Russian Foreign Policy

In this study, I compare and contrast the structures and fates of three other unrecognized states – Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, and the NKR. Following this, I hypothesize on the possible futures for the NKR as an independent republic and on the multiparty conflict it symbolizes, as well as the implications of such possibilities on the people of Nagorno-Karabakh.

"First issue of new academic journal. Studia Turkica Mongolica Tibetica Manchurica Sibirica Russica et cetera.

Tartaria Magna is a peer reviewed e-journal in Russian. Editors accept papers and reviews in English and provide Russian translation. We may consider publication of the papers and reviews that have been published in other journals within the period of 3 years. More info: www.tartaria-magna.ru"

This article examines Russian foreign policy towards the “Russian diaspora”. It will be shown that Russian efforts to utilize its diaspora for its own geopolitical ends have come to little. Instead the main successes of Russian compatriot policy have been in cementing its own domestic identity and in placating calls for imperial expansionism from within Russia. To this end, it will be argued that Russia’s soft engagement with its “compatriots” in the Baltic states serves an important domestic function for the Russian authorities while doing little to undermine the internal stability and sovereignty of the Baltic states.  In fact, it is argued that Russia’s application of soft power in the region acts as a pressure valve, tempering Russian imperialism by creating the illusion of meaningful Russian influence.

Russia can be considered both an empire and a subaltern, a duality reflected in Russian foreign policy, especially its promotion of multipolarity. Voices that claim to speak for the subaltern cannot always be trusted, since they often silence and oppress rather than emancipate and empower others.

Резкая и подчас презрительная риторика в адрес Украины усиливает антироссийские политические движения в этой стране. «Мягкая сила» Москвы еще больше пострадает, если после вильнюсского саммита начнется торговая война против одной или более стран «Восточного партнерства».

As Russia recovered from its chaotic days of the 1990s, its leaders became increasingly concerned about their country’s international image and standing. There was also increasing recognition that in the information age formal as well as “new” public diplomacy (PD) have become integral components in any international actor’s pursuit of interests. Hence, as Russia began to clarify its identity and global role – for itself as well as for the international community – it also started to pay increasing attention to its PD, particularly in its “near abroad”, which it still regards as its own sphere of influence, and the West, where it seeks recognition and acceptance. However, Russia’s political and strategic culture does not encourage decentralized and networked approaches, while top-down and state-supported initiatives largely get dismissed as propaganda by the Western public. Given the prevalence of historical stereotypes and selective perception, Russian PD would benefit greatly from relationships between non-state actors, as well as non-traditional and alternative information approaches that harness the potential of new media and social networking. This paper will examine the discussion of PD within Russia and will look at several examples of its practical limitations within the context of New PD.