribute to all the stakeholders, including the government and the local communities. SABMiller had come to realise that its success was linked to the communities where it operated and decided to respond to the changing needs of the society. The company devised strategies to combat the abuse of alcohol and conserve water through several initiatives. However, analysts were wondering whether SABMiller's sustainable development initiatives would pay-off in the long-run to develop new revenue opportunities as envisaged by the management.

In 1997, Peter Brabeck (Brabeck) became the CEO of Swiss Food major Nestlé SA (Nestle). One of ambitious growth targets of Brabeck was to find ways to increase the annual sales of SFr90 billion. However, Brabeck realised that un-competitiveness had seeped into Nestle. The management had no other option but to draw up a new model or split the company. Brabeck chose to decentralise and reorganise the factories located in different countries into regions (Zones) and also created 'strategic business units' (SBUs) to oversee the management of similar products. The reportable business segments included, Zone Europe (ZEUR), Zone Americas (ZAMS) and Zone Asia, Oceania and Africa (ZAOA). For Nestle, ZAOA represented 76% of world's population, of which China and India were the most populous countries. Nestle considered India a growth engine and believed that opportunities for growth existed not only in the rural and smaller towns but also at the top-end of the market pyramid. In keeping with the belief, Nestle over the last decade, focused more on the mass market and failed to tap the opportunities at the upper end of the market. Having realised the folly, Nestle redrew its strategy to focus on premium end of the market. However, uncertainties like slow economic growth and consumption contraction in the Indian market as well as in the emerging markets remained a major concern for the company.

Purpose – The purpose of the article is to share certain findings of a five-year investigation.

Design/methodology/approach – It draws upon under-pinning research reports and analysis of early adoptions of what the evidence suggests is the most affordable route to high performance organisations.

Findings – Many corporate culture change programmes are unnecessary if their purpose is to quickly change behaviours and can be problematic in organisations that need to embrace a diversity of cultures and a variety of approaches and behaviours across different functions and business units.

Practical implications – Performance support can be a cost-effective way of changing behaviour, ensuring people remain current and competitive and delivering multiple objectives without requiring a change of culture or structure.

Originality/value – The article suggests that a “new leadership” and shift of emphasis is required.