Post-Soviet Regimes

"This important book analyzes the dubious role of the so-called Democratic Antifascist Youth Movement `Nashi´ in contemporary Russia. Part and parcel of the Putinist project of political stabilization, Nashi dominates state-sponsored youth politics in Russia, communicating demands from official discourse to a young audience. Idealizing the past, present, and future of Putin`s Russia, Nashi mobilized young Russians through its emotional appeal, skillful use of symbolic politics and the promise for professional self-realization. However, the movement`s impact remains limited - mostly due to its internal contradictions.
Based on original and meticulous research, Ivo Mijnssen skillfully picks apart the dynamics underlying Nashi`s influence and furthers a deeper understanding of state-sponsored youth politics in early 21st century Russia.

Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 114

REVIEWS: "Mijnssen clarifies the role that historical consciousness plays in the construction of security politics against domestic and external enemies as well as the translation of these constructions into concrete actions with precise conceptual thinking and clear language. This is an excellent study!" - Heiko Haumann, Professor Emeritus of East European History, University of Basel"

This study examines the role of political factors in attitudes toward World War II in contemporary Ukraine. The question under examination is which factors determine public views of the principal warring sides and their leaders in Ukraine. This paper uses a representative national survey specifically designed for this research project and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 2012. It analyzes the roles of regionalism, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, age, and sex in attitudes toward the Red Army, Soviet partisans, the German Army (Wehrmacht), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the war, as well as toward the wartime leaders of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the UPA. The analysis of the survey data shows that regional values, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, and age have significant effects on views of the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the war and attitudes toward the wartime activities of Joseph Stalin and Roman Shukhevych. Public perceptions of the German Army and Adolf Hitler in Ukraine do not vary much across regions, political parties, and ethnic, language, age, and sex groups.

"A representative survey, which was conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) in all regions with the exception of Crimea as a part of its Omnibus survey from April 29 till May 11, 2014 for my academic study on political regionalism in Ukraine, provides the latest and exclusive data on separatism in the one of the largest European countries in the midst of both a major internal conflict and the biggest post-Cold War conflict between the West and Russia. The survey shows that only the minority of residents of Ukraine (14%) support different forms of separatism, while the majority (53%) favors preserving the current status of their region within unitary Ukraine but with expanded powers. The survey results confirm that the majority of residents of Donbas now back different forms of separatism (54% overall and 61% excluding undecided). There is also significant but varying levels of support for separatism in three neighboring Eastern regions (15%) and in the South (10%). In all other major historical and geographic regions of Ukraine, separatist feelings are marginal or not detectable by the national poll. Specifically, the survey confirms that Rusyn separatism in Transcarpathia lacks significant public support, but the number of the respondents there was insufficient to determine the level of separatist attitudes among its Hungarian minority. This poll shows that the separatist attitudes do not necessarily mean preference for outright secession from Ukraine and formation of independent state or joining another state, which basically means Russia. Autonomy as a part of federal Ukraine is preferred by many separatists, including in Donbas. But regional autonomy with introduction of a federal system of government has currently no visible support in Western Ukraine and it has a marginal support in the Center. Minorities of the respondents in all regions back preserving the current status of their region with existing powers in unitary Ukraine. Preserving current status of their regions within unitary Ukraine but with expanded powers has a majority support in all regions, with the exception of Donbas.
     
The survey also indicates that the presidential elections scheduled for May 25 are unlikely to resolve the lack of the central government legitimacy in Donbas. Some 70% of the respondents in this region say that they either would not go to vote or do not know/unsure which candidate to support. Just 5% residents of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions express the intention to vote for Petro Poroshenko, an oligarch who previously switched his allegiances between the Party of Regions and pro-Western nationalist parties. He currently leads the presidential race with 33% of the national support, which puts him far ahead of other candidates. 

The survey results show that views expressed by the Russian government and media concerning widespread popular support for separatism in all Eastern and Southern Ukraine are unfounded. Crimea and Donbas are not representative of the entire South-East, because they have the much larger ethnic Russian populations and history of separatism. Overall, ethnic Russians in Ukraine are split on the issue of separatism. Similar percentages of ethnic Russians and people with mixed Russian and Ukrainian descent support preservation of the current unitary system (40%), mostly with expanded powers and different separatist options (44%), including joining Russia (18%). In contrast, only 24% of Russian speakers, who include many ethnic Ukrainians, favor secession from Ukraine or regional autonomy in federal Ukraine. 

However, the survey also confirms that the representation of separatism in Donbas by the Ukrainian and the Western governments and the media as small groups of armed Russian agents and local “terrorists,” who lack popular backing in this region, and therefore can be defeated by force is mistaken. In this case, crucial policy decisions in Ukraine, the US, Canada, the EU countries, and Russia are based on misunderstanding or lack of understanding of the regional Ukrainian politics and public preferences. An autonomous Donbas in a unitary state could be a model acceptable by people in different regions. The experience with similar models adopted in  Gagauzia in Moldova and in Crimea in the beginning of the 1990s suggests that this compromise solution might work, even though it cannot guarantee preserving country’s unity in the long run.
 
The survey also shows that during the current conflict, like in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the “Orange Revolution,” it is incorrect to view public opinion in Ukraine concerning separatism as static. This poll, which indicates significant rise in separatist attitudes, was held from April 29 till May 11, 2014 in the midst of the mass burning of pro-Russian separatists in Odessa by the Right Sector and football ultras, the killings of pro-Russian protesters in Mariupol and Krasnoarmisk by special government battalions organized with participation of this far right organization, and unrecognized referendums supporting self-proclaimed republics in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. And last but not least, it demonstrates the need for academic research of such politically controversial but crucial issues in the Ukrainian and global politics. There were political scientists specializing in Ukraine who were warning about possibilities of civil war and break-up of one of the largest European countries before and soon after the current crisis began in November of 2013. "

"The project entitled “How to steal a billion” refers to the contemporary economic history of Russia. The project was the result of a cooperation between the internet portal ‘Economic crime today’ (Russia, http://econcrime.ru/) and the Chair for Macro-Sociology of the University of Konstanz (Germany, http://www.uni-konstanz.de/zakharine/). The primary subject of the investigation was the scandal involving the misappropriation of public funds from the budget of Moscow Region in the period from 2000 to 2008. The true reason for the economic downturn was the continuous misuse of state and public funds, whose resources had been embezzled by a mysterious group of crooks.
Over a long period of time, investors kept purchasing securities issued by a number of state companies hidden behind undecipherable abbreviations like MOITK, IKMO etc.. These companies were overseen by the former Finance Minister of the Moscow Region Alexei Kuznetsov and managed by RIGroup Finance, a joint venture owned by Kuznetsov’s wife Janna Bullock. RIGroup was engaged in the construction of a chain of commercial and entertainment plazas, called ‘Happy Family’ a name full of symbolism. Today five years have passed since the swindle called “Podmoskovye Corporation” was exposed and publicly condemned. But, effectively, little has changed regarding the lack of investment in the Moscow Region. Financial and legal relationships between the former borrowers and the former creditors are not regulated up to date. The authorities need money to perform the tasks which the citizens entrust to them. But no one is about to provide assistance to institutions that have been involved in fraud, corruption and money laundering. No repercussions have followed so far for the officials of the Moscow Region Administration who are alleged to have been the primary beneficiaries of the gigantic financial affair.
The author is analyzing strategies on how companies can successfully participate in the promising market of international money laundering. It was to be demonstrated that the consequences of so-called globalization for national economies worldwide were extremely inconsistent. There is a discrepancy between a weak impact of national states on global markets on the one hand and the free circulation of financial resources, commodities and people on the other hand. The first conclusion that can be extracted from the analysis is that the risks associated with corruption are increasing against the backdrop of wide-spread electronic commerce. There appears to be a growing temptation for state officials to take advantage of their status. High posts in finance have a good chance of being sold at a “higher price” on the world market than offered in the local market. The second conclusion one has arrived at is that international monitoring policy has a week influence on combating corruption. It seems to be due to the wave-like character of media campaigns and a genuine lack of political commitment on the part of quarrelsome independent states.
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Purification rites serve to indicate borders in tribal societies. Newcomers have to wash off traces of the outside world in order to become integrated in a closed community. It is quite usual that elites performing purification rites strive for total control over the financial resources of a clan, a village, or an entire country. Some of these rites turn out to be important with regard to the processes of constitution and reproduction of political elites in postmodern societies. This was the primary argument of a study that analyzed the phenomenon of “bath friendships” between Russian and German politicians from a historical and sociological perspective.

This paper analyzes public perceptions of Joseph Stalin and Stepan Bandera in modern Ukraine. It uses data from a national representative survey conducted in September 2013 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology for this study. The analysis reveals major determinants of attitudes toward the leaders of, respectively, the Soviet Union and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, amid continuing attempts to recast their political identities in contemporary Ukraine.

"Starting from the presidential campaign of 2004, “the hot issues” of history are more and more actively abused in the political technologies of leading parties in order to manipulate electoral preferences.
A special attention in these technologies is given to the Soviet past as connected with the more traumatic memories typical for different electoral groups. In Ukraine, the mobilisation of electorate with the abuses of the past is especially effective because it overlaps with the regional differences.
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This article charts the last decade of Georgian politics through theories of semi-authoritarianism and democratization. It first dissects Saakashvili's system of dominant-power politics, which enabled state-building reforms, yet atrophied political competition. It then analyzes the nested two-level game between incumbents and opposition in the run-up to the 2012 parliamentary elections. After detailing the verdict of Election Day, the article turns to the tense cohabitation that next pushed Georgia in the direction of feckless pluralism. The last section examines if the new ruling party is taking Georgia in the direction of democratic reforms or authoritarian closure.

This qualitative study examines the role of clients in petty corruption by analyzing actual corrupt exchanges between ordinary citizens and low level public and private employees in post-communist Hungary. Using a grounded theory approach, interviews reveal how clients from different social strata deal with low-level agents in corrupt situations. Findings suggest two contrasting forms of low-level corruption: transactions where the client and the agent do not have a prior relationship and where external factors dominate the relationship; and cases with stronger social ties between the actors, where the client has more freedom to structure the transaction. However, a client's social background frequently determines the form of corrupt transaction and the form of resources illegally exchanged in the deal.

This paper examines the emergence and consolidation of the political regime in Azerbaijan (1993--present) in its early stages. The main questions are the following: When did the regime consolidate and what were the circumstances under which the process of consolidation took place? What were the major threats to the status quo? What type of authoritarian regime did emerge and what are its main characteristics?