Paul Sahni

It is not difficult to argue that Max Weber has outlived all his competitors in the classical tradition. His ideas have inspired scores of sociologists in a host of areas for more than sixty years. The contemporary vitality of these ideas is in no small measure due to the fact that he is the most salient advocate of modernism and that he has both resisted and vindicated some of postmodernism’s most cogent criticisms of modern social science and society. This essay first reviews what three recently published books have to say about Weber’s liberal pluralism and his significance in the new century and postmodern legacy. Following this is a critical commentary that discusses how the modernist and postmodernist facets of his theory of
rationalization frame the books’ shared interest in his relevance for our present-day concerns with diversity and the value of scientific inquiry and expansion of substantive rationality. Lastly, I conclude with some reflections regarding the reasons for the perennial standing of Weber’s sociology and the challenges it faces.

The centrality of judges in Max Weber’s theory of legal rationalization and their residual status in his ‘Sociology of Law’ are discussed. The vital role he assigns to judges is exposed by privileging his frequently overlooked discussion of
the anti-formal tendencies in modern law. Their minimized standing in his comparative examination of the Continental and the English administrations of justice is explained by foregrounding the influence exerted on him by the ideals of
Pandectist jurisprudence, as revealed in his Critique of Stammler, and by the politico-legal context in which he wrote, as evinced in his assessment of the Free Law Movement.

The first article of the International Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, reads: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” International Law has a long history, one that is largely rooted in Western economic and geo-political developments. As the above quotation makes apparent, however, it is also most firmly and explicitly rooted in Enlightenment ideals and thus, like all law, anchored in constellations of substantive value postulates that are ethical, philosophical, religious, and utilitarian in nature (Weber, 1978:654-658).
It has recently been argued that Durkheim, a founding father of the sociology of law, showed much less interest in regulatory law which, of course, was less prevalent at his time than it is today, and that his now classic analytical reliance on punitive and restitutive forms of law, to put it lightly, is in need of supplementation (Cotterrell, 1999:69-70), particularly in light of the variety of legal forms with which we are faced today. The verity of these observations, however, does not mean that his writings have nothing to say to us. To the contrary, insofar as he emphasizes the intimate relationship between law and morality  and, in this connection, the role of the state, in conjunction with the fact that his substantive political conceptions came to fruition in a time when the drive towards international regulative law was intensifying, Durkheim articulates a score of sociological and, in particular, normative conceptions which are wholly coterminous with the self-understanding and legitimation which currently governs the relation between states, viz., International Law.  In this latter sense, his paradigm proves to be particularly revealing, to the extent that his political philosophy is wholly commensurate with the strongly ‘ideal’ nature of International Law. For, both proffer a framework which defies some of the most fundamental assumptions that have shaped the continental politico-legal tradition and, therefore, Austin’s (1955) perennial treatment of the rule of law as a domestic order that is, in the final instance, backed up by the coercive force of the state, the sole and final arbitrator of basic norms.
In what follows, I explore the relevance of Durkheim’s thought with respect to International Law’s markedly inter-state order and reliance on a distinct conception of human right. Mindful of the sociological and political levels of his writings, it is argued that their strength lies in providing a causal empirical analysis regarding the development of a modern world order, as well as a normative discussion of what it ought to consist of. Conversely, it will also be observed that his long recognized confusion of these two levels of his sociology, along with his expansive analytical categories and complete neglect of the question of power, continue to stand as its most severe shortcomings. Towards this goal, I begin by first explicating the two levels of Durkheim’s explication of human dignity, before then turning to his perception of the centrality of the state in terms of promoting rational dialogue, and a sense of humanity and brotherhood. Finally, I conclude with an assessment and critical evaluation of the bearing of his thought at present.

Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and Politics as a Vocation are interpreted in light of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and Faust.The significance of Goethe’s faith in human striving, the renunciation of wholly contemplative aspirations, and the subsequent undertaking of a specialised vocation are
discussed. Following this, the way in which these themes influenced substantive dimensions ofWeber’s sociology is developed. This explication contends that Goethe’s
vision of active asceticism, the motivational power of conviction, and a transcendent deed which contributes to the vitality of future generations, influenced Weber’s understanding
of meaningful and responsible social and political action.

Over the past four decades the field of Weberian scholarship has enjoyed a sustained period of diversification and expansion. To a considerable extent, this process has been driven by a series of attempts to unearth the ‘true Weber’, that is, to define his central question (Fragestellung) and outline the thematic unity (Gesamtdeutung) of his oeuvre. However, as his own conception of the inevitability of rationalization towards the irrational would predict, the result has been the proliferation of a multiplicity of Max Webers. This most important reason for his continued, and arguably dominant, sociological standing also speaks directly of the field’s present-day vitality. This essay first considers what three recently published books have to say about issues of interest in Weber studies today, including subjects ranging from
Weber’s agrarian and physico-anthropological sociology, to his academic reception, methodological writings and relation to postmodern theory. Following this, I provide a critical commentary on the books’ shared interest in the substantive
underpinning of Weber’s methodology, with an emphasis on the sociology of law and on his early work (pre-1898) and reception in particular, in light of current developments and areas of investigation. Lastly, I submit some concluding
reflections regarding the reasons for the continuing relevance of Weber’s sociology for modern social thought.