Judicial Politics

In the Matter of: Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC; DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.; Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Acceptance Corp.; Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.; and Asset Backed Securities Corporation Respondents.

ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE AND DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 8A OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECTION 21C OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING FINDINGS, AND
IMPOSING A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

This article combines historical and philosophical analysis to examine and critique the ideas motivating Christian conservative legal activism. Such activists routinely claim to be motivated by a Christian worldview, which they define as a comprehensive explanation of reality that determines all their thinking and action, including their legal activism and argumentation. Examination of the historical and philosophical roots of the concept of worldview identified by Christian thinkers reveals two understandings of the concept: an analytic tool for rationally comparing the evidence for different social philosophies, and a pre-theoretical lens that determines what counts as evidence in the first place. Christian conservatives have largely favored the first sense of worldview as a tool to understand issues like sexuality and gender identity in an essentialist way and to demonstrate with foundationalist logic the rational superiority of their legal conclusions about these issues. However, a comparison of the Christian conservative worldview and the queer theory worldview illustrates how this understanding of worldview as a tool fails because there is no neutral perspective outside of any worldview, from which one could examine and compare one to another. The idea of worldview as a pre-theoretical, historically, and socially contingent lens can be more productive. Embracing this notion of worldview in a personalist way is necessary to build a culture of dialogue that uses narrative to pursue the truth while also respecting and honoring the different perspectives from which these narratives are told.

“La República Federal de Alemania ha pasado de ser un Estado democrático de derecho a un «Estado judicial»”. Con esta contundente aseveración iniciaba Bernd RÜTHERS, profesor emérito en la Universidad de Constanza, el prefacio a la primera edición de su ensayo titulado “Die Heimliche Revolution. Vom Rechtsstaat zum Richeterstaat”, 2014, Mohr Siebeck, Tubinga. Dos años más tarde aparecería publicada una segunda edición (2016, Mohr Siebeck, Tubinga), rematada entonces con un epílogo en el que el autor responde a algunas de las objeciones formuladas contra la primera edición. En ExLibris damos cuenta ahora de la publicación de la versión española de dicha obra, cuya preparación ha corrido a cuenta de Francisco J. CAMPOS ZAMORA (Profesor de la Universidad de Costa Rica) y que ha sido publicada, coincidiendo con el nonagésimo aniversario de Bernd RÜTHERS, a principios del año 2020 por Marcial Pons en su colección Filosofía y Derecho.

Under pressure from a series of criticisms from a retiring judge, Chief Justice Carmody leaps into the fray with a letter to the profession.

However, he fails to deal with one of the three major points of criticism.

This paper analyses what the Chief Justice has achieved and what remains to be done.

As questões esboçadas pela crise política brasileira desafiam muito os esquemas analíticos que vêm sendo usados para o estudo do protagonismo
político das instituições judiciais no Brasil e mesmo, em maior escala, nos países latino-americanos. Pode-se afirmar que uma compreensão mais profunda das diferentes lógicas políticas que perpassam as instituições judiciais
no Brasil e, mesmo nos países latino-americanos, tem como desafio ir além, tanto dos indicadores comparativos de “bom funcionamento das instituições”, quanto das diferentes versões da história política oficial. No primeiro caso, a comparação tende a ocorrer a partir de métricas abstraídas de contextos muito distantes que subsidiam com freqüência pacotes de reformas mobilizados pelas “elites modernizantes” nas disputas políticas locais. No segundo caso, fica-se refém do “efeito da forma” que implica em estudar as “instituições” a partir dos formatos legais e na sua interpretação oficial dada pela ciência produzida pelos atores do jogo político ou judiciário. Ou seja, atribuir-se o incremento das lógicas que perpassam tanto as disputas no interior do campo jurídico, quanto a relação com o poder político apenas a um “efeito de instituição”, por exemplo. Uma análise interpretativa da legitimidade das intervenções do poder judiciário no jogo político implica em incluir como dimensão fundamental o imbricamento das diferentes lógicas que cercam os episódios de hiper-ativismo que podem ameaçar regimes democráticos.

DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.4084.5682
MARIANO SILVA, Jeferson. (2016), Jurisdição constitucional em Espanha (1981-1992) e Brasil (1988-1997. Tese de doutorado (Ciência política). Rio de Janeiro: IESP-UERJ.
O trabalho apresenta um método de análise descritiva das jurisdições constitucionais, pensado como uma ferramenta que permita ampliar os estudos sobre comportamento judicial comparado e especialmente voltado à análise (a) das circunstâncias históricas particulares em que as jurisdições constitucionais são praticadas; (b) do significado político dos discursos que elas produzem; e (c) dos dissensos e consensos jurisdicionais que as constituem. Os procedimentos metodológicos apresentados são aplicados a dois conjuntos de decisões judiciais: as sentenças prolatadas nos julgamentos de Recursos de Inconstitucionalidade, realizados pelo Tribunal Constitucional de Espanha, entre 1981 e 1992, e as prolatadas nos julgamentos de Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade, realizados pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, entre 1988 e 1997. Os resultados decorrentes desses ensaios de aplicação do método inicialmente proposto indicam duas conclusões gerais. De uma parte, é possível distinguir, no comportamento dos juízes constitucionais, divergências consistentemente associadas à natureza política de suas indicações. De outra parte, as clivagens do comportamento judicial, mais ou menos coincidentes com as clivagens políticas presentes no momento de formação das composições dos tribunais constitucionais, não atrelam, necessariamente, o comportamento dos juízes constitucionais às preferências atuais dos atores políticos que os indicaram. Ou seja, as divisões mais gerais do espaço político se propagam no espaço da jurisdição constitucional, porém sofrem, neste último espaço, uma refração, por meio da qual os juízes constitucionais indicados por um grupo político agem, muitas vezes, diversamente dos – e mesmo contrariamente aos – interesses desse grupo.

This article analyses how the politico-legal debate has affected institutional reforms of judicial accountability in Italy since the enactment of the Constitution of the Italian Republic in 1948. It discusses the interaction between measures aimed at reshaping the accountability framework and the underlying political motivation for them.
The aim of this article is not to investigate the practice of holding judges
accountable, which is often termed de facto judicial accountability. The real effects of institutional reform are inferred from the existing literature. Instead, this article analyses the rationales and justifications for institutional reform and argues that it is difficult to ensure a proper and stable balance-of-accountability framework in abstracto and ex ante in a general way, due to the ever-changing underlying socio-political conditions. Fixed, one-size-fits-all templates cannot ensure balance.
More specifically, this article demystifies the myth of the Italian
‘self-governing’ Consiglio superiore della magistratura. According to this myth, the Italian judicial council, made up of a majority of judges charged with administering a system free from political interferences (hence ‘self-governing’), is mostly seen as the tool for independence. As we will see, a self-governing judicial body does not, however, necessarily enhance judicial independence, and can even undermine it under certain circumstances. Italian and international scholars share this conclusion,16 yet the myth still prevails when it comes to analysing
judicial reform in Europe. What is often neglected, as the Italian case can teach us, is that judicial councils are flexible tools for achieving a balance in judicial accountability. The structure of this article is as follows. The first section introduces the essential features of the Italian judiciary and the political background of its evolution during the post-war era of the Italian Republic. Subsequently, the Consiglio superiore della magistratura’s functioning with regard to accountability mechanisms is analysed, followed by a discussion of three key areas of reform affecting judicial accountability: the rules regulating the career system, notably evaluation, promotion, and appointment to specific positions; the rules regulating disciplinary responsibility; and those regulating the civil liability of judges. The last section focuses on the broader repercussions of the Italian case study.

Uma característica das instituições democráticas é a de que elas dão alguma dose de previsibilidade ao sistema político, de modo que os diferentes atores em disputa podem mais facilmente antecipar as ações dos demais. Uma ilustração das vantagens disso talvez seja a defesa que o socialista Karl Kautsky (1964) fez da opção democrática: “Quando as pessoas são despertadas para a ação em uma democracia, há menos risco do que sob o despotismo de que pensamentos e aspirações revolucionários sejam prematuramente provocados, ou que elas desperdicem sua energia em esforços fúteis. Quando a vitória é alcançada, ela não é perdida, mas mantida. E isso é melhor no fim do que a mera excitação palpitante de um novo drama revolucionário.” (the beginning, not an abstract)

Lorsque le ministre belge de la Justice présenta son ambitieux plan de réforme de l'organisation judiciaire devant la Faculté de droit de l'Université libre de Bruxelles 1 , il tint d'emblée à rassurer son public en ses termes : « Ne vous inquiétez pas de mon projet ! Contrairement à mes prédécesseurs, je ne changerai pas un article de vos codes de procédure. Ma réforme est purement managériale ». À cette même occasion, il termina son discours en lançant cette prédiction : « Ma réforme peut très bien ne pas aboutir et le gouvernement peut tomber avant qu'elle ne soit votée au Parlement [ce qui arriva en effet] 2 , mais cela n'a pas d'importance, car mon projet sera nécessairement repris par mes successeurs, quels qu'ils soient ». Et je crois bien qu'il avait raison.

Resumo Comumente, os estudos dedicados à centralização da jurisdição constitucional no Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) adotam, como fundamento, suposta ampliação da segurança jurídica e presumido ganho de eficácia em contexto de crescente demanda do Poder Judiciário. Comparando-se os discursos nos debates legislativos que alteraram o texto constitucional, expandindo os efeitos das decisões do STF, e os dados levantados pela pesquisa “A quem interessa o controle concentrado de constitucionalidade?”, analisou-se, neste artigo, a eficácia do aumento da concentração do controle no STF para a redução da litigiosidade e, consequentemente, da sobrecarga nessa corte. Observou-se que a ampliação dos poderes do STF na adjudicação constitucional, durante os últimos cinquenta anos, não resultou em diminuição da sobrecarga; contudo, as estratégias de seletividade, para reduzir os julgamentos de mérito, foram mais eficazes. Por outro lado, houve a estabilização do número de acórdãos proferidos, fa...

Cox v LSF9 Master Participation Trust and US Bank as Trustee Fraud

Another Homeowner wins an unlawful foreclosure case against U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., U.S. Bank, N.A., U.S. Bancorp, the LSF9 Master Participation Trust, et al, as the Appeals Court remands the case due to lack of standing.

Si bien el reclamo de justicia siempre estuvo más o menos presente en las reivindicaciones de las organizaciones de derechos humanos, hace relativamente poco que se observa un cambio de estrategia y de movilización, convirtiendo al Poder Judicial en el foco de los
discursos militantes de las organizaciones. Este artículo plantea algunas cuestiones acerca del Poder Judicial, su historia, su estructura, su función en el sistema democrático y su incidencia en la efectivización de demandas en materia de cumplimientos de derechos vinculados al pasado reciente.
Ahora bien, ¿cómo se fue conformando esta dinámica institucional que permitió la permanencia del funcionamiento de sectores estatales casi intactos -como es el caso del Poder Judicial- durante el terrorismo de Estado, el Golpe, la transición y consolidación democráticos que ha perpetuado la impunidad durante más de 30 años?

Abstract (D): Die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des Richteramts steht in der Schweiz in einem Spannungsverhältnis zur richterlichen Unabhängigkeit. Dies trifft auch auf das Bundesrichteramt zu: Bundesrichterinnen und Bundesrichter werden vom Schweizer Parlament nach Massgabe des Parteiproporzes gewählt und müssen sich nach Ablauf ihrer 6-jährigen Amtszeit zur Wiederwahl stellen. Aufgrund dieser Besonderheit sind Kandidierende für das Bundesrichteramt faktisch gezwungen, einer Partei anzugehören, um für die Wahl überhaupt in Frage zu kommen. Die 2019 eingereichte Justiz-Initiative möchte eine Abkehr von diesem System erwirken, indem sie vorschlägt, dass die Mitglieder des Bundesgerichts nach einer ersten, durch eine unabhängige Fachkommission vorgenommenen Vorauswahl per Losverfahren bestimmt werden; ausserdem soll deren Amtszeit erst fünf Jahre nach Erreichen des ordentlichen Rentenalters enden. Eine Abwahl durch das Parlament ist nur in schwerwiegenden Fällen vorgesehen. Der vorliegende Beitrag nimmt diese Initiative zum Anlass, um das schweizerische Wahlsystem der Mitglieder des Bundesgerichts kritisch zu beleuchten. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt in diesem Zusammenhang der von Dennis Thompson und Lawrence Lessig entwickelte Begriff der institutionellen Korruption. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass die Justiz-Initiative dazu beitragen kann, diese institutionelle Korruption zu verhindern und die Unabhängigkeit der Bundesrichter(innen) wesentlich zu stärken.

Abstract (E): In Switzerland, the institutional design of the judiciary conflicts with judicial independence. This also applies to the Swiss Federal Tribunal: its judges are elected by the Federal Parliament based on the proportional strength of its political parties, and they must be re-elected after 6 years. Because of this peculiarity, candidates for the federal judicial office are de facto forced to join a political party in order to be elected. The "Justice Initiative", submitted in 2019, seeks to move away from this system by proposing that the members of the Swiss Federal Tribunal be chosen by lot after a pre-screening by an independent commission. Moreover, the initiative proposes that they remain in office until five years after they reach the ordinary retirement age. Recall by the Federal Parliament is only possible in particularly serious cases. The present contribution takes this initiative as an opportunity to critically evaluate the Swiss system of parliamentary elections that applies to Federal Supreme Court judges. In this context, the concept of institutional corruption developed by Dennis Thompson and Lawrence Lessig plays an important role. The article shows that the Justice Initiative can contribute to preventing institutional corruption in the Swiss federal judiciary, and that it can significantly strengthen the independence of Swiss federal judges.

In Indonesia, the Supreme Court justices recruitment have suffered from many influences, giving rise to what has been called political bargaining, associated with a member of Parliament, executive government, the supreme court itself, private lawyers, and many other parties who could count on special treatment by “their judges.” Since the changing of political situation mainly indicated by stepping down of Soeharto by people power in 1998, parliament’s role in judicial recruitment is becoming dominant. In 1999, the Constitution Amendment gave the role to the Judicial Commission in order to minimize political intervention. Even so, there are still many problems which arise during the process. The article try to answer the question as to how the recruitment process of the Supreme Court in Indonesia impacts the independence of the judiciary. The analysis in this essay centers on the institutional position of those in charge of selecting judges. Moreover it explores the extent to which other political institutions can influence the recruitment of judges that will affect independence of the judiciary.

Throughout U.S. history, the two major political parties have switched positions many times on a variety of issues, including whether the United States should intervene more or less in foreign affairs. Are these changes simply the product of historical contingency, or are there structural factors at work that can help explain these developments? To improve our understanding of American party ideologies, this paper applies a historical institutional approach to the question of party ideology development, and shows how party control of government institutions influences the evolution of party ideologies. Specifically, this paper finds that changes in party control of the presidency can help explain changes in party ideologies with respect to foreign policy.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), has developed into the superior authority in the legal order within the European Union (EU). One of the main aspects that factored into accomplishing that mission, was the Courts instrumentally use of “meta-principles of political morality”, like e.g. the principles of rule of law and/or democracy. This paper claims that the fundamental rights doctrine of the CJEU is also used as such a meta-principle of political morality and highlights several reasons for its development.

This article examines judicial challenges to central government power in the Supreme Court of India by analyzing activism and assertiveness in fundamental rights decisions from 1977 to 2007. Based on field research and contextual analysis of politically significant decisions, the article traces patterns of judicial assertiveness in politically significant fundamental rights decisions. During this era, the Court was selectively assertive in challenging the central government in fundamental rights cases. This article provides an explanatory account of the motives and factors that drove the Supreme Court of India‘s selective activism and assertiveness in politically significant fundamental rights decisions. It argues that existing public law theories, including regime politics, institutionalist models, and strategic models, fail to provide a complete account of patterns of judicial assertiveness in the Supreme Court of India. Instead, these theories should be supplemented by focusing o...

Le droit n'a-t-il pas pour mission dans la société libérale de laisser à la porte les différentes conceptions du bien à l'appréciation personnelle et les différentes conceptions du juste à l'appréciation du législateur? D'ailleurs, le désaccord sur ces valeurs porté devant le juge est-il encore un désaccord sur le droit, dès lors qu'on peut penser que dans ces cas, le droit n'est pas encore déterminé? Mais ces questions sont plus théoriques que pratiques, car, de fait ces désaccords sont portés devant les juges et la question est de savoir comment ils les tranchent. Les méthodes de construction de l'accord et du désaccord sur le droit par les juges est ainsi un point d'entrée extrêmement important du point de vue de la politique et de la philosophie morale.

The existence of judicial restraint and judicial activism is very debatable in the judicial world. However, to categorize justices as being either consistent in their decision or being biased on a case by case basis is an overgeneralization. While it is true that in many cases justices vote by party lines, the Supreme Court has also seen many cases in which the decisive vote was cast against party ideology. While consistency in decision-making is not always possible for a variety of reasons, it is also fair to assume that each justice votes in alignment with his or her conscience. This paper analyzes several cases connected to judicial restraint and judicial activism to demonstrate that a clear pattern in decision-making is impossible to determine, and that a correct evaluation can only be made on a case by case basis.

Este artigo aborda a judicialização da política no Brasil a qual tem, nas relações entre Poder Judiciário e Congresso Nacional, sob a égide do discurso constitucional, um dos seus pontos mais controvertidos. A despeito de críticas jurídicas e políticas, é frequente o questionamento dos atos interna corporis do Parlamento, pelas minorias parlamentares, perante o Supremo Tribunal Federal. O presente artigo propõe-se a explorar o controle de constitucionalidade preventivo realizado pelo Tribunal quando provocado por meio de Mandado de Segurança impetrado pelos representantes do povo no Congresso Nacional. Para tal fim, a pesquisa emprega a abordagem proposta pela Judicial Politics, que conjuga Direito e Política, para fazer uma análise exploratório-descritiva das decisões proferidas quanto ao tema, referenciadas no sítio eletrônico do Tribunal, no período de 1980 a 2013. Ao final, com o método indutivo, pretende-se questionar a viabilidade jurídica e os interesses políticos envolvidos na delegação das questões interna corporis para o guardião da Constituição.

PROBLEM: School officials throughout the United States have adopted zero tolerance
policies to address student discipline, resulting in an increase in out-of-school
suspensions and expulsions. The introduction of police on school campuses also
increased the referral of students to the juvenile courts. Although school personnel
generally view zero tolerance policies as a constructive measure, this approach denies
recent research on adolescent brain development that mischief is a foreseeable
derivative of adolescence.
METHODS: A case study method examined one juvenile court’s innovative
multi-integrated systems approach related to the adverse trends associated with zero
tolerance policies.
FINDINGS: A multi-disciplinary protocol resulted in more effective youth assessments
that reduced out-of-school suspensions and school referrals; increased graduation
rates by 20%; and decreased delinquent felony rates by nearly 50%. The
resulting protocol changed how the system responds to disruptive students by
significantly reducing out-of-school suspensions and school referrals, and putting
into place alternatives as well as providing community resources to address the
underlying causes of the behavior.
CONCLUSION: A multi-systems approach that targets the reasons for disruptive
behavior improves student educational and behavioral outcomes.

...scholars now have an easier access to various
kinds of data that can help us understand the legal
systems in post-Communist countries. This allows for
the systematic study of law and politics, and more
broadly, of state-society relations in this part of the
world.

Law & Courts Newsletter of the Law & Courts Section of the American Political Science Association, Volume 24, Number 2
Summer 2015, pages 11-13

Με τις διατάξεις της υποπαρ. Β.3 του άρθρου πρώτου του ν. 4093/2012, όπως τελικά διαμορφώθηκαν με το ν. 4111/2013, επιβλήθηκαν μειώσεις στις συντάξεις του Δημοσίου, δηλαδή των δημόσιων λειτουργών, περιλαμβανομένων των δικαστικών, και των πολιτικών και στρατιωτικών δημόσιων υπαλλήλων.
Με τη σχολιαζόμενη απόφαση 1277/2018 του Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου σε Ολομέλεια, η οποία εκδόθηκε μετά από αγωγή συνταξιούχου αντιπροέδρου του ίδιου του Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου, οι διατάξεις αυτές κρίθηκαν αντισυνταγματικές ως προς την εφαρμογή τους στο σύνολο των δημόσιων λειτουργών και υπαλλήλων. Το δικαστήριο έκρινε ότι οι μειώσεις στις συντάξεις του Δημοσίου αντίκειται στις συνταγματικές αρχές της ισότητας στα δημόσια βάρη (άρθρο 4 παρ. 5), της αναλογικότητας (άρθρο 25 παρ. 1) και της αναλογίας σύνταξης και μισθού ενεργείας, που συνάγεται από το ειδικό συνταγματικό καθεστώς των δημόσιων λειτουργών και υπαλλήλων. 
Το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο εξέδωσε την απόφαση 1277/2018 με τη διαδικασία της πρότυπης δίκης, δηλαδή κατά το άρθρο 108Α του π.δ. 1225/1981, όπως προστέθηκε με το ν. 4055/2012. Δυστυχώς, φαίνεται ότι ο θεσμός της πρότυπης δίκης είναι ευεπίφορος σε (κατα)χρήσεις που επιτρέπουν στο δικαστήριο να ασκεί αφηρημένο έλεγχο συνταγματικότητας χωρίς καμία σύνδεση με την υπόθεση που προκάλεσε τη δίκη, δηλαδή κατ’ αποτέλεσμα να εκφέρει κανονιστικού χαρακτήρα κρίσεις και, άρα, να ασκεί -στην πραγματικότητα, να νοσφίζεται- κανονιστική εξουσία

This Term paper is written on the extra judicial killing and violation of human rights in Bangladesh. Now a day the problem of extra judicial killing is increasing day by day. Extra judicial killing is one kind of crime. Any peaceful man does not expect extra judicial killing. It cataract to the judiciary and the new National Human Rights Commission to make sure that human rights are fully imposed, not least with value to allegations of pain and extrajudicial killings by security forces. The main objectives of this study are to know about concept, nature, and recent statistics of extra judicial killing and also are to understand how the extra judicial killing violates the human rights. Its objective is to know about the laws behind the extra judicial killing. In this study, here use secondary data analysis and data are collected from the journals, articles etc. The major findings of this study are in 2015, 127 people were killed by extrajudicially , 101 were killed in 'crossfire/encounters/gun fights'. And in 2014, 65 persons were killed in 'crossfire/encounters/gunfights.' Among the deceased 42 were killed by RAB, 15 by police, 04 jointly RAB and the Coast Guard. These killings are violating the rules of Bangladesh Constitution, UDHR, and ICCPR etc. It gives a bad picture of the country to other countries. So the government must take some necessary steps to stop these killing.

Responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas desde la teoría de sistemas Magíster 45 VOLUMEN UNIVERSIDAD ANDINA SIMÓN BOLÍVAR, SEDE ECUADOR Toledo N22-80 • Teléfonos: (593-2) 255 6405, 250 8150 • Fax: (593-2) 250 8156 Apartado postal: 17-12-569 • Quito, Ecuador

Notice and Complaint filed on 5/11/22 versus US 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Judges sitting in Richmond, Virginia.

The US 4th Circuit Court of Appeals does not have "subject matter jurisdiction" to process a Reciprocal Disciplinary case when the original Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board Order was void ab initio when entered by the VSB DB based on only Virginia courts having "subject matter jurisdiction" to impose discipline on any attorney practicing law in Virginia.

See VA Code § 54.1-3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title54.1/chapter39/section54.1-3915/

Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/446/719/

By tracing the historical development of the relation between the Chinese Communist Party and China’s courts, this article finds that in order to subjugate the state as a whole to its superior power, the Party has confined judicial power to a ranking order which it has determined and administered. It follows that courts can compel compliance with the law by non-state actors or state actors of lower rank but not by state actors of equal or higher rank than theirs. These arrangements are essential for the Party to maintain its control over judicial affairs of political significance without preempting the capacity of courts to regulate social and economic activities of low or no immediate interests to the Party. These arrangements also contribute to both the authoritarian and paternalistic roles that the Party has assumed in its relation with courts, which explains the puzzling nearly schizophrenic character that courts have displayed in the course of their activities.

Sceptics of judicial review – from Jeremy Waldron to those in the Judicial Power Project – have tended to attribute to their opponents an erroneous prioritisation of “justice” over “legitimacy.” They claim that those who make the case for judicial review do so on the grounds that “judges know best,” and that judicial review therefore helps promote the overall justness of a state’s social order – rather than on the grounds that it helps enhance the overall legitimacy of a state’s authority.

This article interrogates that line of attack. It explores its roots in political theory, particularly the idea that those guilty of it (such as Aileen Kavanagh) follow in John Rawls’ supposed prioritisation of justice over legitimacy. And it turns to republican and later-Rawlsian thinking on these two concepts to see whether it may offer a sound basis upon which the case for judicial review can be made…legitimately.