Defense Reform

This article examines a ten-year failure to adapt US security policy to post-Cold War realities and assesses how well three different concepts of military transformation correspond to these new realities. Originally published as a chapter in Security After 9/11: Strategy Choices and Budget Tradeoffs by the Security Policy Working Group, January 2003.

While the missile component of Multi-Domain Operations may be beyond the New Zealand Army’s reach, the cyber, space, communications, and integration component is vital. Australia and the United States are among our closest partners. So how should the New Zealand Army adapt?

This paper analyses the relationship between national security policymaking and the defence sector. The goal is to understand how a lack of attention to national security policymaking affects the defence sector and vice-versa using Brazil as a case study. Our main argument is that a lack of attention in national security policymaking by civilian elites can weaken political controls over the armed forces, inhibit effective defence reforms that challenge military prerogatives, and, over time, reinforce militarization in national security policymaking, especially in its three main pillars: defence, intelligence, and public safety. We call this process national security neglect. Our case study shows that as internal security challenges grew in complexity, civilian political elites pushed the military to dealing with public safety, border security, and national security policymaking. Civilians also delegated civilian posts to the armed forces in defence, public safety and intelligence, instead of engaging in broader reforms. This led to a vicious cycle of military dependency, deteriorated the already fragile political controls over the armed forces, inhibited defence reforms, and increased the military role in the state and society.

In the aftermath of the Kremlin’s 2008 war with Georgia and its 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO realized that Russian aggression could not go unchecked. The Alliance needed a robust and coherent response to prevent Kremlin revanchism and ensure European stability. Led by American forces deploying to Poland and the Baltic states, NATO initiated a series of assurance, deterrence, and defensive measures along its Eastern Flank. But they soon learned that without the ability to move military assets quickly and easily across Europe, they could not achieve credible deterrence.

The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and the International Center for Defence and Security (ICDS) have partnered to tackle this problem-set in a groundbreaking new report, “Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War.” Authors LTG (Ret.) Ben Hodges, Tony Lawrence, and COL (Ret.) Ray Wojcik begin by dissecting the three primary obstacles: (1) legal and procedural obstacles; (2) constraints imposed by the limited capacity of infrastructure; and (3) coordination, command, and control. They then suggest a way forward. In order to establish effective deterrence, Western allies need to rethink the existing post-Cold War models for military and civilian logistics and infrastructure, and eliminate the legal and procedural obstacles to military mobility in Europe.

Text of Presentation to Einstein Forum, Berlin, 15 Nov 2005. Changes in the nature of warfare, military technology, and the global strategic environment pose new challenges for arms control. The article critically examines new forms of strategic warfare, cyber-war, so-called “precision” conventional warfare, global conventional strike weapons, and less-lethal weaponry.

PDA Briefing Report #18, 05 September 2006.  A net assessment of America’s post-911 security policy shows it to be “pyrrhic” in character: although progress has been made in disrupting Al Qaeda, the broader effect has been to increase the threat to the United States, while weakening the nation’s capacity to respond effectively.

PDA Briefing Memo #43, 05 February 2008. The United States is entering a  period of policy transition, but there is a dearth of new thinking regarding  security policy. The debate remains paralyzed by 9/11 and mesmerized by military primacy. Progress depends on rethinking the role of force.

PDA Briefing Memo #43, 05 Feb 2008. The United States is entering a period of policy transition, but there is a dearth of new thinking regarding security policy. The debate remains paralyzed by 9/11 and mesmerized by military primacy. Progress depends on rethinking the role of military force in US global policy.

Between 1998 and 2008 there was a remarkable surge in US defense spending and military activity abroad. A cost-benefit assessment indicates that the USA has been using its armed forces and military power beyond the limit of their utility. This reports traces the problem to the post-Cold War tendency to pursue missions beyond those of traditional deterrence and defense, and it suggests the elements of an alternative.

The rise in US defense spending between 1998 and 2010 has no precedent in all the years since the Korean war. It most readily compares with two earlier, but lesser spending surges: the 1958-1968 surge of 43% and the 1975-1985 surge of 57%. This report  assesses the recent rise and the factors driving it.

The USA enjoys an abundance of military power, but this is a uniquely expensive asset. The post-Cold War evolution of the Pentagon’s mission set is problematic in terms of cost, effects, and effectiveness. Taken together these issues suggest that the balance among America's security instruments is not a cost-effective one. The report argues for returning to an emphasis on more traditional and reliable crisis response, defense, deterrence, and conflict resolution tasks. This would allow a significant reduction in both the size and activity level of US armed forces. Their activity would become more focused and their goals more discrete, determinate, and realistic.

The sharp rise in the Pentagon’s base budget between 1998 and 2011 (46% in real terms) is substantially due to strategic choice, not security requirements. It reflects a refusal to set priorities as well as a move away from the traditional goals of military deterrence, containment, and defense to more ambitious ends: threat prevention, command of the commons, and the transformation of the global security environment. The geographic scope of routine US military activity also has expanded. Report includes two tables showing base budget growth in various categories and per person between 1986 and 2011

The Sustainable Defense Task Force was formed in response to a request from Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), working in cooperation with Representative Walter B. Jones (R-NC), Representative Ron Paul (R-TX), and Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), to explore possible defense budget contributions to deficit reduction efforts that would not compromise the essential security of the United States. The Project on Defense Alternatives coordinated the work of the Task Force. Carl Conetta drafted the main body of the Task Force report in ongoing consultation with Task Force members who developed or digested proposals from the diverse sources cited in the report. A sub-committee of the Task Force reviewed the final draft before publication. It should not be assumed that all Task Force members endorse all items and sections of the report.

The Sustainable Defense Task Force: Carl Conetta (Project on Defense Alternatives), Benjamin H Friedman (Cato Institute), William D Hartung (New America Foundation), Christopher Hellman (National Priorities Project), Heather Hurlburt (National Security Network), Charles Knight (Project on Defense Alternatives), Lawrence J Korb (Center for American Progress), Paul Kawika Martin (Peace Action), Laicie Olson (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation), Miriam Pemberton (Institute for Policy Studies), Laura Peterson (Taxpayers for Common Sense), Prasannan Parthasarathi (Boston College), Christopher Preble (Cato Institute), Winslow Wheeler (Center for Defense Information)

Prepared for “Economics and Security: Resourcing National Priorities,” a workshop sponsored by William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 19–21 May 2010. Full conference proceedings here: http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA530819