29 September Monday, 2014

 We need to make use of every opportunity that reveals itself in order to normalize political relations with Egypt. We can start doing so by choosing our words more carefully when addressing Egypt. Cabinet changes made after the August presidential election can provide Turkey a window of opportunity to make some new adjustments.

Turkey-Egypt relations have numerous aspects worth discussing in detail. In this short article of mine, I want to focus on three headlines which cannot be ruled out considering the current state of bilateral relations, namely our two nations’ cultural, economic, and political ties.

Cultural relations

When we are talking about Turkey’s relations with Egypt, we often underline our shared historical heritage of four centuries under Ottoman rule, yet our relations with Egypt are not limited to those associated with our common Ottoman past. 

Turks’ presence in Egypt dates back to 868 AD, when Tolunoğlu Ahmed came to Egypt together with tens of thousands of Turks from Central Asia who would later help him build his own army upon being appointed as the governor of Egypt by the Abbasid Caliph. In the following eleven centuries up until 1952, it was Turks who ruled over Egypt. Due to such a deep-rooted historical background, which is either not known by many or at least not emphasized, when talking with almost all Egyptians one can observe mixed feelings about Turks and Turkey that range from admiration and envy to hatred and fear.

The first Turkish newspaper produced during the Ottoman era, Vaka-i Mısriye, was first published in Cairo in 1828. Also, Western classics were translated into Turkish for the first time in Cairo, rather than in İstanbul.

When formulating policies on Turkey-Egypt relations, we should not ignore the richness of our shared heritage but take into account its downsides as well as its upsides. 

Economic relations

Turkey managed to build fairly strong economic ties with Egypt under toppled President Hosni Mubarak. An industrial park, exclusively for the use of Turkish businesses, was built at Borg al-Arab, located approximately40 km southwest of Alexandria. Over 250 Turkish companies made large investments in Egypt. Because these businesses provide employment for many Egyptians, the current military regime cannot be expected to shut them down without an excuse. Nonetheless, it can also be said that the regime will not show much tolerance towards Turkish companies in their country either. 

Political relations

Egypt is the largest country in the Middle East with a population of 85 million. It is also the uncontested leader of the Arab world. The headquarters of the Arab League is located in Cairo, and its general secretary is usually elected from a pool of Egyptian candidates. In the Arab world, if Egypt is unwilling to do something, it cannot easily be done. Egypt is also the most important member of the African Union. It was one of the three leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, the importance of which has been reduced under today’s circumstances. Egypt’s diplomacy is well-established and many of its intellectuals are world-renowned. It would be a tragically inaccurate assessment to regard Egypt as a country with decreased influence based solely on the arduous phase though which it is currently passing.

Turkey, under the rule of the AK Party, surmised that the transformation in the Middle East following the Arab Spring was the precursor of an era to be marked by stability under the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) ideology. Such an assessment did not warrant criticism under the circumstances of the time, but the unique domestic dynamics of every single country touched by the Arab Spring meant that each set out on a different evolutionary path. While the MB stayed in power but had to take a step back in various fields in Tunisia, the state’s authority couldn’t evenbe asserted at all in Libya. In Egypt the MB was overthrown, and in Syria different factions within the MB began infighting.

Turkey was the country which voiced the loudest criticism of the process that culminated in Mohamed Morsi’s dismissal. It did the right thing when it unreservedly declared the elected president’s ousting as a military coup. But the military administration of General el-Sisi, who staged the coup, was uncomfortable with the vehement manner in which Turkey’s expressed its concerns and with the strong language used by the Turkish government when addressing the new regime in Cairo. As a result, the regime in Egypt declared the Turkish ambassador in Cairo persona non grata. People from my generation whose careers in diplomacy started in the 1960s can easily empathize with this attitude assumed by the Egyptian authorities because they were also obliged to argue in favor of military coups, which used to be a decadal occurrence in Turkey, in the face of foreigners.

If Turkey makes the sweeping assumption thatthe opinions of a single MB faction, the one with which it has direct contact, represent the entire MB’s consensus view, its assessment would be unsound. Moreover, considering the MB’s tendencies to be the shared tendencies of all Egyptian people would be an even more desperate stretch, because in Egypt there is a solid opposition, led by Coptic Christians, liberals, and seculars, which opposes the MB’s policies. 

General Sisi’s junta, which toppled Morsi, considers the MB an illegal movement much like Turkey did the PKK 10-15 years ago. And just like the evolution of Turkey’s perception of and interaction with the PKK, in line with its aim of resolving the conflict in question Egypt will sooner or later make its peace with the MB through democratic means because the MB, as a popular movement, is deeply-rooted in the social fabric of Egypt. As democracy inevitably gains currency in Egypt, the MB’s power will be reflected in the polls in one way or another, but when this will happen is unclear. Nonetheless, allowing Turkey’s relations with Egypt to remain tense in the meantimewill only deteriorate the long-term prospects of Turkish diplomacy and interests in Egypt. 

Additionally, Egypt regards Hamas in the same way Turkey regards PKK-affiliated groups in Northern Syria and the Qandil Mountains. If Turkey wants to help Hamas, doing that in coordination with Egypt will increase the likelihood of success.Without winning over Cairo, assistance provided to Hamas will be missing a vital component. And in the case that Egypt disregards us; our efforts to support Hamas will probably reach an impasse. It is commonly known that the Rafah Border Crossing between Gaza and Egypt is the only artery that allows for the sustainment of Gaza today. Cairo is well aware that it holds such unmatched leverage over Gaza and the countries wishing to support it. Therefore, we cannot neglect Egypt’s strong influence over Gaza and Hamas. Even if it didn’t hold such a trump card, Egypt would still be able to block any process throughout the Arab world which it deems undesirable.

What to do?

Turkey should design its foreign policy toward Egypt in line with two separate targets, one for the short-term, and the other for the long-term.

Its long-term target concerns the Middle East as a whole, including Egypt.

Despite our shared, deep-rooted history with the region, Turkey is less familiar with the Middle Eastthan even many Western countries. Turkey is not well-equipped to read and gauge developments in Egypt and throughout the region, therefore it observes and follows developments in the Middle East through Western sources, and its assessments are made based on information prepared and processed by Westerners. Furthermore, Ankara runs into difficulties in seeing the big picture when it tries to directly gather information from fieldwork because its human capital is insufficient. The number of Turkish personnel who have full command of Arabic is much less than the number of their Western counterparts. By and large, Turkish universities lack research centers for Arabic studies. Think-tanks and similar institutions in our country are also largely incapable of going into greater depth on subjects concerning the Middle East. These think-tanks don’t have permanent offices in Cairo or other Middle Eastern capitols. To quote an article written several years ago by CIA Analyst Graham Fuller, “the Turkish foreign service almost prides itself on not training any experts who know Arabic”. Even though we take cognizance of the issue now, career employees working for the Foreign Ministry are still not sufficiently encouraged to study Arabic when compared with the support their Western colleagues receive therefor from their respective governments.

In order to rectify our deficiency in this regard in the long-term, it would be fitting for us to generate consistent and realistic policies that will be implemented as soon as possible.

In the short-run, we need to make use of every opportunity that reveals itself in order to mend our political ties with Egypt.We can start doing so by choosing our words more carefully when addressing Egypt. Cabinet changes made after the August presidential election can provide Turkey a window of opportunity to make some new adjustments. At this current juncture, the hardest task before us is providing an honest answer to the question, “did we do anything wrong in our actions until now?”

We also need to try to understand the expectations and demands of social segments of Egypt other than the MB’s grassroots. Those expectations and demandsmay not be in line with Ankara’s desires and vision, but it isn’t up to Turkey to criticize and judge the Egyptian people based on what they want. 

Today, Turkey does not have ambassadors in three major Middle Eastern capitals: Cairo, Damascus, and Tel-Aviv. This situation makes it harder for Turkey to play an active role in the restructuring phase through which the Middle East is currently passing. Turkey needs to take the initiative in putting an end to this dismal state of affairs. Diplomacy is definitely a sensitive craft, and adeptness is required precisely at times like these.

(Yaşar Yakış is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and former Ambassador to Egypt.)